A

SYSTEM OF ORATORY,

Delivered in a

COURSE OF LECTURES

Publicly read at

GRESHAM COLLEGE,

LONDON.

In TWO VOLUMES.

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SYSTEM OF ORATORY,

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GRESHAM COLLEGE,
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To which is prefixed

An INAUGURAL ORATION,
Spoken in Latin, before the Commencement of the LECTURES, according to the uſual Cuſtom.

By *JOHN WARD*, D.LL. P.R.G,C.
F.R. and A.SS. and T.B.M.

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ORATIO,

Quam in COLLEGIO GRESHAMENSI, cum rhetorices praelegendae provinciam illic ſuſcepit, publice habuit

IOHANNES WARDVS,

v. kal. Nov. MDCCXX.

De Uſu et Praeſtantia Artis Dicendi.

CUM mecum ipſe reputo, quo in loco, quantoſque viros, qui hoc munus ante me peregerunt, ſubſecutus, verba apud VOS, AUDITORES DOCTISSIMI atque HUMANISSIMI, ſum facturus, ſine metu & tremore in conſpectum veſtrum prodire nequeo. Nam, ut in celeberrimo hoc et venerando Muſarum domicilio nihil proferre convenit, quod non ſit cogitatione eximium, doctrinaque politum et elaboratum; ita, quam ſim ab hujuſmodi tam naturae, quam artis praeſidiis imparatus, haud ignoro. Veruntamen, cum collegii hujuſce curatores digniſſimi hanc provinciam rhetorices praecepta tradendi mihi demandare dignati ſint, duae res ſunt, quas

merito a me expectari ſentio: in primis, ut iis gratias agam, per quos in hunc locum devenerim; deinde ut, quod deeſt ingenio, cura et diligentia pro viribus compenſare ſtudeam: ne tantum beneficium in hominem vel ingratum, vel alio quovis modo eo prorſus indignum, collocatum fuiſſe unquam videatur. Atque ut harum alteram vere et ex animo meo jam facio, cujus gratiſſima memoria tam altis radicibus menti infixa adhaeret, quae nulla unquam temporis longinquitate evelli poſſit; ſic alteram, quantum in me ſitum eſt, omni opera ſemper contendam.

In praeſentia autem pauca de *uſu* et *praeſtantia* rhetorices dicere conſtitui; unde et occaſio ſeſe offeret praecipuis conviciis et contumeliis, quibus injuſte a quibuſdam ars haec praeſtantiſſima petita fuerit, breviter reſpondendi. Nec aliud ſane argumentum, quo praelectiones auſpicarer, aut mihi, aut vobis magis convenire exiſtimavi: nam, ut artem aliquam profitenti, eam nec inutilem, nec ignobilem eſſe, oſtendere omnino congruit; ita dignam eſſe, cui operam et ſtudium impendant, ex re auditorum eſt moneri. Caeterum, quo commodius id praeſtari poſſit, hanc veniam oro, ut benigne et attente me dicentem, ut facitis, audiatis.

Artis

ARTIS igitur *uſus*, ut ab illo incipiam, ex commoditatibus, quas homines exinde percipiant, praecipue aeſtimari debet; quae ſi et jucunditatem quoque ſecum afferat, ita ut poetae illud *utile dulci* [1] ei recte tribuatur, nihil deſiderari poteſt, quo amorem et gratiam apud omnes conciliet; horum autem utrumque ars, de qua loquimur, merito ſibi vindicare poteſt. Etenim, cum viam rationemque tradat, qua quis apte, compoſite, ornate, et copioſe de unaquaque re dicat, non, ut in aliis quibuſdam artibus ac diſciplinis res ſe habet, uſus ejus certis locis et temporibus terminatur, ſed ſemper fere et ubique prodeſt ac delectat; quippe quae omni aetati et conditioni hominum conveniat, juventuti ac ſenectae, foro et curiae, aulae et caſtris pariter ſe accommodans. Imo in quovis hominum coetu, communique vitae conſuetudine, compto et eleganti orationis genere nihil gratius aut acceptius eſſe poteſt. Res nimis longa et operoſa eſſet ſingula artis dicendi commoda enumerare, pauca igitur ex innumeris fere tetigiſſe contenti erimus. Vis debitis laudibus virtutem efferre, aut vitii turpitudinem depingere ac vituperare? vis ſummorum virorum geſta praeclara celebrare, aliiſque ad imitandum exponere; contra vero nequam et improborum

[1] Horat. *De Art. Poet. v.* 36.

borum hominum pernicioſa facinora in odium et contemptum omnium adducere? hanc artem cole. Vis alicui ad ea, quae ſibi, vel aliis ſint utilia, perſuadere; aut ab iis, quae perniciem et ruinam afferant, dehortari? vis patriae de rebus ſeu belli, ſeu pacis deliberanti opem ferre, et ſaluberrima conſilia ita proponere, ut alios in ſententiam tuam pertrahas? haec ars rationem praebebit. Vis innocentem tueri, ac periculum a capite ejus depellere; aut de ſcelerato ut debita, et communi rei neceſſaria, ſumatur poena dicendo efficere? ex hac arte adjumenta petas. In ſumma, omnia, quae accommodata ſunt ad id, quod volumus, perſuadendum atque obtinendum, haec ars tradit et ſuppeditat. Quid, quod Protei ritu in varias formas docta et artificioſa oratio ſe convertit, quo, quod ſibi velit, aſſequatur? Alias enim ut rivulus parum profundus humili ac demiſſo ſermonis genere humi repit; alias pleni ac leniſſimi fluminis more aequabili curſu fertur ac dilabitur; alias vero quaſi torrens, magno aquarum confluxu turgeſcens, ampliſſima ſententiarum gravitate, et majeſtate verborum grandiloqua inſurgit. Jam in longas et circumductas periodos ſeſe profundit, mox inciſe et membratim rem peragere inſtituit. Nunc docet, nunc quaerit;

rit; nunc reticet, nunc exclamat; nunc irritat, nunc demulcet; nunc orat, nunc minatur; quoquoverſum ſeſe commovens, quo in pectus eorum, quibuſcum agit, ſe inſinuet, et in partes ſuas perducat. Porro, ut homines bruta animantia duobus praecipue praeſtant, ratione nimirum et oratione, Cicero, artis hujus optimus aeſtimator, affirmare non dubitavit, *Eloqui copioſe, modo prudenter, melius eſſe, quam vel acutiſſime ſine eloquentia cogitare* [1]. Cujus rei illam quoque rationem ſubjungit: *Quod cogitatio in ſe ipſa vertitur; eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuſcum communitate juncti ſumus.* Qui in id igitur ſolum incumbit, ut mentis perceptiones accurate perpendat, et inter ſe comparet, unde rerum cognitionem obtineat, ſibi tantum ſapit; dum is, qui ſenſa animi clara et concinna oratione efferre ſtudeat, et ad utilitatem et delectationem hominum intelligentiam ſuam confert. Ideoque ad multa vitae officia homines aptos reddit dicendi peritia, ad quae alii prorſus ſunt inepti.

[1] *De Off. Lib.* i. *c.* 44.

Beneficia ex hac arte percepta ſi exemplis eorum, qui ea claruerunt, oſtendere ſuſciperem, pene infinitus eſſem. Par illud celebratiſſimi nominis oratorum, Demoſthenem dico et Ciceronem, ut inſtitutum vitae, fortunam, et mortem quoque haud admo-

dum diſſimilem habuerunt; ſic illud gloriae utrique convenit, quod non ſemel patriam ſuam in ſummo periculo conſtitutam dicendi facultate liberarunt. Quoties ille aſtutiam et fraudes Philippi, quibus libertati Athenienſium inſidiatus, eos in ditionem ſibi redigere conatus eſt, indagavit, patefecit, eluſit? Pari arte et ingenio hic omnes Catilinae machinationes, ad rempublicam Romanam evertendam deſtinatas, detexit, vim atque audaciam fregit, omniaque illius ac ſociorum nefaria conſilia in auctorum perniciem convertit. Nec minori poſtea laude inſanas Antonii molitiones diu coercuit et repreſſit; donec tandem perfidia eorum, de quibus optime meritus erat, in poteſtatem ejus inſidioſe traderetur. At nequeo me continere, quin illud de clariſſimo hoc viro memorem, quo et amicum de cauſa capitali poſtulatum liberavit, et vis ſumma eloquentiae, ſi alias unquam, vel maxime enituit. Bello civili inter Caeſarem et Pompeium finito, ſummaque rerum jam in Caeſarem devoluta, Quintus Ligarius accuſatur a Q. Tuberone, quod Caeſaris partibus in Africa hoſtis fuiſſet. Ligarii defenſionem Cicero ſuſcipit. Quod cum Caeſar intellexit, Quidni, inquit, Ciceronem orantem audiamus? reus

enim, cujus cauſam agit, pro certo homo improbus et hoſtis eſt. Sed cum Cicero dicere ingreſſus eſt, oratio tam affectibus varia et venuſtate admirabilis videbatur, ut Caeſaris animum mirifice affecerit, quod primum incerto vultu, crebraque coloris mutatione oſtendit; poſtea vero tantis perturbationibus incitatus eſt, ut toto corpore contremeſcens libellos quoſdam e manu dimiſerit. Cauſam igitur obtinuit Cicero, ac Ligarius crimine liberatus eſt [1]. Ita tot gentium domitor vi eloquentiae ſuperatur; et qui per totum fere terrarum orbem victricia arma circumtulerat, armis potentioribus ipſe tandem devincitur. Miranda ſane victoria! in qua togae arma ceſſiſſe veriſſime Cicero gloriari poſſit. Cum arte igitur militari dicendi facultatem nonnulli conferentes, cui potiſſimum palma tribui debeat, in dubio reliquerunt. Sin autem caetera pares habeantur, in illis certe haud parum inter ſe diſcrepant; quod haec ſine vulnere aut laeſione aliqua victoriam reportat, illa non ſine caede et ſanguine; haec volentes captivos ducit et retinet, illa invitos; haec animos, illa corpora tantum devincit.

[1] Plut. *in vit. Cicer.*

Ex iis autem, quae de uſu rhetorices hactenus dicta ſunt, cum et *praeſtantia* ejus

magna ex parte intelligi poſſit, pauciora de illa dicere opus eſſe videtur. Si rem autem recte perpendamus, quid pulchrius eſſe poteſt, quam ea in re alios excellere, qua homines praecipuo quodam modo bruta animalia excellunt? Quid praeclarius, quam de re quacunque ita dicendo valere, ut non modo auditorum aures demulceas, ſed animos etiam ſumma voluptate perfundas? Quid laudabilius, quam in rebus arduis et difficilibus ſaluberrima conſilia ita proponere, ut ad ea amplectenda homines facile adduci poſſint? Etenim eam vim animis noſtris inſevit natura, ut non modo apta et concinna oratione delectemur, ſed etiam variis exinde motibus concitati huc illuc pro voluntate dicentis ſaepe impellamur. Quanti igitur aeſtimari debet, regnare quodammodo ac dominari in aliorum animis; flectere eos linguae gubernaculo, quo velis; et quid probent, quid rejiciant, quaſi pro imperio ac poteſtate praeſcribere? Egregia ſane res, et digna, quam omni ſtudio et animi contentione conſectemur! Itaque non ſine cauſa *flexanimam, atque omnium reginam rerum*, orationem vetus poeta appellavit [1].

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 44. *Pacuvio tribuit* Nonius.

At dicet forſan aliquis, homines vi ac pondere rationum, non affectuum impulſu

et

et concitatione ad aliquid vel amplexandum vel fugiendum moveri oportere. Bene profecto cum rebus humanis ageretur, ſi ita revera eſſet. Sed quis non quotidiana experientia edoctus plane ſentit, pleroſque homines aut rationum momenta ſaepiſſime non percipere; aut ſi percipiant, neſcio qua mentis pertinacia et obſtinatione ad agendum, prout res poſtulent, nullo modo induci poſſe, donec affectuum motu incitentur? Conſtet igitur arti praeſtantiſſimae laus ſua et dignitas, ad humani generis imbecillitati opitulandum natae, quae in eo, quo jam res ſunt ſtatu, non modo utilis, ſed omnino neceſſaria eſſe manifeſto apparet.

Cum tot igitur tantaeque ſint artis dicendi virtutes, non mirum eſt eam pleroſque homines omni aetate in amorem ſui et admirationem rapuiſſe. Sed ita natura comparatum eſt, ut pro variis ac diverſis hominum ingeniis alia aliis placeant, et delectent. Non defuerunt igitur, qui ex artium choro rhetoricen excludere voluerint, uſum modo et exercitationem artis expertem eſſe dicentes. In hunc autem errorem ex Platonis ſententia male intellecta nonnulli olim inciderunt. Nam quae ſummus ille philoſophus contra ſophiſtas

dixerat, qui fictam tantum et ſimulatam artis ſpeciem adhibebant; illos in artem ipſam perperam detorſiſſe oſtendit Fabius [1]. Ariſtoteles etiam, Platonis diſcipulus, in veſtibulo operis ſui *De arte dicendi*, quae arti ſint propria rhetoricae ac dialecticae ex aequo convenire demonſtrat. Et profecto quid in ſe continet dialectica, cujus cauſa artis nomen ſibi aſſumat, quod rhetoricae quoque haud pari jure conveniat? Inveniendi locos, unde quid cuique argumento proprium ſit et congruens petantur, docet? Idem facit et rhetorica. Diſponendi etiam quae inventa ſint, regulas tradit? Tradit et rhetorica. Syllogiſmos et inductiones ad fidem faciendam adhibet? Enthymematis et exemplis, nec minori arte, nec felicitate, contendit rhetorica. Pari igitur paſſu, ut videmus, hactenus incedunt. In eo autem differunt, quod illa nudis et apertis vocibus, quae ad rem explicandam ſufficiant, tantummodo utitur; haec autem pro varia argumenti natura nunc hoc, nunc illud dicendi genus, omnibus verborum luminibus adjunctis, ſuo jure adſciſcit. Non infacete igitur Zeno dialecticam *manui clauſae*, rhetoricam vero *expanſae* et *dilatatae* comparaſſe dicitur [2]. Ni quis forſan illam corporis alicujus oſſibus inter ſe compagibus

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 15.

[2] Cic. *De fin. Lib.* ii. *c.* 6.

pagibus vinctis et colligatis; hanc vero eidem corpori carne vestito, nervis instructo, succo et sanguine pleno, quo et aspectu sit gratius, vitaeque functionibus accommodatius, conferre malit. Sed de hac re pluribus dicendi locus alias dabitur.

Caeterum levis haec videri possit accusatio prae alia quorundam criminatione, qui rhetoricen non modo non esse utilem, sed etiam pernicioſam et pestiferam affirmare non dubitarunt. Et hanc etiam infamiam arti suae conflaverunt sophistae, dum inepte satis & arroganter se docere jactarent, quo modo causa inferior dicendo superior posset evadere; quod non minus ridicule, quam invidiose, ipsi Socrati affingere studuit Aristophanes [1]. Sed istam reprehensionem acutissime refutat Aristoteles, quae mala vulgo ex ea fluere putarentur, illa non arti adscribenda, sed eorum improbitati, qui re per se bona & utilissima ad homines decipiendos abuterentur, docens [2]. Nam quod multa incommoda afferre possit, qui injuste utatur hac dicendi facultate, id in omnibus bonorum generibus, virtute sola excepta, commune esse ostendit; et in iis potissimum bonis, quae maximas habent utilitates, ut in robore, sanitate, divitiis, scientia militari. Quis autem

[1] *In Nub.*

[2] *Rhet. Lib.* i. *c.* 1.

autem ſanus divitias unquam contempſit, ſeu comparare noluit, quod non pauci vel ad luxum, vel injuſtam dominationem iis ſint abuſi? Aut quis militarem artem negligendam ſtatuit, quod illo propoſito nonnulli ea ſe exercuerint, quo alios facilius aggrederentur, et in poteſtatem ſuam redigerent? Ex contrario certe, quo magis ars aliqua in uſum et commodum humani generis excogitata, nefariorum hominum vitio in peſtem et ruinam illorum traducitur, eo diligentius ab aliis excoli oportet, quo leviori negotio ſceleſtis eorum conſiliis obſiſtere poſſint. Nec melius ſaepe aliquis ſe defendere poteſt, quam eodem armorum genere, quo ab alio petitur.

QUANTA igitur ſit artis dicendi utilitas, quanta praeſtantia, paucis explicui; pro argumenti quidem dignitate breviter nimis et anguſte fateor, ut noſtrum tamen tulit ingenium. Nec in alia re magis ſumma vis ac facultas eloquendi requiritur, quam ſi de ipſa eloquentia quis dicere inſtituat. Praeterea aliud eſt artis praeceptiones tradere, aliud uſu et conſuetudine cum laude exercere. Nam et architectus eſſe poteſt, qui non aedificat; neque cos ipſa ſecat. Quin et egenus, licet opibus ipſe carens, ad argenti et auri divites venas alios dirigere poteſt,

poteſt, rationemque docere, qua pretioſum metallum effodiant. Muneri igitur noſtro ſatis me facturum credam, ſi eas rationes indicem, et quaſi digitum ad fontes intendam, quibus facillime ad eloquentiam perveniri poſſe arbitror. Nulla autem rhetorum pracepta ſine aſſidua et conſtanti exercitatione ad ſolidam, et accuratam dicendi facultatem comparandam ſufficere poſſunt. Non enim ex inani verborum copia, figuratis locutionibus, et periodis apte ac numeroſe cadentibus, ea tota conficitur, ut perperam nonnulli exiſtimaſſe videntur; ſed rerum quoque multarum perceptionem, ſententiarumque gravitatem deſiderat. Omnium itaque diſciplinarum cognitionem Craſſus in oratore requirit [1]. Item oratorum principi *eloquentia nihil aliud eſt, quam copioſe loquens ſapientia* [2]. Et profecto is ingenuarum artium eſt conſenſus, ut vinculo quodam inter ſe connexae ſint, et mutuo operas praeſtent; nulla vero ea, de qua agimus, potiori jure ex aliis, quae ſibi ſint uſui, deſumit, utpote qua reliquae omnes viciſſim adornatae, et pulchriores et jucundiores fiant.

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* i. c. 16.
[2] *Orat. Partit.* c. 23.

QUAE cum ita ſint, clariſſimi hujus collegii fundatoris, equeſtris dignitatis viri, Thomae Greſham, prudentiſſimum conſilium

lium omnes bonarum literarum amatores ſine dubio magnopere approbabunt; cui inter caeteras liberales artes et ſcientias, quas hic doceri voluit, etiam rhetorice locum conſtitui placuit. Is enim, ut vir fuit optimus, bonique publici ſtudioſiſſimus, nihil antiquius habuiſſe videtur; quam ut opes et divitiae, quibus adeo abundabat, in civium ſuorum commodum impendi poſſent. Ideoque cum longo rerum uſu, ac multarum regionum peragratione bene intelligeret, quanti res ſit momenti honeſtas artes publice doceri, quibus hominum mentes ad virtutem ac debita inter ſe officia praeſtanda effingi poſſint; in iſtum finem ampliſſimas has aedes, quas ipſe habitaverat, Muſis dicari juſſit. Et hoc quidem egregio conſilio fecit, cum nec ille habuerit, a quibus ſibi ſuccedi magis conveniret, nec hae, cui melius ſuccederent. In commerciis autem hominum, et aſſidua inter ſe conſuetudine, cum ars dicendi tanti ſit uſus, certe in hac nobiliſſima, et frequentiſſima civitate haud injuria inter caeteras ſorores ejus locum ſibi vindicare potuit. Igitur hunc ei denegare noluit vir ille ornatiſſimus, ſed inter reliquas accepit; quo nimirum cives vel cum exteris, qui ad hoc per totum terrarum orbem celeberrimum emporium perpetuo confluunt;

unt; vel inter ſe de quocunque negotiorum genere promptius et accuratius differere poſſent. Neque hac profecto in re a veterum ſapientia deceſſit, qui eundem Mercurium et eloquentiae et mercaturae deum eſſe finxerunt; ſeu, quod eloquentia ad opes acquirendas viam paret, in quem finem et mercatura praecipue inſtituitur, unde et deus quoque divitiarum Mercurius habebatur [1]; ſeu quod opulentis hominibus, ut cultus et apparatus, ita et ſermonis genus elegantius, quam aliis conveniat; ſeu denique, quod fluens et expedita oratio ad contractus et negotia expedienda plurimum conferat. Sed ut fabulas mittamus, ita uſu eveniſſe comperimus, ut bene inſtitutae civitates parem fere ſermonis ac morum excolendi curam plerumque habuerint.

[1] Phurnut. *De nat. deor.* c. 16.

Amplissimus hic in viri illuſtriſſimi laudes excurrendi campus ſeſe aperit, qui de utraque re civibus ſuis tam ſapienter proſpexerit; ſed neque ratio, neque limites inſtituti noſtri, id jam ſuſcipere permittunt. De argumento enim tam nobili et copioſo prorſus ſilere quam leviter tangere, omnino conſultius eſſe duximus. Interim tamen poſteritatem tanta beneficia, et tam eximium in rem literariam munificentiae exemplum, perpetuo gratiſſima memoria proſecuturam

ſecuturam nequaquam dubitare licet. Is enim in omnium mentibus, qui ulla bonarum artium cura tanguntur, monumentum quovis aere perennius pro certo ſibi conſtituit.

Ad vos igitur, AUDITORES CANDIDISSIMI, ſe convertit oratio, qui tanta patientia me audire dignati eſtis. Praecipue autem vobis, curatores digniſſimi, doctiſſimique profeſſores, maximae grates ſunt habendae, quod praeſentia veſtra me cohoneſtare voluiſtis. Caeterum, quod omnes tam faciles aures mihi praebuiſtis, veſtrae potius benevolentiae, quam noſtrae dicendi facultati tribuerim. Sed in laetum omen accipiam, quae in poſterum de ipſa dicendi arte traditurus ſim, vos pari favore accepturos, quo nihil aut dulcius, aut exoptatius, mihi poterit accidere. Dixi.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE character of the author of this work, ſo well known by his other learned and elaborate writings, would have been ſufficient to have recommended it to the public, if he had thought proper to have printed it during his own life; which could not conveniently be done, as he was in the conſtant uſe of it in his lectures. It will therefore be neceſſary, for the ſatisfaction of the reader, to take notice here, that it was the intention of the author, declared to ſeveral of his friends, and evident from the manuſcript itſelf, to be ſeen at the bookſeller's, that theſe lectures ſhould be publiſhed: For which purpoſe he cauſed a fair copy of them to be tranſcribed, after he had from time to time reviſed them with his uſual accuracy, during the ſpace of thirty eight years, in which he moſt punctually diſcharged the duties of his Profeſſorſhip at Greſham College, having been elected into it on the 1ſt of September 1720, and dying on the 17th of October 1758.

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ORATIO,

A SYSTEM of ORATORY

READ AT

GRESHAM COLLEGE.

LECTURE I.

Of the Riſe and Progreſs of Oratory.

LECT. I.

WE commonly find, that perſons of an ingenuous temper are very deſirous to know their benefactors. And certainly thoſe, who have imployed their time to invent or cultivate any part of uſeful knowledge, ought to be eſteemed as ſuch, and remembred with honor and gratitude. For which reaſon, having indeavoured to ſhew the *uſe and excellence* of oratory [1], I ſhall enter upon theſe lectures by inquiring into its *riſe and gradual improvements* in different ages; from whence it will appear, to whom we are cheifly indebted for the many and great advantages ariſing from this art. And

[1] In the *inaugural oration.*

LECT. I. in doing this I ſhall confine myſelf to rhetoricians, that is, thoſe who either taught the art, or at leaſt have writen upon it. Nor will it be neceſſary, I ſhould mention all of them; but ſuch only, who have been moſt celebrated on either of theſe accounts. And as to orators, or thoſe who practiſed this art, they, who are deſirous to be acquainted with their hiſtory, may peruſe Cicero's treatiſe *Of famous orators*; and the *Dialogue concerning the cauſes of corrupt eloquence*, which ſome aſcribe to Tacitus, and others to Quintilian.

THE invention of oratory is by the Egyptians, and fables of the poets, aſcribed to Mercury. And it is well known, that the Greeks made their deities the authors likewiſe of other arts, and ſuppoſed that they preſided over them. Hence they gave Mercury the titles of Λόγιος and Ἑρμῆς, both which names come from words that ſignify to ſpeak. And Ariſtides calls eloquence *the gift of Mercury* [1]. And for the ſame reaſon antiently the tongue was conſecrated to him [2]. He was likewiſe ſaid to be the interpreter or meſſenger of the gods; which office very well ſuited him, as he excelled in eloquence. Hence we read in the Sacred Writings, that when the people

[1] *Platonica ſecunda.*

[2] Athenaeus, *l.* 1. *c.* 14. Phurnutus *De nat. deorum*, *c.* 16.

of Lyſtra took Barnabas and Paul for gods in human ſhape, becauſe of that ſudden and ſurprizing cure, which was wrought upon the lame man, they called Barnabas *Jupiter*, and Paul *Mercury*; for this reaſon, as the inſpired writer tells us, *becauſe he was the cheif ſpeaker* [1], that is (as the ſpectators then thought) the interpreter or ſpokeſman of Barnabas. LECT. I.

[1] *Acts* xiv. 12.

BUT to paſs over theſe fictions of the heathen deities, let us hear what Quintilian ſais of the *origin* of this art; who ſeems to give a very probable account of it in the following paſſage. *The faculty of ſpeech*, ſais he, *we derive from nature, but the art from obſervation. For as in phyſic men by ſeeing that ſome things promote health, and others deſtroy it, formed the art upon thoſe obſervations; in like manner by perceiving that ſome things in diſcourſe are ſaid to advantage, and others not, they accordingly marked thoſe things, in order to imitate the one, and avoid the other. They alſo added ſome things from their own reaſon and judgement, which being confirmed by uſe, they began to teach others, what they knew themſelves* [2]. But no certain account can be given when, or by whom, this method of obſervation firſt began to take place. And

[2] *Inſt. Orat. L.* iii. *c.* 2.

LECT. I.

Ariſtotle ſuppoſes, not without reaſon, that the firſt lineaments of the art were very rude and imperfect [1]. Pauſanias indeed in his *Deſcription of Greece* tells us, that Pittheus the uncle of Theſeus, taught it at Trezene a city of Peloponneſus, and wrote a book concerning it; which he read himſelf, as it was publiſhed by one of Epidaurus [2]. But as Pittheus lived above a thouſand years before Pauſanias, who flouriſhed in the time of the emperour Hadrian, ſome are of opinion he might be impoſed upon by the Epidaurian, who publiſhed this book under the name of Pittheus. But be that as it will, it is very reaſonable to beleive, that the Greeks had the principles of this art ſo early, as the time of Pittheus. For Theſeus his nephew lived not long before the taking of Troy, which, according to Sir Iſaac Newton, happened nine hundred and four years before the birth of Chriſt; at which time Cicero thought it was in much eſteem among them. *Homer*, ſais he, *would never have given Ulyſſes and Neſtor in the Trojan wars ſo great commendations on account of their ſpeeches (to one of whom he attributes force, and to the other ſweetneſs of expreſſion) if eloquence had not in thoſe times been in great repute* [3]. And leſt any

[1] *De Sophiſt. elench. c. ult.*

[2] *In Corinthiac.*

[3] *De clar. orat. c.* 10.

one

LECT. I.

one ſhould imagine, that in thoſe days they made uſe only of ſuch helps, as nature and practice could afford them; the ſame poet informs us, that Peleus ſent Phenix with his ſon Achilles to the Trojan war, to inſtruct him not only in the art of war, but likewiſe of eloquence [1]. But who were the profeſſors of this art for ſome ages following is not known. For Quintilian ſais, that afterwards Empedocles is the firſt upon record, who attempted any thing concerning it [2]. And he, by Sir Iſaac Newton's account, flouriſhed about five hundred years after Troy was taken. At which time, as Cicero obſerves, men being now ſenſible of the powerful charms of oratory, and the influence it had upon the mind, there immediately aroſe ſeveral maſters of it [3]; the cheif of whom are mentioned by Quintilian, who tells us, that: *The oldeſt writers upon this art are Corax and Tiſias, both of Sicily. After them came Gorgias of Leontium in the ſame iſland, who is ſaid to have been the ſcholar of Empedocles, and by reaſon of his great age (for he lived to be an hundred and nine years old) had many contemporaries. Thraſymachus of Calcedon, Prodicus of Cea, Protagoras of Abdera, Hippias of Elis, and Alcidamus of Elea lived*

[1] *Iliad.* α. 443.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Liᵹ.* iii. *c.* 1.

[3] *De clar. orat. c.* 8.

LECT. I.

in his time, as likewiſe Antiphon, who firſt wrote orations [1], *and alſo upon the art, and is ſaid to have ſpoken admirably well in his own defence; and beſides theſe Polycrates, and Theodore of Byzantium* [2]. Thus far Quintilian. Theſe perſons contributed different ways towards the improvement of the art. Corax and Tiſias gave rules for methodizing a diſcourſe and adjuſting its particular parts [3]; as may be conjectured from Cicero's account of them, who ſais: *Tho ſome had ſpoke well before their time, yet none with order and method* [4]. But Gorgias ſeems to have excelled all the reſt in fame and reputation; for he was ſo highly applauded by all Greece, that a golden ſtatue was erected to him at Delphos, which was a diſtinguiſhing honour conferred upon him only [5]. And he is ſaid to have been ſo great a maſter of oratory, that in a public aſſembly he would undertake to declaim immediately upon any ſubject propoſed to him [6]. He wrote, as Cicero informs us, in the demonſtrative or laudatory way [7]; which requires moſt of the ſublime, and makes what Diodorus Siculus ſais of him the more probable, that, *He firſt introduced the ſtrongeſt figures, members of periods oppoſite in ſenſe, of an equal length, or ending with*

[1] See Voſſ. *De nat. rhetor. p.* 73.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

[3] See Turneb. *ad dict. Fabii loc.*

[4] *De clar. orat. c.* 12.

[5] Id. *De orat. L.* iii. *c* 32.

[6] *Ib. lib.* 1. *c.* 22.

[7] *De clar. orat. c.* 12.

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with a like ſound, and other ornaments of that nature [1]. And hence thoſe figures, which give the greateſt force and luſtre to a diſcourſe, were antiently called by his name [2]. Cicero tells us further, that Thraſymachus and Gorgias were the firſt, who introduced numbers into proſe, which Iſocrates afterwards brought to perfection [3]. Quintilian likewiſe mentions Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thraſymachus, as the firſt, who treated of common places, and ſhewed the uſe of them for the invention of arguments [4]. Nor muſt we omit Plato, whoſe elegant dialogue upon this ſubject is ſtill extant, which he entitles *Gorgias*. For tho he does not lay down the common rules of the art; yet he very well explains the nature of it, and maintains its true end and uſe againſt the generality of its profeſſors, who had greatly perverted the original deſign of it. Thus by the ſtudy and induſtry of ſo many ingenious and great men the art of oratory was then carried to a conſiderable height among the Grecians. Tho many of thoſe, who profeſſed it in thoſe times, imployed their ſkill rather to promote their own reputation and applauſe, than to ſerve the real intereſts of truth and virtue. For *they*

[1] Voſſ. *De natura rhetor. p.* 70.
[2] Dion. Halicarn. *Ep. ad Pomp.*
[3] *Orat. c.* 13, 52.
[4] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

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propoſed in an arrogant manner (as Cicero ſais) *to teach how a bad cauſe might be ſo managed, as to get the better of a good one* [1]. That is, they would undertake to charm the ears, and ſtrike the paſſions of their hearers in ſo powerful a manner, by ſophiſtical reaſonings, turns of wit, and fine language, as to impoſe falſehood upon them for truth; than which nothing could be either more diſingenuous in itſelf, or prejudicial to ſociety.

[1] *De clar. orat. c.* 8.

BUT thoſe, who ſucceeded them, ſeem to have conſulted better, both for their own honor, and that of their profeſſion. Iſocrates was the moſt renowned of all Gorgias his ſcholars, whom Cicero frequently extols with the higheſt commendations, as the greateſt maſter and teacher of oratory; *Whoſe ſchool*, as he ſais, *like the Trojan horſe, ſent forth abundance of great men* [2]. Ariſtotle was cheifly induced to ingage in this province from an emulation of his glory; and would often ſay in a verſe of Sophocles, ſomewhat varied to his purpoſe,

[2] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 22.

To be ſilent it is a ſhame,
While Iſocrates gets ſuch fame [3].

[3] Cic. *De orat. L.* iii. *c.* 35.

Quintilian ſais they both wrote upon the art [4], tho there is no ſyſtem of the former now extant. But that of Ariſtotle is

[4] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii *c.* 1. *Ibidem.*

eſteemed

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eſteemed the beſt, and moſt compleat, of any in the Greek language. In this age the Grecian eloquence appeared in its higheſt perfection. Demoſthenes was an hearer both of Iſocrates and Plato, as alſo of Iſaeus (ten of whoſe orations are yet extant) and by the aſſiſtance of a ſurprizing genius, joined with indefatigable induſtry, made that advantage of their precepts, that he has been always eſteemed by the beſt judges the prince of Grecian orators. His great adverſary and rival Aeſchines, after his baniſhment is ſaid to have gone to Rhodes, and imployed his time there in teaching rhetoric [1]. Theodectes and Theophraſtus, both of them ſcholars of Ariſtotle, imitated their maſter in writing upon the art. And from that time the philoſophers, eſpecially the ſtoics and peripatetics, applied themſelves to lay down the rules of oratory [2]; which Socrates had before ſeparated from the province of a philoſopher. And there is yet preſerved a treatiſe upon this ſubject, which ſome have aſcribed to Demetrius Phalereus the peripatetic, and ſcholar of Theophraſtus, tho others more probably to Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus. Quintilian mentions ſeveral other famous rhetoricians in the

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib* xii. *c* 10. Philoſtrat. *De Vit. Soph.* in *Aeſchin.*

[2] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

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the following ages, who were likewiſe writers; as Hermagoras, Athenaeus, Apollonius Molon, Areus Caecilius, Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, Apollonius of Pergamus, and Theodore of Gadara [1]. But of theſe nothing now remains upon the ſubject of oratory, except ſome tracts of Dionyſius, who flouriſhed in the reign of Auguſtus Caeſar. Nor have there be wanting ſome eminent writers of this kind among the Greeks ſince the time of Quintilian; two of whom I cannot omit to mention, Hermogenes, and Longinus, the author of the incomparable treatiſe *Of the ſublime*, a book which can ſcarce be too much commended, or too often read.

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

IT was long before Rome received this art, and not without difficulty at firſt. The reaſon was, becauſe the Romans were for ſeveral ages wholly addicted to military affairs, and to enlarge their territories; ſo that they not only neglected to cultivate learning, but thought the purſuit of it a thing of ill tendency, by diverting the minds of their youth from the cares and toils of war, to a more ſoft and indolent kind of life. Therefore ſo late as the year of their city five hundred ninety two, when by the induſtry of ſome Grecians the liberal

arts

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arts began to flouriſh in Italy, a decree paſſed the ſenate, by which all philoſophers and rhetoricians were ordered to depart out of Rome [1]. But in a few years after, when Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes, who were not only philoſophers but orators, came ambaſſadors from Athens to Rome; the Roman youth were ſo charmed with the eloquence of their harangues, that they could no longer be ſtopt from purſuing the ſtudy of oratory. And by a further acquaintance with the Greeks it ſoon gained ſuch eſteem, that perſons of the firſt quality imployed their time and pains to acquire it. And a young gentleman, who was ambitious to advance himſelf in the ſervice of his country, could have little hopes of ſucceſs, unleſs he had laid the foundation of his future proſpects in that ſtudy.

[1] Sueton. *De clar. rhetor.* c. 1.

SENECA tells us, that Lucius Plotius, a Gaul, was the firſt, who taught the art of oratory at Rome in Latin [2]; which Cicero ſais, was while he was a boy, and when the moſt ſtudious perſons went to hear him, he lamented that he could not go with them; being prevented by the regard he paid to the opinion of ſome of his freinds, who thought that greater improvements

[2] *Praefat. ad Lib.* ii. *controv.*

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provements were made by exercises in the Greek language under Grecian masters [1]. Seneca adds, that this profession continued for some time in the hands of freedmen; and that the first Roman, who ingaged in it, was Blandus of the equestrian order [2], who was succeeded by others; some of whose lives are yet extant, writen by Suetonius, as many of the Grecians are by Philostratus and Eunapius. Quintilian likewise gives us the names of those among the Romans, who wrote upon the art. *The first*, sais he, *as far as I can learn, who composed any thing upon this argument, was M. Cato the Censor. After him Anthony the orator began upon the subject, which is the only work he has left, and that imperfect* [3]. *Then followed some of less note. But he who carried eloquence to its highest pitch among us, was Cicero; who has likewise by his rules given the best plan both to practise, and teach the art. After whom modesty would require us to mention no more, had he not told us himself, that his Books of rhetoric slipt out of his hands, while he was but a youth* [4]. *And those lesser things, which many persons want, he has purposely omitted in his Discourses of oratory* [5]. *Cornificius wrote largely upon the same subject. Stertinius and*

[1] See Suet. *De clar. rhet. c.* 2.

[2] *Ubi supra.*

[3] See Cic. *De orat. Lib.* 1. *c.* 21.

[4] See Cic. *De orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 2.

[5] See Cic. *Ad fam. Lib.* i. *Ep.* 9.

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Gallio the father, each of them ſomething. But Celſus and Lenas were more accurate than Gallio; and in our times Virginius, Pliny, and Rutilius. And there are at this day ſome celebrated authors of the ſame kind, who, if they had taken in every thing, might have ſaved my pains [1]. Time has ſince deprived us of moſt of the writers mentioned here by Quintilian. But we have reaſon to be more eaſy under this loſs, ſince it has preſerved to us Cicero's treatiſes upon this ſubject; which we may well ſuppoſe to have been cheifly owing to their own excellency, and the great eſteem they have always had in the world. Beſides his *Two books of invention*, which Quintilian here calls his *Books of rhetoric*, there are extant of his *Three books of an orator*, one *Of famous orators*, and another, which is called, *The orator*, as alſo his *Topics*, a preface *Concerning the beſt ſort of orators*, and a treatiſe *Of the parts of oratory*. Each of which treatiſes, whether we regard the juſtneſs and delicacy of the thoughts, the uſefulneſs of the rules, or the elegance and beauty of the ſtile, deſerve to be frequently peruſed by all who are lovers of eloquence. For who can be thought ſo well qualified to give the rules

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

of

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of any art, as he who excelled all mankind in the practice of them? But thoſe *Four books to Herennius*, which are publiſhed among Cicero's works, ſeem with good reaſon to be attributed to Cornificius, whom Quintilian here mentions. And Celſus is by ſome affirmed to have taught oratory, whom he alſo places among the rhetoricians, and whoſe *Eight books of medicine* are yet extant, wrote in ſo beautiful a ſtile, as plainly ſhews him to have been a maſter of eloquence. But Quintilian himſelf outdid all, who went before him, in diligence and accuracy as a writer. St. Jerom ſais, he was the firſt who taught publicly at Rome, and received a ſalary from the treaſury [1]. But ſince he places this in the eighth year of Domitian, I fear it will not hold in point of time. For we are told by Suetonius, that Veſpaſian was the firſt, who granted out of the treaſury a yearly ſalary of near eight hundred pounds ſterling to the Latin and Greek rhetoricians [2]. A generous act indeed, and well becoming ſo great a prince! But I return to Quintilian, whoſe *Inſtitutions* are ſo comprehenſive, and writen with that great exactneſs and judgement; that they are generally allowed to be the moſt perfect work

[1] *In Chron. Euſebian.*

[2] *In vit. c.* 18.

work of this kind. With this excellent author therefore I ſhall finiſh my account of the Latin rhetoricians. LECT. I.

THERE were indeed ſome others in the following ages, whoſe works are yet extant; but as they contain nothing of moment, which is not to be found in thoſe already mentioned, I ſhall forbear to name them. Much leſs ſhall I deſcend to that numerous body of writers, who ſince the revival of learning have treated upon this ſubject, for the ſame reaſon. And a very good judge has not long ſince given it as his opinion; that the method of forming the beſt ſyſtem of oratory, is to collect it from the fineſt precepts of Ariſtotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and other celebrated authors; with proper examples taken from the choiceſt parts of the pureſt antiquity [1]. This method therefore I ſhall endeavour to purſue in my following diſcourſes.

[1] A. B. of Cambr. *Lett.* *p.* 213.

LEC-

LECTURE II.

Of the Nature of Oratory.

LECT. II.

IN treating upon any art or ſcience, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to explain the nature and deſign of it; from whence a judgment may beſt be formed of the fitneſs of thoſe rules, which are laid down in order to attain it. For this reaſon Cicero adviſes to begin with a *definition* [1], which gives a general and comprehenſive view of the whole ſubject. This method I propoſe to take in treating on the art of oratory. And therefore having already conſidered the *riſe* and *progreſs* of this art, and ſhewn the antiquity of it; the ſubject of my preſent diſcourſe ſhall be, firſt to define it, and then to explain and illuſtrate the ſeveral parts of the definition, as clearly and breifly as I can.

[1] *De off. Lib.* i. *c.* 2.

BUT before I enter upon this, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that the terms *rhetoric* and *oratory* having no other difference, but that one is taken from the Greek language, and the other from the Latin, may be uſed promiſcuouſly; but the caſe is not the ſame with reſpect to the words

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words *rhetorician* and *orator*. For altho the Grecians uſed the former both to expreſs thoſe, who taught the art, and ſuch who practiſed it; yet the Romans afterward, when they took that word into their language, confined it to the teachers of the art, and called the reſt *orators*. And there ſeems to have been a ſufficient reaſon for this diſtinction, ſince the art was the ſame in both, and might therefore go by either name; but the different province of rhetoricians and orators made it not improper, they ſhould be called by different names. Beſides antiently, before rhetoric was made a ſeparate and diſtinct art from philoſophy, the ſame perſons taught both. And then they were called not only *rhetoricians*, but *ſophiſts*. But becauſe they often imployed their art rather to vindicate what was falſe and unjuſt, than to ſupport truth and virtue; this diſingenuous conduct, by which they frequently impoſed upon weak minds, brought a diſcredit both upon themſelves and their profeſſion. And therefore the name *ſophiſt* or *ſophiſter* has been more generally uſed in an ill ſenſe, to ſignify one ſkilled rather in the arts of cavilling, than qualified to ſpeak well and accurately upon any ſubject. I ſhall juſt mention a

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remarkable inſtance of this kind, as it is related by ſome antient writers, and then procede to the principal ſubject of my preſent diſcourſe. Corax the rhetorician (who is ſaid firſt to have taught the art for money) agreed to inſtruct a young man, whoſe name was Tiſias, upon condition of receiving a certain ſumm when he had learnt it. Tiſias afterward defering to pay the money, Corax ſued him for it. Upon which Tiſias, agreably to the method in which he had been taught, aſking what was the end of this art, and Corax replying to perſuade, propoſed to him this ſophiſm: If I perſuade the judges I owe you nothing, I will not pay, becauſe I have carried the cauſe; but if I do not perſuade them, I will not pay, becauſe I have not yet learned the art. But Corax, who was too cuning a ſophiſter to be ſo eaſily baffled by his ſcholar, immediately retorts upon him: Nay, if you do perſuade the judges, you ſhall pay, becauſe it is a proof you have learnt the art, and you are bound by your agrement; but if you do not perſuade them, you ſhall pay, becauſe they give the cauſe againſt you. Upon hearing this the judges preſently cried out, *An ill bird hatches an ill egg*; and ſo diſmiſſed them

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them without trying the cauſe. In the Greek it is *an ill Corax*, alluding to the maſter's name, which in that language ſignifies *a raven* [1]. If ſuch artifice was only uſed for mirth and pleaſantry, it might perhaps afford matter of diverſion; but when it enters into the ſerious affairs of life, and becomes a profeſſion, it ought by all means to be exploded.

[1] Eraſm. *Chil.* *p.* 1420.

BUT I come now to the *definition* of oratory, which may be thus laid down: Oratory is the art of ſpeaking well upon any ſubject, in order to perſuade.

IT is not neceſſary to uſe many words, to prove that oratory is an *art*. For it is compriſed under certain rules, agreable to reaſon, delivered in a regular method, and ſuited to attain the end it propoſes; which are characters ſufficient to denominate it an art. Indeed the caſe is the ſame here, as in moſt other things, that a good genius is of itſelf more ſerviceable, than the moſt exact acquaintance with all the rules of art, where that is wanting. But it is ſufficient that art help nature, and carry it farther, than it can otherwiſe advance without it. And he who is deſirous to gain the reputation of a good orator, will find the aſſiſtance of both very neceſſary.

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Some perſons have thought, that many of the common ſyſtems wrote upon the ſubject of oratory have been attended with this inconvenience; that by burdening the mind with too great a number of rules about things of leſs importance, they have oftentimes rather diſcouraged than promoted the ſtudy of eloquence. This undoubtedly is an extreme, which ſhould be always carefully avoided. But however, an indifferent guide in a ſtrange road is better than none at all. It may be worth while to hear Quintilian's opinion upon this head. *I would not*, ſais he, *have young perſons think they are ſufficiently inſtructed, if they have learned one of thoſe compends, which are commonly handed about, and fancy themſelves ſafe in the decrees, as it were, of theſe technical writers. The art of ſpeaking requires much labour, conſtant ſtudy, a variety of exerciſe, many trials, the greateſt prudence, and readineſs of thought. But however theſe treatiſes are uſeful, when they ſet you in a plain and open way, and do not confine you to one narrow tract, from which he who thinks it a crime to depart, muſt move as ſlowly as one that walks upon a rope*[1]. We ſee he is not for having us confine ourſelves too cloſely to ſyſtems, tho he thinks they are

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 13.

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of ſervice at firſt, till uſe and experience render them leſs neceſſary. But I procede.

THE buſineſs of oratory is to teach us *to ſpeak well*, which, as Cicero explains it, is to ſpeak *juſtly*, *methodically*, *floridly*, *and copiouſly* [1].

[1] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 5. *De orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 11.

Now in order to ſpeak *juſtly*, or pertinently, a perſon muſt be maſter of his ſubject, that he may be able to ſay all that is proper, and avoid whatever may appear foreign and trifling. And he muſt cloath his thoughts with ſuch words and expreſſions, as are moſt ſuited to the nature of the argument, and will give it the greateſt force and evidence.

AND as it teaches to ſpeak juſtly, ſo likewiſe *methodically*. This requires, that all the parts of a diſcourſe be placed in their proper order, and with that juſt connexion, as to reflect a light upon each other, and thereby to render the whole both clear in itſelf, and eaſy to be retained. But the ſame method is not proper for all diſcourſes. And very frequently a different manner is convenient in handling the ſame ſubject. For it is plain, that art, as well as nature, loves variety; and it diſcovers the ſpeaker's judgement, when the diſpoſition of his diſcourſe is ſo framed,

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as to appear eaſy and natural, rather than the effect of induſtry and labour.

To ſpeak *floridly* is ſo peculiar a property of this art, that ſome have wholly confined it to the pomp and ornaments of language. But that it extends farther, and reſpects things as well as words, I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew hereafter, when I come to treat of the ſeveral parts of which it is compoſed. It contains indeed the whole ſubject of elocution, but does not wholly conſiſt in it. True and ſolid eloquence requires not only the beauties and flowers of language; but likewiſe the beſt ſenſe and cleareſt reaſoning. Beſides rhetoric gives rules for the ſeveral ſorts of ſtile, and directs the uſe of them agreably to the nature of the ſubject. To make this more evident, I ſhall a little conſider the difference between *grammar* and *rhetoric*, that by fixing the bounds of the former, the extent of the latter may the more eaſily be perceived. *Grammar* then is the art of ſpeaking correctly. And he ſpeaks *correctly*, who makes choice of proper words, applies them in their uſual ſenſe, and joins them together in conſtruction agreably to the uſe and idiom of the language, in which he diſcourſes. Nor does grammar, ſtrictly conſidered,

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ſidered, procede any farther. Wherefore the ſubject of ſtile, with the different properties, by which the ſeveral forms of it are diſtinguiſhed from each other, belong to another art, which muſt be rhetoric. For tho rhetoric is ſaid to be the art of ſpeaking well, and grammar the art of ſpeaking correctly; yet ſince the rules for ſpeaking and writing are the ſame, under ſpeaking we are to include writing, and each art is to be conſidered as treating of both. And tho the word *ſtile*, in its proper ſenſe, reſpects only what is writen; yet it is applied to ſpeech, and ſo I ſhall ſometimes uſe it. Now there are uſually reckoned three ſorts of ſtile, called the low, middle, and ſublime. Should any one therefore, in treating upon a familiar and common ſubject, ſwell it with florid and pompous language; or on the contrary, in handling a lofty and magnificent argument, ſhould he fall into a low and vulgar manner of expreſſion; what was ſaid might be all good grammar, but it would certainly be very bad oratory. But the orator often makes uſe of all theſe ſorts of ſtile in the ſame diſcourſe, and varies his language according to the different nature of each part of his ſubject, and his particular view

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at that time in ſpeaking. Tho the uſe of this art is not wholly confined to an orator, or one who ſpeaks in public; but, as Plato obſerves [1], does in ſome meaſure extend to all occaſions of diſcourſe.

[1] *In Phaedro.*

BUT the force of oratory appears in nothing more, than a *copiouſneſs of expreſſion*, or a proper manner of inlargement, ſuited to the nature of the ſubject, which is of great uſe in perſuaſion, and makes the laſt property, required by Cicero, of ſpeaking well. A ſhort and conciſe account of things is often attended with obſcurity, from an omiſſion of ſome neceſſary circumſtances relating to them. Or however, where that is not the caſe, yet for want of proper embelliſhments to inliven the diſcourſe, and thereby to excite and fix the hearers attention, it is apt to ſlip thro their minds without leaving any impreſſion. But where the images of things are drawn in their full proportion, painted in their proper colours, ſet in a clear light, and repreſented in different views, with all the ſtrength and beauties of eloquence, they captivate the minds of the audience with the higheſt pleaſure, ingage their attention, and by an irreſiſtible force move and bend them to the deſign of the ſpeaker.

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THE *ſubject* of oratory, as I have ſaid in the definition, is *every thing*. For there is nothing, but what is capable of receiving much advantage and ornament from this art. Indeed the ſubject of *logic* is equally extenſive; but the difference both in its ſhort and conciſe way of reaſoning from the fluency and copiouſneſs of oratory; and the end it propoſes, which is only the knowledge of truth, while the other carries us to action, render it intirely a diſtinct art. So a ſtatuary and a maſon are converſant in the ſame matter, that is ſtone; but as the one uſes it in buildings, and the other in forming images, theſe are arts plainly different. And both phyſics and medicine are imployed about the human body; but as the former only contemplates its nature and properties, while the latter gives preſcriptions to cure its diſorders, no one eſteems them the ſame art. However, it is not neceſſary, that an orator ſhould be acquainted with all arts; becauſe there is none, upon which he may not have occaſion to diſcourſe. But ſince ſome have formerly been of that opinion, as we learn from Quintilian, I ſhall give you his anſwer to it, who has very fully expreſſed himſelf upon this head. *Some*,

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ſais he, *have aſſerted, that an orator muſt be ſkilled in all arts, if he is to ſpeak upon all. I might here reply in the words of Cicero, in whom I find this expreſſion:* In my opinion no one can be an excellent orator, who has not acquired the knowledge of all the great and laudable arts [1]. *But it is ſufficient for me, if the orator be not unacquainted with the ſubject, about which he is to diſcourſe. He is not indeed acquainted with all cauſes, and yet he ſhould be able to talk upon all. Upon which then ſhall he ſpeak? Upon thoſe which he has learnt. The ſame is to be ſaid of arts. Thoſe, of which he is to ſpeak, let him firſt learn; and of thoſe which he has learned, let him ſpeak. But will not a workman talk better about his own art? or a muſician of muſic? Yes certainly, if the orator be wholly ignorant of the ſubject. For even a peaſant, or an illiterate perſon, will repreſent his own cauſe to better advantage than an orator, who is intirely unacquainted with it; but being once inſtructed by the muſician, workman, or peaſant, he will diſcourſe better upon thoſe ſubjects, than he who taught him* [2]. By this paſſage it appears, that Quintilian thought much leſs furniture neceſſary for an orator, than Cicero had done, who required a knowledge of all the *great arts*; by

[1] See *De orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 6.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 21.

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by which he ſeems to have meant all thoſe, which at that time were eſteemed liberal arts among the Romans. And yet what Cicero thought requiſite, was greatly ſhort of ſome others, who had inſiſted upon a ſkill in *all arts*; which, if at all practicable, could doubtleſs be attained but by very few.

THE principal *end* and deſign of oratory is to *perſuade*. For which reaſon it is frequently called *the art of perſuaſion*. Indeed the orator has often other ſubordinate views: as when he endeavours either to delight his hearers, with what is pleaſant and agreable; or to conciliate their good opinion, by a ſmooth and artful addreſs: but ſtill both theſe are in order to perſuade and excite them to action. Some have objected to this, that perſuaſion is not peculiar to oratory, and other things are found to have as much influence to that end. So money, authority, and intereſt perſuade; and ſometimes the very aſpect, and a ſorrowful countenance, ſhall ſway the mind as much, or more, than words. Thus when Anthony the orator in defending M. Aquilius produced his garment, and expoſed the holes, thro which he had received ſeveral wounds in defence of his country; it is thought,

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that the Roman populace were principally moved by that ſight to clear him from his accuſation. And we are told by Cato, that Servius Galba had the like good fortune merely by raiſing the compaſſion of the people, when he produced not only his own helpleſs children, but likewiſe carried about the ſon of Gallus Sulpitius in his own arms [1]. No one will deny, that the ſeveral things here mentioned are ſuited to perſuade, by influencing the paſſions; but this is no juſt exception, why perſuaſion may not properly be ſaid to be the end of oratory; ſince it is of a different kind, and means only ſo far, as that end can be attained by ſpeaking. Nor can this be with any greater reaſon denied, becauſe the orator does not always gain his point; than curing the diſeaſes of human bodies can be denied to be the end of the art of medicine, becauſe the phyſician may not always prove ſucceſsful.

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 16.

UPON the whole therefore, as the orator has always this in view; while he imploys his art in purſuing only thoſe ends, for which it was at firſt deſigned, the perſuading men to good and virtuous actions, and diſſuading them from every thing that is ill and vicious; nothing can be more commendable in itſelf, or uſeful to human ſocieties.

LEC-

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Of the Diviſion of Oratory.

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HAVING in my laſt diſcourſe treated upon the *nature* of oratory, I now procede to conſider the *diviſion* of it. This will give us a more diſtinct view of the art, by repreſenting the ſeveral parts of which it conſiſts, and afford us a plan for our future diſcourſes, that we may procede regularly in the explication of them. And every one muſt be ſenſible of the advantages, that attend method and order, as they render things more clear and conſpicuous, and very much help the memory to retain them.

Now oratory conſiſts of theſe four parts; *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Elocution*, and *Pronunciation*. This will appear by conſidering the nature of each of them, and what it contributes in forming an orator. Every one who aims to ſpeak well and accurately upon any ſubject, does naturally in the firſt place inquire after and purſue ſuch thoughts, as may ſeem moſt proper to explain and illuſtrate the thing, upon which he deſigns to diſcourſe. And if the nature

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of it requires, that he ſhould bring reaſons to confirm what he ſais, he not only ſeeks the ſtrongeſt, and ſuch as are like to be beſt received; but alſo prepares to anſwer any thing, which may be offered to the contrary. This is *Invention*. After this he deliberates with himſelf in what method to diſpoſe of thoſe things, which have occured to his mind, that they may appear in the plaineſt light, and not loſe their force by diſorder and confuſion. This is the buſineſs of *Diſpoſition*. His next concern is to give his thoughts an agreable dreſs, by making choice of the fiteſt words, cleareſt expreſſions, ſmooth and harmonious periods, with other ornaments of ſtile, as may beſt ſuit the nature of his ſubject, brighten his diſcourſe, and render it moſt entertaining to his hearers. And this is called *Elocution*. The laſt thing he attends to, is to deliver what he has thus compoſed, with a juſt and agreable *Pronunciation*. And daily experience convinces us, how much this contributes both to ingage the attention, and impreſs what is ſpoken upon the mind. This then is the method to which nature directs, in order to qualify ourſelves for diſcourſing to the beſt advantage. Tho by cuſtom and habit

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theſe things become ſo familiar to us, that we do not always attend to them ſeparately in their natural order. However it is the buſineſs of art to follow nature, and to treat of things in that manner, which ſhe dictates.

INDEED ſome have excluded both *invention* and *diſpoſition* from the art of oratory, ſuppoſing they more properly belong to logic; but, I think, without any juſt reaſon. For, as was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe, two arts may be converſant about the ſame ſubject, without interfering, provided they have not the ſame end, and their manner of treating it be likewiſe different. Thus both logic and rhetoric teach us to reaſon from the ſame principles, as from the cauſe, effects, circumſtances, and many others, whence arguments are uſually taken. But beſides theſe, rhetoric directs us to other conſiderations, more peculiarly adapted to conciliate the mind, and affect the paſſions, with which the other art has no concernment. For logic contents itſelf with ſuch principles of reaſoning, which ariſing from the nature of things, and their relations to each other, may ſuffice to diſcover truth from falſehood, and ſatisfy thinking and conſiderate

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ſiderate perſons. Nor does it propoſe any thing more than aſſent, upon a juſt view of things fairly repreſented to the mind. But rhetoric not only directs to thoſe arguments, which are proper to convince the mind; but alſo conſiders the various paſſions and intereſts of mankind, with the bias they receive from temper, education, converſe, or other circumſtances of life; and teaches how to fetch ſuch reaſons from each of theſe, as are of the greateſt force in perſuaſion. It is plain therefore that rhetoric not only ſupplies us with more heads of *invention* than logic, but that they very much differ from each other in the uſe and deſign of them; the one imploying them only as principles of knowledge, but the other cheifly as motives to action.

NOR is their manner of treating them leſs different, which reſpects *diſpoſition*. The logician ſo places the ſeveral propoſitions of a ſyllogiſm in a certain preſcribed method, that the relation between the terms may be evident, and the concluſion appear to be fairly drawn from the premiſes. And if either of the premiſes ſeems weak, or the truth of it not ſufficiently clear, he ſupports it by a freſh argument;

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and ſo procedes in one ſuccinct and uniform chain of reaſoning, till he has made out the proof of what he at firſt propoſed. But the orator is not thus tied down to mode and figure; or to perfect ſyllogiſms, which he ſeldom uſes: but reaſons in the manner he thinks moſt convenient; begins with either of the premiſes, and ſometimes with the concluſion itſelf; confirms one part with proper reaſons, and enlarges upon it for greater evidence and variety, before he procedes to another; and drops any part, which he thinks ſufficiently clear of itſelf, and may be ſupplied by the attentive hearer. And thus by a diverſity of method, and an agreable variety, he conſults the pleaſure and entertainment of his hearers, as well as their inſtruction. Beſides, he conſiders the frame and ſtructure of his whole diſcourſe, and as his view is not every where the ſame, he divides it into certain parts, and ſo diſpoſes each of them, as may beſt anſwer his intention. From all which it appears, that *Diſpoſition*, conſidered as a part of oratory, is widely different from that, which is taught by logic.

THE third part of oratory before mentioned is *Elocution*. In what this conſiſts

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has been hinted already. All acknowledge it belongs to this art, tho many ſeem to miſtake the true nature and extent of it. For nothing is more common, than to ſuppoſe that only to be oratory, which is delivered in a florid and pompous ſtile. Whereas *Elocution* comprehends all characters of ſtile, and ſhews how each of them is to be applied; and directs as well to a choice of words, and propriety of expreſſion, as to the ornaments of tropes and figures. Indeed as the florid and ſublime characters more eſpecially relate to the orator's province, who has the greateſt occaſion for them; the name of *Eloquence* has been more peculiarly appropriated to thoſe characters. But to ſuppoſe from hence, that the art of oratory is wholly confined to theſe, or that the orator acts out of his ſphere, when he does not uſe them, is equally to miſtake in both caſes.

IN Ariſtotle's time rhetoricians had treated only of the three parts already mentioned. And accordingly he himſelf ſais: *There are three things to be treated of in rhetoric: the firſt reſpects the invention of arguments, the ſecond elocution, and the third the right placing the ſeveral parts of a diſcourſe* [1]. And if we conſider the art in

[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

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in itſelf, without regard to the principal uſe and application of it; nothing further ſeems to be neceſſary. For as architecture conſiſts in three things; materials proper for building, the putting together thoſe materials, and beautifying the whole ſtructure; ſo here, the invention of arguments, placing every thing in its juſt order, and giving it a ſuitable and proper dreſs, ſeems to contain the whole of this art. And where diſcourſes are only publiſhed in order to be read, nothing can be done further. But the cheif end of oratory, which is perſuaſion, is often much better attained by ſpeaking, than writing. The orator's province is to be the mouth of an aſſembly, to addreſs to others in perſon, to adviſe them to their good, diſſuade them from things prejudicial, and excite them by all proper motives to fall in with, and purſue their true intereſt. He is to appear upon all occaſions as a patron of truth and virtue, and to oppoſe every thing, which has a tendency to ſubvert them. And he, who ingages in this province, will find it neceſſary to be maſter not only of a ready invention; an eaſy method of diſpoſing his thoughts; and a happy elocution; but likewiſe of all the arts of ad-

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dreſs, and advantages of a good delivery. This ſhews the neceſſity of the fourth part of oratory, which is called *Pronunciation*, and ſometimes *Action*. For as this does not only comprehend the juſt management of the voice, but likewiſe of the countenance and geſture, that each of them may ſuit the nature of the argument, and manner of expreſſion; from the former of theſe it has been called *Pronunciation*, and from the latter *Action*, both being generally underſtood by the antients under either name [1]. It ſeems highly probable, that orators took this firſt from the ſtage. Whence the Greeks call it ὑπόκρισις, which is a word borrowed from the theatre, and ſignifies the perſonating of another, as actors do on the ſtage, by their manner of ſpeech and behaviour ſuited to the perſons of thoſe, whom they repreſent. And Ariſtotle tells us, that in his time ſome rules had been writen for the pronunciation of actors [2]. But however the name might take its origin from the theatre, yet the pronunciation of an orator is very different from that of actors. For his manner of expreſſion has not that rapture and extaſy, which we ſometimes find in tragedy; nor do the ludicrous motions and geſtures of the ſtage ſuit

[1] See Cic. *De invent. Lib.* 1. *c.* 7.

[2] *Ubi ſupra.*

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ſuit the gravity of his character. His deſign is not barely to amuſe or terrify, but ſo far to affect the paſſions, as thereby to ingage the mind to a more ready compliance with what is offered. Ariſtotle ſaw, that the want of this was a defect in the rules of oratory; and therefore, tho he mentions but three parts of the art, he has notwithſtanding given ſome few precepts concerning it [1]. And it is plain, that Demoſthenes was then very ſenſible of its influence, and laid the greateſt ſtreſs upon it; who, as we are told in Cicero, *being aſked, what was the principal thing in oratory, is ſaid to have given the firſt, ſecond, and third place to action, as if the whole art conſiſted in it* [2]. But tho it was not introduced into the ſchools ſo early, as the other parts of this art; yet many ſince Ariſtotle have writen upon it more largely; nor is any ſyſtem eſteemed perfect, in which this is wanting.

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

[2] *De orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 56.

BUT many writers add a fifth part of oratory to the four already mentioned, and that is *Memory*. And this opinion is ſupported by great authorities. For Cicero more than once divides the art into five parts [3]; and ſo does Quintilian, who ſais: *The whole of oratory conſiſts, as the moſt and beſt*

[3] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 7. & *alibi.*

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beſt authors reckon, of five parts; Invention, Method, Elocution, Memory, Pronunciation or Action [1]. But if we conſider the uſe of this faculty, it is very evident, that it is not peculiar to oratory, but common to all arts and ſciences; for which reaſon it ought not to be eſteemed as a part of this art, diſtinct from all others. Tho ſince none have more occaſion for its aſſiſtance than the orator, and there ſeems to be no other art, to which it can ſo properly be refered (unleſs it be made a diſtinct art of itſelf) I ſhall hereafter ſpeak more of it, in treating upon *Pronunciation*, to which it ſeems moſt properly to relate.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 3.

WHAT has been hitherto ſaid of the nature and uſe of the ſeveral parts of oratory, may, I preſume, be ſufficient to ſhew, that the diviſion here made is adequate to the ſubject, and comprehenſive of the whole art. A fuller and more diſtinct explication of each of them, in the order now laid down, will be the buſineſs of our following diſcourſes. At preſent it may not be amiſs to reduce the ſeveral things, about which it treats, to a few general heads, which may be of ſervice hereafter to ſhew the different uſe of ſome of its parts in each of them.

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ALL diſcourſe then conſiſts of *things* or ideas, and *words* the ſigns of thoſe ideas, by which they are expreſſed to others. And therefore ſome have reduced the four parts of oratory already mentioned to two, *Invention*, and *Elocution*; the former of which they attribute to things, and the latter to words [1]. But as they bring *Diſpoſition* under *Invention*, and *Pronunciation* under *Elocution*, there is no real difference between this diviſion of the art, and the former. I ſhall procede therefore with the diviſion of its ſubject. And what relates purely to *words*, I ſhall refer to its proper place, which is *Elocution*. But the *things* it treats of are differently divided, according to their different nature, or the ſeveral ways of conſidering them.

[1] See Voſſ. *De rhetor. nat. & conſtit. c.* 17.

AND firſt, they are either *ſimple* or *complex*: that is ſingle, individual things; or ſuch as are connected in propoſitions. Thus for inſtance: If *Virtue* was made the ſubject of a diſcourſe, and any one ſhould ſpeak in the praiſe of it, ſhew the excellency of its nature, the pleaſure that attends the practice of it, and its happy effects to human ſociety; this would be a ſimple theme. But ſhould it be inquired: *Whether virtue is to be ſought for itſelf?*

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the ſubject would be complex. For here are two things mentioned, *virtue* and *ſought for itſelf*; and the relation theſe ſtand in to each other, or whether they are ſo connected, that one may juſtly be affirmed of the other, is the matter which comes under conſideration.

AGAIN, the argument of a diſcourſe may be either a *general*, or a *particular propoſition*. A general propoſition is that, which is expreſſed in general terms, diveſted of all circumſtances, ſuch as perſons, time, place, and the like. And a particular propoſition is limited by ſome or other of theſe circumſtances, which the former wants. So if the queſtion be put: *Whether it be lawful for a man to kill himſelf?* the inquiry is general. But if it be aſked: *Whether Cato did well in ſo doing?* this is particular.

BUT the principal diſtribution of the ſubject of oratory is made, by dividing it into three kinds of diſcourſe, called by the antients *demonſtrative*, *deliberative*, and *judicial*. The *firſt* of theſe comprehends all ſuch diſcourſes, as relate to the praiſe or diſpraiſe of perſons, or things. This is a very extenſive feild, and contains in it whatever in nature or art, on the account

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of any good or bad qualities, excellences or defects, is fit to be made the ſubject of a diſcourſe. By this virtue is applauded, and vice cenſured; good examples recommended to the imitation of others, and bad ones expoſed to their abhorrence. All panegyric and invective are its proper themes. So that the cheif deſign of theſe diſcourſes is to inſpire men with generous ſentiments of honor and virtue, and to give them a diſtaſte to every thing, that is baſe and vitious, by examples of each, which are the moſt powerful means of inſtruction. Tho, as has been ſaid already, they are not wholly confined to perſons. To the *deliberative* kind belongs whatever may become a ſubject of debate, conſultation, or advice. Of this ſort are all ſpeeches made in public aſſemblies, which reſpect the common good and benefit of mankind, their lives, liberties, and eſtates; whatever is adviſed to, or diſſuaded from, upon the foot of any valuable intereſt, which is the end propoſed in theſe diſcourſes, ſo far as it is conſiſtent with honor and juſtice. The laſt head contains all *judicial ſubjects*; by this property is ſecured, innocence protected, juſtice maintained, and crimes puniſhed. All

matters

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matters canvaſſed at the bar are of this ſort. And it is doubtleſs a very valuable and uſeful end in ſpeaking, to vindicate juſtice and equity in oppoſition to fraud or violence. Ariſtotle is ſaid to have been the author of this diviſion [1], which ſeems to be very juſt; ſince perhaps there is no ſubject of oratory, whether ſacred or civil, but may be refered to one or other of theſe heads. And not only the view and intention of the ſpeaker (as we have ſeen already) is different in each of them, which would be ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them from one another; but they require likewiſe a different ſtile and way of management, as will be ſhewn hereafter, when I come to treat of each of them in particular.

[1] See Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. c. 4.

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LECTURE IV.

Of Invention in general, and particularly of Common Places.

A FINE and ſtately building affords an agreable proſpect, tho ſeen at a diſtance; but the beauty and elegancy of its parts, their proportion and order, with the united harmony and ſplendor reſulting from the whole, which diſcover themſelves at a nearer view, give a much greater pleaſure to a curious and judicious eye. In like manner, tho the account already given of the *nature* of oratory, its importance, and the great ends it is deſigned to anſwer, may excite a regard for it in ſtudious and inquiſitive minds; yet a more diſtinct explication of the ſeveral parts, whereof it conſiſts, and the fitneſs of its precepts to attain their reſpective ends, will doubtleſs very much contribute to highten its juſt value and eſteem. I now propoſe therefore to enter upon this ſubject, and in the proſecution of it, I ſhall follow the method before laid down in my laſt diſcourſe on the *diviſion* of oratory. And as I there obſerved the ſimilitude between the arts of ſpeaking and building, in both

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of which the artiſt firſt collects his materials, then adjuſts them in proper order, and afterwards gives them ſuch ornaments as ſuit his deſign; I ſhall accordingly begin with *Invention*, which furniſhes the orator with materials. For invention, conſidered in general, is the diſcovery of ſuch things, as are proper to perſuade [1]. And in order to attain this end, the orator propoſes to himſelf three things; to prove or illuſtrate the ſubject upon which he treats, to conciliate the minds of his hearers, and to ingage their paſſions in his favor. And as theſe require different kinds of arguments or motives, invention furniſhes him with a ſupply for each of them, as will be ſhewn in their order.

[1] Voſſ. *Part. orat. Lib.* 1. *c.* 2. §. 1.

I SHALL firſt conſider that part of *Invention*, which directs to *arguments proper for the proof of a thing*; which, as Cicero tells us, is, *The diſcovery of ſuch things, as are really true, or that ſeem to be ſo, and make the thing, for which they are produced, appear probable* [2]. And the things, which are thus diſcovered, are called *Arguments*. For, *an Argument*, as defined by him, *is a reaſon, which induces us to beleive, what before we doubted of* [3]. If we reflect upon thoſe things, which relate to the common affairs

[2] *De invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 7.

[3] *Topic. c.* 2.

affairs of life, and the numerous tranſactions between mankind, we ſhall find that moſt of them are of a dubious nature, and liable to various conſtructions, as they are taken in different views; from whence a diverſity of opinions is formed concerning them. And where the nature of the thing does not admit of certainty, every conſiderate and prudent perſon will give into that ſide of the queſtion, which carries in it the greater degree of probability. And as theſe are the ſubjects, with which the antient orators were principally concerned, we find by Cicero's definition, that all he requires of ſuch arguments, as they commonly made uſe of, is to render a thing probable. Indeed there are ſome things, which do not ſo much require reaſoning, as a proper and ſuitable manner of repreſenting them, to make them credible; and becauſe the ſeveral ways of illuſtrating theſe are alſo taught by the precepts of this art, they are likewiſe in a large ſenſe of the word called *arguments*.

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BUT as different kinds of diſcourſes require different *arguments*, rhetoricians have conſidered them two ways; in general, under certain heads, as a common fund for all ſubjects; and in a more particular manner,

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manner, as they are ſuited to *demonſtrative*, *deliberative*, or *judicial* diſcourſes. At preſent I ſhall treat only upon the former of theſe. And now, that one thing may receive proof and confirmation from another, it is neceſſary that there be ſome relation between them; for all things are not equally adapted to prove one another. And that we may the better conceive this, I ſhall make uſe of a plain and familiar inſtance. In meaſuring the quantity of two things, which we would ſhew to be either equal or unequal, if they are of ſuch a nature, that one cannot be applied to the other, then we take a third thing, which may be applied to them both; and that muſt be equal at leaſt to one of the two, which if applied to the other, and found equal to that alſo, we preſently conclude, that thoſe two things are equal; but if it be unequal to the other, we ſay, that thoſe two things are unequal. Becauſe it is the certain and known property of all quantities, that whatſoever two things are equal to a third, are equal to one another; and where one of any two things is equal to a third, and the other unequal, thoſe two things are unequal to one another. What has been ſaid of quantities, will hold

true in all other caſes, that ſo far as any two things or ideas agree to a third, ſo far they agree to one another. And by agreeing I underſtand this, that the one may be affirmed of the other. So likewiſe on the contrary, as far as one of any two things or ideas does agree to a third, and the other does not, ſo far they diſagree with one another, in which reſpect one of them cannot be truly affirmed of the other. Since therefore in every propoſition one thing is ſpoken of another, if we would find out whether the two ideas agree to each other or not, where this is not evident of itſelf, we muſt find out ſome third thing, the idea of which agrees to one of them; and then that being applied to the other, as it does agree or diſagree with it, ſo we may conclude, that the two things propoſed do agree or diſagree with one another. This will be made more clear by an example or two. Should it be inquired, *Whether virtue is to be loved?* the agreement between virtue and love might be found by comparing them ſeparately with happineſs, as a common meaſure to both. For ſince the idea of happineſs agrees to that of love, and the idea of virtue to that of happineſs; it follows,

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that the ideas of virtue and love agree to one another; and therefore it may be affirmed, *That virtue is to be loved.* But on the contrary, becauſe the idea of miſery diſagrees with that of love, but the idea of vice agrees to that of miſery, the two ideas of vice and love muſt conſequently diſagree with one another; and therefore it would be falſe to aſſert, *That vice is to be loved.* Now this third thing logicians call the *Medium* or *middle Term*, becauſe it does as it were connect two extremes, that is, both parts of a propoſition. But rhetoricians call it an *Argument*, becauſe it is ſo applied to what was before propoſed, as to become the inſtrument of procuring our aſſent to it. I have mentioned theſe plain examples only for illuſtration, by which we may in ſome meaſure perceive the nature and uſe of arguments.

BUT from whence, and by what methods they are to be ſought, I ſhall now explain.

A LIVELY imagination and readineſs of thought are undoubtedly a very great help to invention. Some perſons are naturally endued with that quickneſs of fancy, and penetration of mind, that they are ſeldom at a loſs for arguments either to defend their

their own opinions, or to attack their adverſaries. However theſe things being the gift of nature, and not to be gained by art, do not properly fall under our preſent conſideration. LECT. IV.

BUT, I ſuppoſe, it will be readily granted, that great learning and extenſive knowledge are a noble fund for invention. Indeed Craſſus, the Roman orator, carries this matter much farther, when he ſais: *I think, that no one ought to be accounted an orator, who is not thoroughly accompliſhed with all thoſe arts, which are fit for a gentleman to learn. For tho in an oration we do not make uſe of them, yet whether we have learnt them, or not, will appear very eaſily, and cannot be hid. As in ſculpture, tho the artiſt doth not directly make uſe of the art of painting, yet it is not difficult to diſcover whether he underſtand painting or not. In like manner in diſcourſes at the bar, in the forum, or ſenate, tho other arts are not made uſe of, yet it preſently appears, whether the perſon ſpeaking be only acquainted with the method of declaming, or comes to it qualified with all the liberal arts* [1]. It may be hard to deny the name of orator to all ſuch, who fall ſhort of the qualifications here mentioned; and Quintilian, as I have

[1] Cic. *De orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 16.

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ſhewn in a former diſcourſe [1], is for making conſiderable abatements; but yet it muſt be owned, that the greater furniture any one has acquired of uſeful learning, he will by that means be better prepared to ſpeak in public upon all occaſions. An orator therefore ſhould be furniſhed with a ſtock of important truths, ſolid maxims of reaſon, and a variety of knowledge, collected and treaſured up both from obſervation, and a large acquaintance with the liberal arts; that he may not only be qualified to expreſs himſelf in the moſt agreable manner, but likewiſe to ſupport what he ſais with the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt arguments.

[1] *Lect.* II. *p.* 20.

BUT the greateſt help to invention is, for a perſon to conſider well before hand the ſubject, upon which he is to ſpeak, and not to venture to affirm any thing concerning it, which he has not firſt a clear notion of himſelf. The better any one underſtands a thing himſelf, the better is he able to explain it to others. For tho the ſame arguments do not ſtrike the minds of all perſons with equal force, either becauſe they do not come equally prepared to attend to what is ſaid; or from a different way of thinking, to which they have been

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accuſtomed: yet there is no method, by which any one can more reaſonably hope to bring others to his opinion, than by laying before them thoſe very arguments, by which upon a cloſe conſideration of the thing he was himſelf induced to beleive it. And the more thoroughly he is himſelf perſuaded of the truth of what he ſais, he will be qualified to impreſs it with greater ſtrength and clearneſs upon the minds of thoſe, to whom he ſpeaks.

BUT becauſe all are not born with a like happy genius, and have not the ſame opportunity to cultivate their minds with learning and knowledge; and becauſe nothing is more difficult than to dwell long upon the conſideration of one thing, in order to find out the ſtrongeſt arguments, which may be offered for and againſt it; upon theſe accounts art has preſcribed a method to leſſen in ſome meaſure theſe difficulties, and help every one to a ſupply of arguments upon any ſubject. And this is done by the contrivance of *common places*, which Cicero calls the *ſeats* or *heads of arguments*, and by a Greek name *topics* [1]. They are of two ſorts, *internal* and *external*. As to the former, tho things with regard to their nature and properties are

[1] *Topic*, *c.* 1, 2.

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exceding various, yet they have certain common relations, by means whereof the truth of what is either affirmed or denied concerning them in any reſpect may be evinced. The antient Greek rhetoricians therefore reduced theſe relations to ſome general heads; which are termed *common places*, becauſe the reaſons or arguments ſuited to prove any propoſition are repoſited in them, as a common fund or receptacle. And they are called *internal heads*, becauſe they ariſe from the ſubject, upon which the orator treats; and are therefore diſtinguiſhed from others named *external*, which he fetches from without, and applies to his preſent purpoſe, as will be ſhewn hereafter [1]. Cicero and Quintilian make them ſixteen; three of which comprehend the whole thing they are brought to prove; namely, *Definition*, *Enumeration*, and *Notation*; and of the remaining thirteen ſome contain a part of it, and the reſt its various properties and circumſtances, with other conſiderations relating to it; and theſe are *Genus*, *Species*, *Antecedents*, *Conſequents*, *Adjuncts*, *Conjugates*, *Cauſe*, *Effect*, *Contraries*, *Oppoſites*, *Similitude*, *Diſſimilitude*, and *Compariſon*. I ſhall give a breif account of each of theſe, in the order now mentioned.

[1] *Lect.* V.

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DEFINITION explains the nature of the thing defined, and ſhews what it is. And to whatſoever the definition agrees, the thing defined does ſo likewiſe. If therefore Socrates be a rational creature, he is a man; becauſe it is the definition of a man, that he is a rational creature.

ENUMERATION takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove, that what agrees to all the parts, agrees to the whole; and what does not agree to any one or more parts, does not agree to the whole. As when Cicero proves to Piſo, that all the Roman ſtate hated him; by enumerating the ſeveral ranks and orders of Roman citizens, who all did ſo [1]. [1] *In Piſon.* c. 27.

NOTATION or etymology explains the meaning or ſignification of a word. From which we reaſon thus: If he cannot pay his debts, he is inſolvent: For that is the meaning of the word inſolvent.

GENUS is what contains under it two or more ſorts of things, differing in nature. From this head logicians reaſon thus: Becauſe every animal is mortal, and man is an animal, therefore man is mortal. But orators make a further uſe of this argument, which they call aſcending from the hypotheſis to the theſis, that is, from a

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particular to a general. As ſhould a perſon, when ſpeaking in praiſe of juſtice, take occaſion from thence to commend and ſhew the excellency of virtue in general, with a view to render that particular virtue more amiable. For ſince every ſpecies contains in it the whole nature of the genus, to which it relates, beſides what is peculiar to itſelf, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from it; what is affirmed of the genus, muſt of neceſſity be applicable to the ſpecies.

SPECIES is that, which comprehends under it all the individuals of the ſame nature. From hence we may argue: He is a man, therefore he has a rational ſoul. And orators ſometimes take occaſion from this head to deſcend from the theſis to the hypotheſis; that is, in treating upon what is more general to introduce ſome particular contained under it, for the greater illuſtration of the general.

ANTECEDENTS are ſuch things, as being once allowed, others neceſſarily, or very probably follow. From this head an inſeparable property is proved from its ſubject: as, It is material, and therefore corruptible.

CONSEQUENTS are ſuch things, as being allowed, neceſſarily, or very probably infer their

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their antecedents. Hence the ſubject is proved from an inſeparable property, in this manner: It is corruptible, and therefore material.

ADJUNCTS are ſeparable properties of things, or circumſtances that attend them. Theſe are very numerous, and afford a great variety of arguments, ſome of which uſually occur in every diſcourſe. They do not neceſſarily infer their ſubject, but if fitly choſen render a thing credible, and are a ſufficient ground for aſſent. The way of reaſoning from them we ſhall ſhew preſently.

CONJUGATES are words deduced from the ſame origin with that of our ſubject. By theſe the habit is proved from its acts: as, He who does juſtly, is juſt. He does not act wiſely, therefore he is not wiſe. But this inference will not hold, unleſs the actions appear continued and conſtant.

A CAUSE is that, by the force of which a thing does exiſt. There are four kinds of cauſes, matter, form, efficient and end, which afford a great variety of arguments. The way of reaſoning from them is to infer the effect from the cauſe: as, Man is endued with reaſon, therefore he is capable of knowledge.

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AN EFFECT is that, which ariſes from a cauſe, therefore the cauſe is proved by it; as, He is endued with knowledge, therefore with reaſon.

CONTRARIES are things, which under the ſame genus are at the utmoſt diſtance from each other. So that what we grant to the one, we utterly deny the other: as, Virtue ought to be embraced, therefore vice ſhould be avoided.

OPPOSITES are ſuch things, which, tho repugnant to each other, yet are not directly contradictory: as, to love and to injure, to hate and to commend. They differ from contraries in this, that they do not abſolutely exclude one another. An argument is drawn from things repugnant thus: He will do a man a miſcheif, therefore he does not love him. He loves a man, therefore he will not reproach him.

SIMILITUDE is an agreement of things in quality. Thus Cicero proves, that pernicious citizens ought to be taken out of the ſtate; by the likeneſs they bear to corrupted members, which are cut off to prevent further damage to the body [1].

[1] *Philipp.* viii. *c.* 5.

DISSIMILITUDE is a diſagreement of things in quality. From this head Cicero ſhews the preference of his own exile to Piſo's

Piſo's government of Macedonia; by the difference between their conduct, and the people's eſteem of them [1]. LECT. IV.

[1] *In Piſon.* c. 14, &c.

COMPARISON is made three ways. For either a thing is compared with a greater, with a leſs, or with its equal. This place therefore differs from that of ſimilitude on this account, that the quality was conſidered in that, but here the quantity. An argument from the greater is thus drawn: If five legions could not conquer the enemy, much leſs will two. And by this the manner of the reſt may be eaſily conceived.

I SHALL juſt give one example ſomewhat larger, than I have hitherto done, of the manner of reaſoning from theſe heads, whereby the uſe of them may further appear. If any one therefore ſhould have indeavoured to perſuade Cicero not to accept of his life upon the condition offered him by Antony; that he would burn his Philippic orations, which had been ſpoken againſt him; he might be ſuppoſed to uſe ſuch arguments as theſe; partly taken from the adjuncts of Cicero, partly from thoſe of Antony, and partly from the thing itſelf. And firſt with re-

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gard to Cicero it might be ſaid: That ſo great a man ought not to purchaſe his life at ſo dear a price, as the loſs of that immortal honor, which by ſo great pains and labor he had acquired. And this might be confirmed by another argument. That now he was grown old, and could not expect to live much longer. And from the character of Antony he might argue thus: That he was very crafty and deceitful, and only deſigned by giving him hopes of life, to have the Philippics firſt burnt, which otherwiſe he knew would tranſmit to poſterity an eternal brand of infamy upon him; and then he would take off the author. And this might be ſhewn by compariſon. For ſince he would not ſpare others, who had not ſo highly exaſperated him, and from whom he had not ſo much to fear; certainly he would not forgive Cicero, ſince he knew well enough, that ſo long as he lived, he himſelf could never be in ſafety. And laſtly an argument might alſo be fetched from the nature of the thing itſelf in the following manner. That Cicero by this action would ſhamefully betray the ſtate, and the cauſe of liberty, which he had thro his whole life moſt

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couragiouſly defended, with ſo great honor to himſelf, and advantage to the public [1]. Upon ſuch an account a perſon might have uſed theſe, or the like arguments with Cicero, which ariſe from the forementioned heads.

[1] See Senec. *Senator.* vii.

FROM this account of *Common Places* it is eaſy to conceive, what a large feild of diſcourſe they open to the mind upon every ſubject. Theſe different conſiderations furniſh out a great number and variety of arguments, ſufficient to ſupply the moſt barren invention. He can never be at a loſs for matter, who conſiders well the nature of his ſubject, the parts of which it conſiſts, the circumſtances which attend it, the cauſes from whence it ſprings, the effects it produces, its agreement, diſagreement, or repugnancy to other things, and in like manner carries it thro all the remaining heads. But altho this method will aſſiſt us very much to inlarge upon a ſubject, and place it in different views; yet a prudent man is not ſo deſirous to ſay a great deal, as to ſpeak to the purpoſe, and therefore will make choice of proper arguments, and ſuch only, which have a direct tendency to confirm or illuſtrate his ſubject.

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ſubject. And for this end, it is neceſſary for him to gain firſt a thorough knowledge of his ſubject, and then arguments will naturally ſpring up in his mind proper to ſupport it; and if he be ſtill at a loſs, and find occaſion to have recourſe to theſe heads, he will readily perceive from whence to take thoſe, which are beſt ſuited to his purpoſe.

LEC-

LECTURE V.

Of external Topics.

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THE nature and design of *Common Places* have been shewn already; and a particular account of those, which, because they are taken from the subject matter of a discourse, are therefore called *internal*, has likewise been given. But the orator sometimes reasons from such topics, as do not arise from his subject, but from things of a different nature, and for that reason are called *external*. And because the former are more properly invented by him, and the effect of his art, Aristotle calls them *artificial Topics*, and the latter *inartificial* [1]. But as they both require skill in the management, Quintilian very much blames those, who take no notice of these latter, but exclude them from the art of rhetoric [2]. I propose therefore to make them the subject of my present discourse, and shew the methods of reasoning from them. They are all taken from authorities, and are by one general name called *Testimonies*.

[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* i. *c.* 2. See also Quint. *Inst. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 1.

[2] *Ibid.*

Now

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Now a *Teſtimony* may be expreſſed by writing, ſpeech, or any other ſign proper to declare a perſon's mind. And all *teſtimonies* may be diſtinguiſhed into two ſorts, *divine* and *human*. A *divine Teſtimony*, when certainly known to be ſuch, is inconteſtable, and admits of no debate, but ſhould be acquieſced in without heſitation. Indeed the antient Greeks and Romans eſteemed the pretended oracles of their deities, the anſwers of their augurs, and the like fallacies, divine teſtimonies. But with us no one can be ignorant of their true notion, tho they do not ſo directly come under our preſent conſideration. *Human Teſtimonies* are of various kinds, but as they furniſh the orator with arguments (in which view I am now to conſider them) they may be reduced to three heads; *Writings*, *Witneſſes*, and *Contracts*.

By *Writings* here are to be underſtood writen laws, wills, or other legal inſtruments, expreſſed and conveyed in that manner. And it is not ſo much the force and validity of ſuch teſtimonies, conſidered in themſelves, that is here intended; as the occaſion of diſpute, which may at any time ariſe concerning their true deſign and import, when produced in proof upon either

either ſide of a controverſy. And theſe are five; *Ambiguity, Diſagreement between the words and intention, Contrariety, Reaſoning*, and *Interpretation* [1]. I ſhall ſpeak to each of theſe in their order. LECT. V.

[1] Cic. *De Invent. Lib.* ii. *c.* 40.

A WRITING is then ſaid to be *ambiguous*, when it is capable of two or more ſenſes, which makes the writer's deſign uncertain. Now ambiguity may ariſe either from ſingle words, or the conſtruction of ſentences. From ſingle words; as when either the ſenſe of a word, or the application of it is doubtful. As: *ſhould it be queſtioned, whether ready money ought to be included under the appellation of chattels left by a will.* Or: *if a teſtator bequeath a certain legacy to his nephew Thomas, and he has two nephews of that name.* But ambiguity is alſo ſometimes occaſioned from the conſtruction of a ſentence; as when ſeveral things, or perſons having been already mentioned, it is doubtful to which of them, that which follows ought to be refered. For example: a perſon writes thus in his will: *Let my heir give as a legacy to Titius, an horſe out of my ſtable, which he pleaſe* [2]. Here it may be queſtioned whether the word *he* refers to the heir, or to Titius; and conſequently, whether

[2] See Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vii. *c.* 9. Et Cic. *De Invent. Lib.* ii. *c.* 40.

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ther the heir be allowed to give Titius which horſe he pleaſe, or Titius may chooſe which he likes beſt. Now as to controverſies of this kind, in the firſt caſe above mentioned, the party, who claims the chattels, may plead, that all moveable goods come under that name, and therefore that he has a right to the money. This he will endeavour to prove from ſome inſtances, where the word has been ſo uſed. The buſineſs of the oppoſite party is to refute this, by ſhewing that money is not there included. And if either ſide produce precedents in his favor, the other may indeavour to ſhew the caſes are not parallel. As to the ſecond caſe, ariſing from an ambiguity in the name, if any other words or expreſſions in the will ſeem to countenance either of the claimants, he will not fail to interpret them to his advantage. So likewiſe if any thing ſaid by the teſtator, in his life time, or any regard ſhewn to either of theſe nephews more than the other, may help to determine, which of them was intended; a proper uſe may be made of it. And the ſame may be ſaid with regard to the third caſe. In which the legatee may reaſon likewiſe from the common uſe of language, and

ſhew,

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ſhew, that in ſuch expreſſions it is uſual to make the reference to the laſt or next antecedent; and from thence plead, that it was the deſign of the teſtator to give him the option. But in anſwer to this it may be ſaid, that allowing it to be very often ſo; yet in this inſtance it ſeems more eaſy and natural, to repeat the verb *give* after *pleaſe*, and ſo to ſupply the ſentence, *which he pleaſe to give him*, refering it to the heir; than to bring in the verb *chooſe*, which was not in the ſentence before, and ſo by ſupplying the ſenſe, *which he pleaſe to chooſe*, to give the option to Titius. But where controverſies of this kind ariſe from a law, recourſe may be had to other laws, where the ſame thing has been expreſſed with greater clearneſs, which may help to determine the ſenſe of the paſſage in diſpute.

A SECOND controverſy from *Writings* is, when one party adheres to the *words*, and the other to what he aſſerts was the writer's *intention*. Now he who oppoſes the literal ſenſe, either contends, that what he himſelf offers is the ſimple and plain meaning of the writing; or that it muſt be ſo underſtood in the particular caſe in debate. An inſtance of the former is this,

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as we find it in Cicero. A perſon who died without children, but left a widow, had made this proviſion in his will: *If I have a ſon born to me, he ſhall be my heir.* And a little after: *If my ſon die, before he comes of age, let Curius be my heir* [1]. There is no ſon born, Curius therefore ſues for the eſtate, and pleads the intention of the teſtator, who deſigned him for his heir, if he ſhould have no ſon, who arrived at age; and ſais, there can be no reaſon to ſuppoſe, he did not intend the ſame perſon for his heir, if he had no ſon, as if he ſhould have one, who afterwards died in his minority. But the heir at law inſiſts upon the words of the will, which, as he ſais, require, that firſt a ſon ſhould be born, and afterwards die under age, before Curius can ſuccede to the inheritance. And there being no ſon, a ſubſtituted heir, as Curius was, can have no claim, where the firſt heir does not exiſt, from whom he derives his pretention, and was to ſuccede by the appointment of the will. Of the latter caſe rhetoricians give this example: *It was forbiden by a law to open the city gates in the night. A certain perſon notwithſtanding in time of war did open them in the night, and let in*

[1] See Cic. *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 32. *De invent. Lib.* ii. *c.* 42.

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in ſome auxiliary troops, to prevent their being cut off by the enemy, who was poſted near the town. Afterwards, when the war was over, this perſon is arraigned, and tried for his life, on the account of this action [1]. Now in ſuch a caſe the proſecutor founds his charge upon the expreſs words of the law; and pleads, that no ſufficient reaſon can be aſſigned for going contrary to the letter of it, which would be to make a new law, and not to execute one already made. The defendant on the other hand alleges, that the fact, he is charged with, cannot however come within the intention of the law; ſince he either could not, or ought not to have complied with the letter of it in that particular caſe, which muſt therefore neceſſarily be ſuppoſed to have been excepted in the deſign of that law, when it was made. But to this the proſecutor may reply; that all ſuch exceptions, as are intended by any law, are uſually expreſſed in it: and inſtances may be brought of particular exceptions expreſſed in ſome laws; and if there be any ſuch exception in the law under debate, it ſhould eſpecially be mentioned. He may further add; that to admit of exceptions not expreſſed in the

[1] Hermog. *De ſtat.* §. 11.

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law itſelf, is to enervate the force of all laws by explaining them away, and in effect to render them uſeleſs. And this he may further corroborate, by comparing the law under debate with others, and conſidering its nature, and importance, and how far the public intereſt of the ſtate is concerned in the due and regular execution of it; from whence he may infer, that ſhould exceptions be admited in other laws of leſs conſequence, yet however they ought not in this. Laſtly, he may conſider the reaſon alleged by the defendant, on which he founds his plea, and ſhew, there was not that neceſſity of violating the law in the preſent caſe, as is pretended. And this is often the more requiſite, becauſe the party, who diſputes againſt the words of the law, always endeavours to ſupport his allegations from the equity of the caſe. If therefore this plea can be enervated, the main ſupport of the defendant's cauſe is removed. For as the former arguments are deſigned to prevail with the judge to determine the matter on this ſide the queſtion, from the nature of the caſe; ſo the intention of this argument is to induce him to it, from the weakneſs of the defenſe made by the oppoſite party.

But

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But the defendant will on the contrary uſe ſuch arguments, as may beſt demonſtrate the equity of his cauſe, and endeavour to vindicate the fact from his good deſign, and intention in doing it. He will ſay, that the laws have alloted puniſhments for the commiſſion of ſuch facts, as are evil in themſelves, or prejudicial to others; neither of which can be charged upon the action, for which he is accuſed: that no law can be rightly executed, if more regard be had to the words and ſyllables of the writing, than to the intention of the legiſlator. To which purpoſe he may allege that direction of the law itſelf, which ſais: *The law ought not to be too rigorouſly interpreted, nor the words of it ſtrained; but the true intention and deſign of each part of it duly conſidered* [1]. As alſo that ſaying of Cicero: *What law may not be weakened and deſtroyed, if we bend the ſenſe to the words, and do not regard the deſign and view of the legiſlator* [2]? Hence he may take occaſion to complain of the hardſhip of ſuch a procedure, that no difference ſhould be made between an audacious and wilful crime, and an honeſt or neceſſary action, which might happen to diſagree with the letter of the law, tho

[1] L. 19. *hibend.*

[2] *Pro Caecin. c.* 18.

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not with the intent of it. And as it was obſerved before to be of conſiderable ſervice to the accuſer, if he could remove the defendant's plea of equity; ſo it will be of equal advantage to the defendant, if he can fix upon any words in the law, which may in the leaſt ſeem to countenance his caſe, ſince this will take off the main force of the charge.

THE third controverſy of this kind is, when two writings happen to *claſh* with each other, or at leaſt ſeem to do ſo. Of this Hermogenes gives the following inſtance. One law injoins: *He, who continues alone in a ſhip during a tempeſt, ſhall have the property of the ſhip.* Another law ſais: *A diſinherited ſon ſhall injoy no part of his father's eſtate* [1]. Now a ſon, who had been diſinherited by his father, happens to be in his father's ſhip in a tempeſt, and continues there alone, when every one elſe had deſerted it. He claims the ſhip by the former of theſe laws, and his brother tries his right with him by the latter. In ſuch caſes therefore it may firſt be conſidered, whether the two laws can be reconciled. And if that cannot be done, then which of them appears more equitable. Alſo whether one be poſitive, and

[1] Hermog. *De Stat.* §. 12.

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the other negative; becauſe prohibitions are a ſort of exceptions to poſitive injunctions. Or if one be a general law; and the other more particular, and come nearer to the matter in queſtion. Likewiſe which was laſt made: ſince former laws are often abrogated, either wholly or in part, by ſubſequent laws; or at leaſt were deſigned to be ſo. Laſtly, it may be obſerved, whether one of the laws be not plain and expreſs, and the other more dubious, or has any ambiguity in it. All or any of which things that party will not omit to improve for his advantage, whoſe intereſt is concerned in it.

THE fourth controverſy is *Reaſoning*. As when ſomething not expreſsly provided for by a law, is infered by ſimilitude, or parity of reaſon, from what is contained in it. Quintilian mentions this inſtance of it: *There was a law made at Tarentum to prohibit the exportation of wool, but a certain perſon exports ſheep* [1]. In this caſe the proſecutor may firſt compare the thing, which occaſions the charge, with the words of the law, and ſhew their agreement, and how unneceſſary it was, that particular thing ſhould have been expreſsly mentioned in the law, ſince it is plainly con-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vii. *c.* 8.

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tained in it, or at leaſt an evident conſequence from it. He may then plead that many things of a like nature are omited in other laws for the ſame reaſon. And laſtly, he may urge the reaſonableneſs and equity of the procedure. The defendant on the other hand will endeavour to ſhew the deficiency of the reaſoning, and the difference between the two caſes. He will inſiſt upon the plain and expreſs words of the law, and ſet forth the ill tendency of ſuch inferences, and concluſions drawn from ſimilitudes, and compariſons; ſince there is ſcarce any thing, but in ſome reſpect may bear a reſemblance to another.

THE laſt controverſy under this head is *Interpretation*, in which the diſpute turns upon the true meaning and explication of the law, in reference to that particular caſe. We have the following inſtance of this in the Pandects: *A man who had two ſons, both under age, ſubſtitutes Titius as heir to him, who ſhould die laſt, provided both of them died in their minority. They both periſh together at ſea, before they came to age. Here ariſes a doubt, whether the ſubſtitution can take place, or the inheritance devolves to the heir at law* [1]. The latter pleads, that as neither of them can be ſaid to have died

[1] *L. 9. ff. de rebus dub.*

laſt, the ſubſtitution cannot take place, which was ſuſpended upon the condition, that one died after the other. But to this it may be ſaid, it was the intention of the teſtator, that if both died in their nonage, Titius ſhould ſuccede to the inheritance; and therefore it makes no difference whether they died together, or one after the other; and ſo the law determines it.

THE ſecond head of external arguments are *Witneſſes*. Theſe may either give their evidence, when abſent, in writing ſubſcribed with their name; or preſent, by word of mouth [1]. And what both of them teſtify, may either be from hear-ſay; or what they ſaw themſelves, and were preſent at the time it was done. As the weight of the evidence may be thought greater or leſs on each of theſe accounts, either party will make ſuch uſe of it, as he finds for his advantage. The characters of the witneſſes are alſo to be conſidered; and if any thing be found in their lives, or behaviour, that is juſtly exceptionable, to invalidate their evidence, it ought not to be omited. And how they are affected to the contending parties, or either of them, may deſerve conſideration; for ſome allowances may be judged reaſonable in caſe of freindſhip,

[1] See Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 7.

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ſhip, or enmity, where there is no room for any other exception. But regard ſhould cheifly be had to what they teſtify, and how far the cauſe is affected by it. Cicero is very large upon moſt of theſe heads in his defenſe of Marcus Fonteius, with a deſign to weaken the evidence of the Gauls againſt him [1]. And where witneſſes are produced on one ſide only, as orators ſometimes attempt to leſſen the credit of this kind of proof, by pleading that witneſſes are liable to be corrupted, or biaſſed by ſome prevailing intereſt or paſſion, to which arguments taken from the nature and circumſtances of things are not ſubject; it may be anſwered on the other hand, that ſophiſtical arguments, and falſe colourings are not expoſed to infamy or puniſhment, whereas witneſſes are reſtrained by ſhame and penalties, nor would the law require them, if they were not neceſſary.

[1] *Cap.* 6. *&c.*

THE third and laſt head of external arguments are *Contracts*, which may be either public or private. By public are meant the tranſactions between different ſtates, as leagues, alliances, and the like; which depend on the laws of nations, and come more properly under deliberative diſcourſes, to which I ſhall refer them [2]. Thoſe are called pri-

[2] See *Lect.* IX.

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private, which relate to leſſer bodies, or ſocieties of men, and ſingle perſons; and may be either writen, or verbal. And it is not ſo much the true meaning and purport of them, that is here conſidered, as their force and obligation. And, as the Roman law declares, *Nothing can be more agreable to human faith, than that perſons ſhould ſtand to their agreements* [1]. Therefore in controverſies of this kind, the party, whoſe intereſt it is, that the contract ſhould be maintained, will plead, that ſuch covenants have the force of private laws, and ought religiouſly to be obſerved, ſince the common affairs of mankind are tranſacted in that manner; and therefore to violate them, is to deſtroy all commerce and ſociety among men. On the other ſide it may be ſaid, that juſtice and equity are cheifly to be regarded, which are immutable. And beſides, that the public laws are the common rule to determine ſuch differences, which are deſigned to redreſs thoſe, who are aggreived. And indeed where a compact has been obtained by force or fraud, it is in itſelf void, and has no effect either in law or reaſon. But on the other hand, the Roman lawyers ſeem to have very rightly determined, that all ſuch ob-

[1] *L. 1. pr. ff. de poet.*

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obligations, as are founded in natural equity, tho not binding by national laws, and are therefore called *nuda pacta*, ought however in honor and conſcience to be performed [1].

[1] Pauli *Recept. Sent. Lib.* ii. *t.* 14. *de uſur.* §. 1. *& ibi Schulting.*

THUS I have gon thro the common heads of invention, both internal and external, which may be of ſervice to an orator, when his view is to inform his hearers, and prove the truth of what he aſſerts. But the particular application of them to the ſeveral ſorts of diſcourſes, he may have occaſion to treat upon, I ſhall explain in ſome following lectures.

LEC-

LECTURE VI.

Of the State of a Controverſy.

IN my two laſt diſcourſes I conſidered the nature of *Common Places*, with the method of reaſoning from them; and ſhould now procede in a more particular manner to ſhew the uſe of them in the ſeveral kinds of diſcourſes; but there is one thing, which muſt be firſt inquired into, and that is, what rhetoricians call, *The State of a Cauſe* or *Controverſy*. For the antients obſerving, that the principal queſtion, or point of diſpute, in all controverſies might be refered to ſome particular head, reduced thoſe heads to a certain number; that both the nature of the queſtion might by that means be better known, and the arguments ſuited to it be diſcovered with greater eaſe. And theſe heads they call *States*. LECT. VI.

BY the *State of a Controverſy* then we are to underſtand, the principal point in diſpute between contending parties, upon the proof of which the whole cauſe or controverſy depends. We find it expreſſed by ſeveral other names in antient writers:

as,

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as, *the conſtitution of the cauſe, the general head, and the cheif queſtion* [1]. And as this is the principal thing to be attended to in every ſuch diſcourſe; ſo it is what firſt requires the conſideration of the ſpeaker, and ſhould be well fixed and digeſted in his mind, before he procedes to look for arguments proper to ſupport it. Thus Antony, the Roman orator, ſpeaking of his own method in his pleadings, ſais: *When I underſtand the nature of the cauſe, and begin to conſider it, the firſt thing I endeavour to do is, to ſettle with myſelf what that is, to which all my diſcourſe relating to the matter in diſpute ought to be refered: then I diligently attend to thoſe other two things, how to recommend myſelf, or thoſe for whom I plead, to the good eſteem of my hearers; and how to influence their minds, as may beſt ſuit my deſign* [2]. This way of proceding appears very agreable to reaſon and prudence. For what can be more abſurd, than for a perſon to attempt the proof of any thing, before he has well ſettled in his own mind a clear and diſtinct notion, what the thing is, which he would endeavour to prove? Quintilian deſcribes it to be, *That kind of queſtion, which ariſes from the firſt conflict of cauſes* [3]. In judi-

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 6. Juven. *Sat.* 6.

[2] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 27.

[3] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 6.

cial

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cial cafes it immediately follows upon the charge of the plaintif, and plea of the defendant. Our common law expreffes it by one word, namely, the *Iſſue*. Which interpreters explain, by deſcribing it to be, *That point of matter depending in ſuit, whereupon the parties join, and put their cauſe to the trial*[1]. Examples will further help to illuſtrate this, and render it more evident. In the cauſe of Milo, the charge of the Clodian party is, *Milo killed Clodius*. Milo's plea or defenſe, *I killed him, but juſtly*. From hence ariſes this grand queſtion, or ſtate of the cauſe: *Whether it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius?* And that Clodius was lawfully killed by Milo, is what Cicero in his defenſe of Milo principally endeavours to prove. This is the main ſubject of that fine and beautiful oration. The whole of his diſcourſe is to be conſidered as centering at laſt in this one point. Whatever different matters are occaſionally mentioned, will, if cloſely attended to, be found to have been introduced ſome way or other, the better to ſupport and carry on this deſign. Now in ſuch caſes, where the fact is not denied, but ſomething is offered in its defenſe, the ſtate of the cauſe is taken from the de-

[1] Manley *in voc.* Iſſue.

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defendant's plea, who is obliged to make it good. As in the inſtance here given, the cheif point in diſpute was the lawfulneſs of Milo's action, which it was Cicero's buſineſs to demonſtrate. But when the defendant denies the fact, the ſtate of the cauſe ariſes from the accuſation; the proof of which then lies upon the plaintif, and not, as in the former caſe, upon the defendant. So in the cauſe of Roſcius, the charge made againſt him is, *That he killed his father*. But he denies the fact. The grand queſtion therefore to be argued is: *Whether or not he killed his father?* The proof of this lay upon his accuſers. And Cicero's deſign in his defenſe of him is to ſhew, that they had not made good their charge. But it ſometimes happens, that the defendant neither abſolutely denies the fact, nor attempts to juſtify it; but only endeavours to qualify it, by denying that it is a crime of that nature, or deſerves that name, by which it is expreſſed in the charge. We have an example of this propoſed by Cicero: *A perſon is accuſed of ſacrilege, for taking a thing, that was ſacred, out of a private houſe. He owns the fact, but denies it to be ſacrilege; ſince it was committed in a private houſe, and not*

in

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in a temple. Hence this queſtion ariſes; *Whether to take a ſacred thing out of a private houſe is to be deemed ſacrilege, or only ſimple theft*[1]? It lies upon the accuſer to prove, what the other denies; and therefore the ſtate of the cauſe is here alſo, as well as in the preceding caſe, taken from the inditement.

1 *De Invent. Lib.* ii. *c.* 18. See alſo Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vii. *c.* 3.

BUT beſides the principal queſtion, there are other ſubordinate queſtions, which follow upon it in the courſe of a diſpute, and ſhould be carefully diſtinguiſhed from it. Particularly that, which ariſes from the reaſon or argument, which is brought in proof of the principal queſtion. For the principal queſtion itſelf proves nothing, but is the thing to be proved, and becomes at laſt the concluſion of the diſcourſe. Thus in the cauſe of Milo, his argument is:: *I killed Clodius juſtly, becauſe he aſſaſſinated me.* Unleſs the Clodian party be ſuppoſed to deny this, they give up their cauſe. From hence therefore this ſubordinate queſtion follows: *Whether Clodius aſſaſſinated Milo?* Now Cicero ſpends much time in the proof of this, as the hinge, on which the firſt queſtion, and conſequently the whole cauſe depended. For if this was once made to appear, the lawfulneſs

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of Milo's killing Clodius, which was the grand queſtion or thing to be proved, might be infered, as an allowed conſequence from it. This will be evident, by throwing Milo's argument, as uſed by Cicero, into the form of a ſyllogiſm.

An aſſaſſinator is lawfully killed:
Clodius was an aſſaſſinator:
Therefore he was lawfully killed by Milo, whom he aſſaſſinated.

If the minor propoſition of this ſyllogiſm was granted, no one would deny the concluſion. For the Roman law allowed of ſelf defenſe. But as Cicero was very ſenſible this would not be admited, ſo he takes much pains to bring the court into the beleif of it. Now where the argument brought in defenſe of the ſecond queſtion is conteſted, or the orator ſuppoſes that it may be ſo, and therefore ſupports that with another argument, this occaſions a third queſtion conſequent upon the former; and in like manner he may procede to a fourth. But be they more or fewer, they are to be conſidered but as one chain of ſubordinate queſtions, dependent upon the firſt. And tho each of them has its particular ſtate, yet none of theſe is, what rhetoricians call *The State*

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of the Cauſe, which is to be underſtood only of the principal queſtion. And if, as it frequently happens, the firſt or principal queſtion is itſelf directly proved from more than one argument; this makes no other difference, but that each of theſe arguments, ſo far as they are followed by others to ſupport them, become a diſtinct ſeries of ſubordinate queſtions, all dependent upon the firſt. As when Cicero endeavours to prove, that Roſcius did not kill his father, from two reaſons or arguments: *Becauſe he had neither any cauſe to move him to ſuch a barbarous action, nor any opportunity for it* [1].

[1] *Pro Roſc. Amer. c.* 14.

MOREOVER, beſides theſe ſubordinate queſtions, there are alſo incidental ones often introduced, which have ſome reference to the principal queſtion, and contribute towards the proof of it, tho they are not neceſſarily connected with it, or dependent upon it. And each of theſe alſo has its *State*, tho different from that of the *Cauſe*. For every queſtion, or point of controverſy, muſt be ſtated, before it can be made the ſubject of diſputation. And it is for this reaſon, that every new argument advanced by an orator is called a queſtion, becauſe it is conſidered as a

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freſh matter of controverſy. In Cicero's defenſe of Milo, we meet with ſeveral of this ſort of queſtions, occaſioned by ſome aſperſions, which had been thrown out by the Clodian party to the prejudice of Milo. As, *That he was unworthy to ſee the light, who owned he had killed a man.* For Milo before his trial had openly confeſſed, he killed Clodius. So likewiſe, *That the ſenate had declared the killing of Clodius was an illegal action.* And further, *That Pompey, by making a new law to ſettle the manner of Milo's trial, had given his judgement againſt Milo.* Now to each of theſe Cicero replies, before he procedes to the principal queſtion. And therefore, tho the queſtion, in which the ſtate of a controverſy conſiſts, is ſaid by Quintilian to ariſe from, *the firſt conflict of cauſes*, yet we find by this inſtance of Cicero, that it is not always the firſt queſtion in order, upon which the orator treats.

BUT it ſometimes happens, that the ſame cauſe or controverſy contains in it more than one ſtate. Thus in judicial cauſes, every diſtinct charge occaſions a new ſtate. All Cicero's orations againſt Verres relate to one cauſe, founded upon a law of the Romans againſt unjuſt exactions,

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actions, made by their governors of provinces upon the inhabitants; but as that proſecution is made up of as many charges, as there are orations, every charge, or inditement, has its different ſtate. So likewiſe his oration in defenſe of Coelius has two ſtates, in anſwer to a double charge made againſt him by his adverſaries: one, *for borrowing money of Clodia, in order to bribe certain ſlaves to kill a foreign ambaſſador*; and the other, *for an attempt afterward to poiſon Clodia herſelf*. Beſides which there were alſo ſeveral other matters of a leſs heinous nature, which had been thrown upon him by his accuſers, with a deſign, very likely, to render the two principal charges more credible; to which Cicero firſt replies, in the ſame manner, as in his defenſe of Milo.

THO all the examples, we have hitherto brought to illuſtrate this ſubject, have been taken from judicial caſes; yet not only theſe, but very frequently diſcourſes of the deliberative kind, and ſometimes thoſe of the demonſtrative, are managed in a controverſial way. And all controverſies have their *State*. And therefore Quintilian very juſtly obſerves, that *ſtates belong both to general and particular queſtions; and to all*

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ſorts of cauſes demonſtrative, deliberative, and judicial [1]. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, this is the main point in diſpute between him, and thoſe who oppoſed that law: *Whether Pompey was the fiteſt perſon to be intruſted with the management of the war againſt Mithridates?* This is a ſubject of the deliberative kind. And of the ſame nature was that debate in the ſenate, concerning the demolition of Carthage. For the matter in diſpute between Cato, who argued for it, and thoſe who were of the contrary opinion, ſeems to have been this: *Whether it was for the intereſt of the Romans to demoliſh Carthage* [2]? And ſo likewiſe in thoſe two fine orations of Cato and Caeſar, given us by Salluſt, relating to the conſpirators with Catiline, who were then in cuſtody, the controverſy turns upon this: *Whether thoſe priſoners ſhould be puniſhed with death, or perpetual impriſonment?* Examples of the demonſtrative kind are not ſo common; but, I think, Cicero's oration concerning the *Anſwers of the ſoothſayers*, may afford us an inſtance of it. Several prodigies had lately happened at Rome, upon which the ſoothſayers being conſulted, aſſigned this as the reaſon of them; becauſe ſome places conſecrated

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 6. See alſo Cic. *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 42.

[2] See Flor. *Lib.* ii. *c.* 15. *&c.*

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ſecrated to the gods, had been afterwards converted to civil uſes. Clodius charged this upon Cicero, whoſe houſe was rebuilt at the public expenſe, after it had been demoliſhed by Clodius, and the ground conſecrated to the goddeſs Liberty. Cicero in this oration retorts the charge, and ſhews, that the prodigies did not reſpect him, but Clodius. So that the queſtion in diſpute was: *To which of the two thoſe prodigies related.* This oration does not appear to have been ſpoken in a judicial way, and muſt therefore belong to the demonſtrative kind. His invective againſt Piſo is likewiſe much of the ſame nature, wherein he compares his own behaviour and conduct with that of Piſo.

As to the number of theſe *States*, both Cicero and Quintilian reduce them to three. I ſhall recite Quintilian's reaſon, which he gives for this opinion. *We muſt*, ſais he, *agree with thoſe, whoſe authority Cicero follows, who tell us, that three things may be inquired into in all diſputes; whether a thing is, what it is, and how it is. And this is the method, which nature preſcribes. For in the firſt place it is neceſſary the thing ſhould exiſt, about which the diſpute is: becauſe no judgement can be made*

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either of its nature, or quality, till its exiſtence be manifeſt; which is therefore the firſt queſtion. But tho it be manifeſt, that a thing is, it does not preſently appear what it is; and when this is known, the quality yet remains: and after theſe three are ſetled, no further inquiry is neceſſary [1]. Thus far Quintilian. Now the firſt of theſe three ſtates is called the *conjectural* ſtate; as if it be inquired: *Whether one perſon killed another?* This always follows upon the denial of a fact, by one of the parties, as was the caſe of Roſcius. And it receives its name from hence, that the judge is left, as it were, to conjecture, whether the fact was really commited, or not, from the evidence produced on the other ſide. The ſecond is called the *definitive* ſtate, when the fact is not denied; but the diſpute turns upon the nature of it, and what name is proper to give it; as in that example of Cicero: *Whether to take a ſacred thing out of a private houſe be theft, or ſacrilege?* For in this caſe it is neceſſary to ſettle the diſtinct notion of thoſe two crimes, and ſhew their difference. The third is called the ſtate of *quality*, when the contending parties are agreed both as to the fact, and the nature of it; but the diſ-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. c. 6.

diſpute is: *Whether it be juſt or unjuſt, profitable or unprofitable, and the like*: as in the cauſe of Milo. Ariſtotle [1], and from him Voſſius [2], add a fourth ſtate, namely of *quantity*. As: *Whether an injury be ſo great, as it is ſaid to be.* But Quintilian thinks this may be refered to ſome or other of the preceding ſtates; ſince it depends upon the circumſtances of the fact, as the intention, time, place, or the like [3].

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[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. *c.* 26.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* 1. *c.* 6. §. 7.

[3] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 6.

FROM what has been ſaid upon this ſubject, the uſe of it may in a good meaſure appear. For whoever ingages in a controverſy, ought in the firſt place to conſider with himſelf the main queſtion in diſpute, to fix it well in his mind, and keep it conſtantly in his view; without which he will be very liable to ramble from the point, and bewilder both himſelf, and his hearers. And it is no leſs the buſineſs of the hearers principally to attend to this; by which means they will be helped to diſtinguiſh and ſeparate from the principal queſtion, what is only incidental, and to obſerve how far the principal queſtion is affected by it; to perceive what is offered in proof, and what is only brought in for illuſtration; not to be miſled

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by digreſſions, but to diſcern when the ſpeaker goes off from his ſubject, and when he returns to it again; and, in a word, to accompany him thro the whole diſcourſe, and carry with them the principal chain of reaſoning, upon which the cauſe depends, ſo as to judge upon the whole, whether he has made out his point, and the concluſion follows from the premiſes. The neceſſity of this is generally the greater, in proportion to the length of a diſcourſe, however exact and artful the compoſition may be. They, who have read Cicero's orations with care, cannot but know, that altho they are formed in the moſt beautiful manner, and wrought up with the greateſt ſkill; yet the matter of them is often ſo copious, the arguments ſo numerous, the incidents either to conciliate or move his audience ſo frequent, and the digreſſions ſo agreable; that without the cloſeſt attention it is many times no eaſy matter to keep his main deſign in view. A conſtant and fixed regard therefore to the ſtate of the cauſe, and principal point in diſpute, is highly neceſſary to this end. But tho rhetoricians treat of theſe ſtates only as they relate to controverſies, and become the ſubject matter of diſpute between differing parties;

parties; yet every diſcourſe has one or more principal heads, which the ſpeaker cheifly propoſes to prove or illuſtrate. And therefore what has been ſaid upon this ſubject, may likewiſe be conſidered, as proper to be attended to in all diſcourſes. LECT. VI.

I HAVE only to add, that hitherto I have treated of the nature and uſe of the three ſtates ſo far, as relates to them in general; a more particular account of them, with the arguments, which are properly ſuited to each ſtate, will be given hereafter in their due place [1].

[1] See *Lect.* IX.

LEC-

LECTURE VII.

Of Arguments ſuited to Demonſtrative Diſcourſes.

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THE general method of deducing *Arguments* from *Common Places*, has been already explained. But more fully to ſhew the uſe of this ſubject, and the aſſiſtance it affords the orator, it may not be improper ſeparately to conſider the particular heads, which are more eſpecially ſuited to the ſeveral kinds of diſcourſes. Theſe are ſubordinate to the former, and ſpring from them, like branches from the ſame ſtock, or rivulets from a common fountain; as will evidently appear, when we come to explain them.

THIS is what I propoſe to enter upon at preſent, and ſhall begin with thoſe, which relate to *demonſtrative* diſcourſes. And as theſe conſiſt either in praiſe or diſpraiſe, agreably to the nature of all contraries, one of them will ſerve to illuſtrate the other. Thus he, who knows, what *Arguments* are proper to prove the excellency of virtue, and commend it to our eſteem; cannot be much at a loſs for ſuch, as will ſhew the

the odious nature of vice, and expoſe it to every one's abhorrence; ſince they are all taken from the ſame heads, and directly the reverſe of each other. In treating therefore upon the topics, ſuited to this kind of diſcourſes, I need only mention thoſe, which are requiſite for praiſe; from whence ſuch, as are proper for diſpraiſe, will eaſily enough be diſcovered. LECT. VII.

Now we praiſe either *perſons* or *things*: under which diviſion all beings with their properties and circumſtances may be comprehended, ſo as to take in whatever belongs either to nature or art. But in each part of the diviſion I ſhall confine my diſcourſe principally to thoſe ſubjects, relating to ſocial life, in which oratory is more uſually converſant. And under the former head, which reſpects perſons or intelligent beings, I ſhall only ſpeak of men. The antient ſophiſts among the Greeks in their laudatory ſpeeches ſeem rather to have ſtudied, how to diſplay their own eloquence, than to make them ſerve any valuable purpoſes in life; for their characters were ſo hightened, like poetical images, as ſuited them more to excite wonder and ſurpriſe, than to become the proper ſubjects of imitation. And for this reaſon Ariſtotle excludes

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cludes them from the number of civil diſcourſes, or ſuch as relate to the affairs of ſociety [1]. Tho if we conſider their nature, rather than the abuſe of them, they appear to be very proper ſubjects for an orator, and to come within the main deſign of his province, which is perſuaſion. For to what purpoſe can eloquence be better employed, than to celebrate virtuous perſons, or actions, in ſuch a manner, as to excite mankind to their imitation, which is the proper end of ſuch diſcourſes. And indeed the panegyrics of the Greeks, which were pronounced in the general aſſemblies of their ſeveral ſtates, ſeem to have been deſigned to recommend virtue by ſo public a teſtimony, as appears by that of Iſocrates in praiſe of the Athenians. For as to the invectives of Demoſthenes againſt king Philip, they are rather of the *deliberative* kind, and ſo do not come under our preſent conſideration; ſince the orator's principal view in thoſe diſcourſes is to animate the Athenians in a defenſe of their liberties, by a vigorous proſecution of the war againſt king Philip; to which end he likewiſe propoſes the fiteſt methods for carrying it on with ſucceſs. And moſt of Cicero's invectives againſt Mark Antony may be re-

fered

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 7.

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fered to the ſame kind of diſcourſes. But as it is evident from common obſervation, that men are more influenced by examples, than precepts; ſo the celebrating virtue, and expoſing vice, from particular inſtances in human life, as patterns to others in what they ought to purſue, and what to avoid, has by wiſe men been generally eſteemed very ſerviceable to mankind. For which reaſon likewiſe the tranſmiting to poſterity the lives of great and eminent men has met with good acceptance, as a uſeful and laudable deſign. And therefore the Romans, who were ſenſible that ſuch diſcourſes were not only ſuited for entertainment, but might likewiſe be made very uſeful to the public, did not confine them to the ſchools of rhetoricians, and the exerciſes of young perſons. For it was their cuſtom, as Quintilian tells us, to have them pronounced in public aſſemblies, even by magiſtrates, and ſometimes by an order from the ſenate [1]. So we read, that a funeral oration was ſpoken in honor of Junius Brutus by Publicola, his collegue in the conſulſhip [2]. And a like diſcourſe, with a ſtatue and public funeral was decreed by the ſenate to the honor of M. Juventius [3]. Tho afterwards indeed we

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 7.

[2] Dion. Hal. *Lib.* v. *c.* 17.

[3] Dion. Caſſ. *Lib.* xlvi. *p.* 324.

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we generally find this office performed by ſome relation. In compliance with which cuſtom, as Suetonius relates, Auguſtus, when but twelve years of age, pronounced a funeral diſcourſe in praiſe of his grandmother Julia [1]. And Tiberius, when but nine years old, paid the like honor to his deceaſed father, as the ſame hiſtorian informs us [2]. And Cicero's invective againſt Piſo, with his ſecond againſt Mark Antony, may be refered to *demonſtrative* diſcourſes, as they reſpect things that were paſt, and ſo could not then be ſubjects for conſultation. For all praiſe or diſpraiſe muſt either regard what is paſt, or preſent. And generally ſpeaking, perſons are moſt affected by preſent things. Indeed the encomiums of antient heroes, and their famous actions, are very entertaining, and afford an agreable pleaſure in the recital; but ſuch examples of virtue, as are ſtill in being, or at leaſt yet freſh in memory, have the greateſt influence for imitation.

[1] *In Vit.* c. 9.

[2] *In Vit.* c. 6.

BUT in praiſing or diſpraiſing *perſons*, rhetoricians preſcribe two methods. One is, to follow the order, in which every thing happened, that is mentioned in the diſcourſe; the other is, to reduce what is ſaid under certain general heads, without

out a ſtrict regard to the order of time. LECT. VII.

IN purſuing the former method, the diſcourſe may be very conveniently divided into three periods. The firſt of which will contain, what preceded the perſon's birth; the ſecond, the whole courſe of his life; and the third, what followed upon his death.

UNDER the firſt of theſe may be comprehended, what is proper to be ſaid concerning his country or family. And therefore, if theſe were honorable, it may be ſaid to his advantage, that he no ways diſgraced them, but acted ſuitably to ſuch a deſcent. But if they were not ſo, they may be either wholly omited, or it may be ſaid, that inſtead of deriving thence any advantage to his character, he has confered a laſting honor upon them; and that it is not of ſo much moment where, or from whom a perſon derives his birth, as how he lives.

IN the ſecond period, which is that of his life, the qualities both of his mind and body, with his circumſtances in the world, may be ſeparately conſidered. Tho as Quintilian rightly obſerves: *All external advantages are not praiſed for themſelves;*

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ſelves, but according to the uſe, that is made of them. For riches, and power, and intereſt, as they have great influence, and may be applied either to good or bad purpoſes, are a proof of the temper of our minds, and therefore we are either made better, or worſe by them [1]. But theſe things are a juſt ground for commendation, when they are the reward of virtue, or induſtry. Bodily indowments are health, ſtrength, beauty, activity, and the like; which are more or leſs commendable, according as they are imployed. And where theſe, or any of them, are wanting, it may be ſhewn, that they are abundantly compenſated by the more valuable indowments of the mind. Nay ſometimes a defect in theſe may give an advantageous turn to a perſon's character; for any virtue appears greater, in proportion to the diſadvantages the perſon laboured under in exerting it. But the cheif topics of praiſe are taken from the virtues and qualifications of the mind. And here the orator may conſider the diſpoſition, education, learning, and ſeveral virtues, which ſhone thro the whole courſe of the perſon's life. In doing which the preference ſhould always be given to virtue above knowledge, or any other accom-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 7.

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pliſhment. And in actions, thoſe are moſt conſiderable, and will be heard with greateſt approbation, which a perſon either did alone, or firſt, or wherein he had feweſt aſſociates; as likewiſe thoſe, which exceeded expectation, or were done for the advantage of others, rather than his own. And further, as the laſt ſcene of a man's life generally commands the greateſt regard, if any thing remarkable at that time was either ſaid or done, it ought particularly to be mentioned. Nor ſhould the manner of his death, or cauſe of it, if accompanied with any commendable circumſtances, be omited; as if he died in the ſervice of his country, or in the purſuit of any other laudable deſign.

THE third and laſt period relates to what followed after the death of the perſon. And here the public loſs, and public honors confered upon the deceaſed, are proper to be mentioned. Sepulchers, ſtatues, and other monuments to perpetuate the memory of the dead, at the expence of the public, were in common uſe both among the Greeks and Romans. But in the earlieſt times, as theſe honors were more rare, ſo they were leſs coſtly. For as in one age it was thought a ſufficient

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reward for him, who died in the defenſe of his country, to have his name cut in a marble inſcription, with the cauſe of his death; ſo in others it was very common to ſee the ſtatues of gladiators, and perſons of the meaneſt rank, erected in public places. And therefore a judgement is to be formed of theſe things from the time, cuſtom, and circumſtances of different nations; ſince the frequency of them renders them leſs honorable, and takes off from their evidence, as the rewards of virtue. But, as Quintilian ſais: *Children are an honor to their parents, cities to their founders, laws to thoſe who compiled them, arts to their inventors, and uſeful cuſtoms to the authors of them* [1].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 7.

AND this may ſuffice for the method of praiſing perſons, when we propoſe to follow the order of time, as Iſocrates has done in his *funeral oration* upon Evagoras, king of Salamis, and Pliny in his *panegyric* upon the emperor Trajan. But as this method is very plain and obvious, ſo it requires the more agreable dreſs to render it delightful; leſt otherwiſe it ſeem rather like an hiſtory, than an oration. For which reaſon we find, that epic poets, as Homer, Virgil, and others, begin with the

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the middle of their ſtory, and afterwards take a proper occaſion to introduce what preceded, to diverſify the ſubject, and give the greater pleaſure and entertainment to their readers.

THE other method above hinted was, to reduce the diſcourſe to certain general heads, without regarding the order of time. As if any one in praiſing the elder Cato ſhould propoſe to do it, by ſhewing, that he was a moſt prudent ſenator, an excellent orator, and moſt valiant general; all which commendations are given him by Pliny [1]. In like manner the character of a good general may be compriſed under four heads, ſkill in military affairs, courage, authority, and ſucceſs; from all which Cicero commends Pompey [2]. And agreably to this method Suetonius has writen the lives of the firſt twelve Caeſars.

[1] *Hiſt. Nat. Lib.* vii. *c.* 27.

[2] *Pro leg. Manil. c.* 11.

BUT in praiſing of perſons care ſhould always be taken, to ſay nothing that may ſeem fictitious, or out of character, which may call the orator's judgement, or integrity in queſtion. It was not without cauſe therefore, that Lyſippus the ſtatuary, as Plutarch tells us, blamed Apelles for painting Alexander the Great with thunder in his hand; which could never ſuit his

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character, as a man, however he might boaſt of his divine deſcent; for which reaſon Lyſippus himſelf made an image of him holding a ſpear, as the ſign of a warrior [1]. Light and trivial things in commendations are likewiſe to be avoided, and nothing mentioned, but what may carry in it the idea of ſomething truly valuable, and which the hearers may be ſuppoſed to wiſh for, and is proper to excite their emulation. Theſe are the principal heads of praiſe with relation to men. In diſpraiſe, as was hinted before, the heads contrary to theſe are requiſite; which being ſufficiently clear from what has been ſaid, need not particularly be inſiſted on.

[1] *De Iſ. & Oſir.*

I PROCEDE therefore to the other part of the diviſion, which reſpects *things*, as diſtinguiſhed from *perſons*. By which we are to underſtand all beings inferior to man, whether animate or inanimate; as likewiſe the habits and diſpoſitions of men, either good or bad, when conſidered ſeparately, and apart from their ſubjects, as arts and ſciences, virtues and vices; with whatever elſe may be a proper ſubject for praiſe or diſpraiſe. Some writers indeed have for their own amuſement, and the diverſion of others, diſplayed their eloquence in a

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jocoſe manner upon ſubjects of this kind. So Lucian has writen in praiſe of a *fly*, and Syneſius an elegant encomium upon *baldneſs*. Others, on the contrary, have done the like in a ſatyrical way. Such is Seneca's *Apotheoſis* or conſecration of the emperor Claudius; and the *Myſopogon* or beard hater, writen by Julian the emperor. Not to mention ſeveral modern authors, who have imitated them in ſuch ludicrous compoſitions. But as to theſe things, and all of the like nature, the obſervation of Antony in Cicero ſeems very juſt: *That it is not neceſſary to reduce every ſubject we diſcourſe upon to rules of art* [1]. For many are ſo trivial, as not to deſerve it; and others ſo plain and evident of themſelves, as not to require it. But ſince it frequently comes in the way both of orators and hiſtorians to deſcribe *countries*, *cities*, and *facts*, I ſhall breifly mention the principal heads of invention, proper to illuſtrate each of theſe.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 11.

COUNTRIES then may be celebrated from the pleaſantneſs of their ſituation, the clemency and wholeſomneſs of the air, and goodneſs of the ſoil, to which laſt may be refered the ſprings, rivers, woods, plains, mountains, and minerals. And to

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all theſe may be added their extent, cities, the number and antiquity of the inhabitants, their policy, laws, cuſtoms, wealth, character for cultivating the arts both of peace and war, their princes, and other eminent men they have produced. Thus Pacatus has given us a very elegant deſcription of Spain, in his *panegyric upon the emperor Theodoſius*, who was born there [1].

[1] *Cap.* 4.

CITIES are praiſed from much the ſame topics, as countries. And here, whatever contributes either to their defenſe, or ornament, ought particularly to be mentioned; as the ſtrength of the walls and fortifications, the beauty and ſplendor of their buildings, whether ſacred or civil, public or private. We have in Herodotus a very fine deſcription of Babylon, which was once the ſtrongeſt, largeſt, and moſt regular city in the world [2]. And Cicero has accurately deſcribed the city Syracuſe, in the iſland Sicily, in one of his orations againſt Verres [3].

[2] *Lib.* 1. *c.* 178.

[3] *Act.* iv. *in Verr. c.* 52.

BUT *facts* come much oftner under the cognizance of an orator. And theſe receive their commendation from their honor, juſtice, or advantage. But in deſcribing them all the circumſtances ſhould be related in their proper order, and that in the moſt lively and affecting manner, ſuited

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to their different nature. Livy has repreſented the demolition of Alba by the Roman army, which was ſent thither to deſtroy it, thro the whole courſe of that melancholy ſcene, in a ſtile ſo moving and pathetic, that one can hardly forbear condoling with the inhabitants, upon reading his account.

BUT in diſcourſes of this kind, whether of praiſe or diſpraiſe, the orator ſhould (as he ought indeed upon all occaſions) well conſider where, and to whom he ſpeaks. For wiſe men often think very differently both of perſons and things from the common people. And we find that learned and judicious men are frequently divided in their ſentiments, from the ſeveral ways of thinking, to which they have been accuſtomed. Beſides different opinions prevail, and gain the aſcendant, at different times. While the Romans continued a free nation, love of their country, liberty, and a public ſpirit, were principles in the higheſt eſteem among them. And therefore when Cato killed himſelf, that he might not fall into the hands of Caeſar, and ſurvive the liberty of his country, it was thought an inſtance of the greateſt heroic virtue; but afterwards, when they had

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had been accuſtomed to an arbitrary government, and the ſpirit of liberty was now loſt, the poet Martial could venture to ſay,

[1] *Lib.* ii. *ep.* 80.

Death to avoid 'tis madneſs ſure to die [1].

A prudent orator therefore will be cautious of oppoſing any ſettled and prevailing notions of thoſe, to whom he addreſſes; unleſs it be neceſſary, and then he will do it in the ſofteſt and moſt gentle manner.

Now if we look back, and conſider the ſeveral heads of praiſe, enumerated under each of the ſubjects above mentioned; we ſhall find, they are taken from their nature, properties, circumſtances, or ſome other general topic; as was intimated in the begining of this diſcourſe.

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LECTURE VIII.

Of Arguments ſuited to Deliberative Diſcourſes.

IN my laſt diſcourſe I began to treat upon the particular heads of argument, ſuited to the three kinds of orations, and I went thro thoſe, which properly relate to the *demonſtrative* kind. I ſhall now procede to give a breif account of ſuch, as more peculiarly reſpect *deliberative* ſubjects, in which we either adviſe to a thing, or diſſuade from it. And they are taken from the nature and circumſtances of the thing itſelf under conſultation. LECT. VIII.

THIS kind of diſcourſes muſt certainly have been very antient, ſince doubtleſs from the firſt beginning of mens converſing together, they deliberated upon their common intereſt, and offered their advice to each other. But neither thoſe of the *laudatory*, nor *judicial* kind, could have been introduced, till mankind was ſettled in communities, and found it neceſſary to incourage virtue by public rewards, and bring vice under the reſtraint of laws. The early practice of *ſuaſory* diſcourſes appears

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appears from ſacred writ, where we find, that when Moſes was ordered upon an embaſſy into Egypt, he would have excuſed himſelf for want of eloquence [1]. And Homer repreſents the Greeks at the ſeige of Troy, as flocking like a ſwarm of bees to hear their generals harangue them [2]. Nor is this part of oratory leſs conſpicuous for its uſefulneſs to mankind, than its antiquity; being highly beneficial either in councils, camps, or any ſocieties of men. How many inſtances have we upon record, where the fury of an inraged multitude has been checked and appeaſed by the prudent and artful perſuaſion of ſome particular perſon? The ſtory of Agrippa Menenius, when the commons of Rome withdrew from the ſenators, and retired out of the city, is too well known, to need reciting [3]. And how often have armies been animated and fired to the moſt dangerous exploits, or recalled to their duty, when ready to mutiny, by a moving ſpeech of their general? many inſtances of which we find in hiſtory.

[1] *Exod.* iv. 10.

[2] *Iliad.* β. 87.

[3] Liv. *Lib.* ii. *c.* 32. Flor. *Lib.* i. *c.* 23.

ALL deliberation reſpects ſomething future, for it is in vain to conſult about what is already paſt. The ſubject matter of it, are either things public or private, ſacred

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ſacred or civil; indeed all the valuable concerns of mankind, both preſent and future, come under its regard. And the end propoſed by this kind of diſcourſes is cheifly profit or intereſt. But ſince nothing is truly profitable, but what is in ſome reſpect good; and every thing, which is good in itſelf, may not in all circumſtances be for our advantage; properly ſpeaking, what is both good and profitable, or beneficial good, is the end here deſigned. And therefore, as it ſometimes happens, that what appears profitable, may ſeem to interfere with that, which is ſtrictly juſt and honorable; in ſuch caſes it is certainly moſt adviſeable to determine on the ſafer ſide of honor and juſtice, notwithſtanding ſome plauſible things may be offered to the contrary. But where the diſpute lies apparently between what is truly honeſt, and ſome external advantage propoſed in oppoſition to it, all good men cannot but agree in favor of honeſty. Such was the caſe of Regulus, who being taken priſoner by the Carthaginians, was permited to go to Rome upon giving his oath, that unleſs he could perſuade the ſenate to ſet at liberty ſome young Carthaginian noblemen, then priſoners at Rome,

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in exchange for him, he ſhould return again to Carthage. But Regulus, when he came to Rome, was ſo far from endeavouring to prevail with the ſenate to comply with the deſire of the Carthaginians, that he uſed all his intereſt to diſſuade them from harkening to the propoſal. Nor could the moſt earneſt intreaties of his neareſt relations and freinds, nor any arguments they were able to offer, ingage him to continue at Rome, and not return again to Carthage. He had then plainly in his view on the one ſide eaſe, ſecurity, affluence, honors, and the enjoyment of his freinds; and on the other certain death, attended with cruel torments. However thinking the former not conſiſtent with truth and juſtice, he choſe the latter [1]. And he certainly acted, as became an honeſt and brave man, in chooſing death, rather than to violate his oath. Tho whether he did prudently in perſuading the ſenate not to make the exchange, or they in complying with him, I ſhall leave others to determine. Now when it proves to be a matter of debate, whether a thing upon the whole be really beneficial or not; as here ariſe two parts, advice and diſſuaſion, they will each require proper heads of argument. But

[1] Florus, *Lib.* ii. *c.* 2.

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as they are contrary to each other, he who is acquainted with one, cannot well be ignorant of the other. For which reaſon, as in my laſt diſcourſe, I recited only the topics ſuited for praiſe, leaving thoſe for diſpraiſe to be collected from them; ſo here likewiſe, I ſhall cheifly mention thoſe proper for advice, from whence ſuch as are ſuited to diſſuade will eaſily be perceived. Now the principal heads of this kind are theſe following, which are taken from the nature and properties of the thing itſelf under conſideration.

AND firſt, *pleaſure* often affords a very cogent argument in diſcourſes of this nature. Every one knows, what an influence this has upon the generality of mankind. Tho, as Quintilian remarks, pleaſure ought not of itſelf to be propoſed, as a fit motive for action in ſerious diſcourſes, but when it is deſigned to recommend ſomething uſeful, which is the caſe here. So would any one adviſe another to the purſuit of polite literature. Cicero has furniſhed him with a very ſtrong inducement to it, from the pleaſure which attends that ſtudy, when he ſais: *If pleaſure only was propoſed by theſe ſtudies, you would think them an entertainment becoming a man of*

ſenſe,

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ſenſe, and a gentleman. For other purſuits neither agree with all times, all ages, nor all places; but theſe ſtudies improve youth, delight old age, adorn proſperity, afford a refuge and comfort in adverſity, divert us at home, are no hindrance abroad, ſleep, travel, and retire with us in the country [1].

[1] *Pro Archia, c. 7.*

A SECOND head is *profit* or advantage, which has no leſs influence upon many perſons, than the former; and when it reſpects things truly valuable, is a very juſt and laudable motive. Thus Cicero, when he ſends his *Books of offices* to his ſon, which he wrote in Latin for his uſe, adviſes him to make the beſt advantage both of his tutor's inſtructions, and the converſation at Athens, where he then was; but withal to peruſe his philoſophical treatiſes, which would be doubly uſeful to him, not only upon account of the ſubjects, but likewiſe of the language, as they would enable him to expreſs himſelf upon thoſe arguments in Latin, which before had only been treated of in Greek.

THE laſt head of this kind, which I ſhall mention, is *honor*. And no argument will ſooner prevail with generous minds, or inſpire them with greater ardor. Virgil has very beautifully deſcribed Hector's ghoſt

ghoſt appearing to Aeneas, the night Troy was taken, and adviſing him to depart, from this motive of honor. LECT. VIII.

O goddeſs-born, eſcape by timely flight
The flames, and horrors of this fatal night.
The foes already have poſſeſs'd the wall,
Troy nods from high, and totters to her fall.
Enough is paid to Priam's royal name;
More than enough to duty, and to fame.
If by a mortal hand my father's throne
Cou'd be defended, 'twas by mine alone [1].

[1] *Aen. Lib.* ii. *v.* 289.

The argument here made uſe of, to perſuade Aeneas to leave Troy immediately is, that he had already done all that could be expected from him, either as a good ſubject, or brave ſoldier; both for his king, and country; which were ſufficient to ſecure his honor; and now there was nothing more to be expected from him, when the city was falling, and impoſſible to be ſaved; which could it have been preſerved by human power, he himſelf had done it.

BUT altho a thing conſidered in itſelf appear beneficial, if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may ſtill be queſtionable; in which caſe the following heads taken from the circumſtances, which attend it, will afford proper arguments to ingage in it.

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AND first the *possibility* of succeeding may sometimes be argued, as one motive to this end. So Hannibal endeavoured to convince king Antiochus, that is was possible for him to conquer the Romans, if he made Italy the seat of the war; by observing to him, not only that the Gauls had formerly destroyed their city; but that he had himself defeated them, in every battle he fought with them in that country [1].

[1] Justin, *Lib.* xxxi. *c.* 5.

BUT the bare possibility of a thing is seldom a sufficient motive to undertake it, unless on very urgent occasions. And therefore an argument founded upon *probability* will be much more likely to prevail. For in many affairs of human life, men are determined either to prosecute them or not, as the prospect of success appears more or less probable. Hence Cicero after the fatal battle at Pharsalia dissuades those of Pompey's party, with whom he was engaged, from continuing the war any longer against Caesar; because it was highly improbable after such a defeat, by which their main strength was broken, that they should be able to stand their ground, or meet with better success, than they had before [2].

[2] *Ad fam. Lib.* vii. *ep.* 3.

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BUT further, ſince probability is not a motive ſtrong enough with many perſons to ingage in the proſecution of a thing, which is attended with conſiderable difficulties, it is often neceſſary to repreſent the *facility* of doing it, as a further reaſon to induce them to it. And therefore Cicero makes uſe of this argument to incourage the Roman citizens in oppoſing Mark Antony (who upon the death of Caeſar had aſſumed an arbitrary power) by repreſenting to them, that his circumſtances were then deſperate, and that he might eaſily be vanquiſhed [1].

[1] *Philipp.* iv. *c.* 5.

AGAIN, if the thing adviſed to can be ſhewn to be in any reſpect *neceſſary*, this will render the motive ſtill much ſtronger for undertaking it. And therefore Cicero joins this argument with the former, to prevail with the Roman citizens to oppoſe Antony, by telling them, that, *The conſideration before them was not in what circumſtances they ſhould live; but whether they ſhould live at all, or die with ignominy and diſgrace* [2]. This way of reaſoning will ſometimes prevail, when all others prove ineffectual. For ſome perſons are not to be moved, till things are brought to an

[2] *Ibidem.*

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extremity, and they find themſelves reduced to the utmoſt danger.

To theſe heads may be added the conſideration of the *event*, which in ſome caſes carries great weight with it. As when we adviſe to the doing of a thing from this motive, that whether it ſucceede or not, it will yet be of ſervice to undertake it. So after the great victory gained by Themiſtocles over the Perſian fleet, at the ſtreights of Salamis, Mardonius adviſed Xerxes to return into Aſia himſelf, leſt the report of his defeat ſhould occaſion an inſurrection in his abſence; but to leave behind him an army of three hundred thouſand men under his command; with which, if he ſhould conquer Greece, the cheif glory of the conqueſt would redound to Xerxes; but if the deſign miſcarried, the diſgrace would fall upon his generals [1].

[1] Juſtin. *Lib.* ii. *c.* 13.

THESE are the principal heads, which furniſh the orator with proper arguments in giving advice. Cicero in his oration for the Manilian law, where he endeavours to perſuade the Roman people to chooſe Pompey for their general in the Mithridatic war, reaſons from three of theſe topics, into which he divides his whole diſcourſe;

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courſe; namely, the neceſſity of the war, the greatneſs of it, and the choice of a proper general. Under the firſt of theſe he ſhews, that the war was neceſſary from four conſiderations; the honor of the Roman ſtate, the ſafety of their allies, their own revenues, and the fortunes of many of their fellow citizens, which were all highly concerned in it, and called upon them to put a ſtop to the growing power of king Mithridates, by which they were all greatly indangered. So that this argument is taken from the head of *neceſſity*. The ſecond, in which he treats of the greatneſs of the war, is founded upon the topic of *poſſibility*. For tho he ſhews the power of Mithridates to be very great, yet not ſo formidable, but that he might be ſubdued; as was evident from the many advantages, Lucullus had gained over him and his aſſociates. In the third head he endeavours to prevail with them to intruſt the management of the war in the hands of Pompey, whom he deſcribes as a conſummate general, for his ſkill in military affairs, courage, authority, and ſucceſs, in all which qualities he repreſents him as ſuperior to any other of their generals, whom they could at that time make choice

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of. The design of all which was to persuade them, they might have very good reason to hope for success, and a happy event of the war, under his conduct. So that the whole force of his reasoning under this head is drawn from *probability*. These are the three general topics, which make up that fine discourse. Each of which is indeed supported by diverse other arguments and considerations, which will be obvious in perusing the oration itself, and therefore need not be here enumerated. On the contrary, in another oration he endeavours to dissuade the senate from consenting to a peace with Mark Antony, because it was base, dangerous, and impracticable [1].

[1] *Philipp.* vii. *c.* 3.

But no small skill and address are required in giving advice. For since the tempers and sentiments of mankind, as well as their circumstances, are very different and various; it is often necessary to accommodate the discourse to their inclinations and opinions of things. And therefore the weightiest arguments are not always the most proper, and fitest to be used on all occasions. Cicero, who was an admirable master of this art, and knew perfectly well how to suit what he said to the

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taſte and reliſh of his hearers, in treating upon this ſubject, diſtinguiſhes mankind into two ſorts; the ignorant and unpoliſhed, who always prefer profit to honor; and ſuch as are more civilized and polite, who prefer honor and reputation to all other things [1]. Wherefore they are to be moved by theſe different views, praiſe, glory, and virtue influence the one; while the other is only to be ingaged by a proſpect of gain, and pleaſure. Beſides it is plain, that the generality of mankind are much more inclined to avoid evils, than to purſue what is good; and to keep clear of ſcandal and diſgrace, than to practiſe what is truly generous and noble. Perſons likewiſe of a different age act from different principles; young men for the moſt part view things in another light, from thoſe who are older, and have had more experience, and conſequently are not to be influenced from the ſame motives. Every nation alſo has its particular cuſtoms, manners, and polity, which give a different turn to the genius of the inhabitants. Hence we find in hiſtory, that what was commendable in one country, was a diſgrace in another. For which reaſon, Cornelius Nepos, in writing the life of that

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[1] *Orat. Partit. c. 25, &c.*

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excellent Theban general, Epaminondas, introduces his account of him by saying: *I must caution my readers, not to judge of foreign customs by their own; nor to think, that such things as are disregarded by them, were equally contemned by others. For we know that music with us is unbecoming the character of a gentleman, and dancing is looked upon as a vice; but these things are approved, and in great esteem among the Greeks.* And therefore when Cato, by way of reproach, had called Muraena a dancer; Cicero questions the fact, as highly improbable; since, as he sais: *No sober man would dance even at a modest entertainment* [1]. I mention this to shew, how requisite it is many times to guard against common prejudices, and to suit our discourse to the sentiments of those, to whom we address. And this can never be more necessary, than in giving advice. The speech of Alexander, made to his soldiers before he ingaged the Persians, as we have it in Curtius, is finely wrought up in this respect. For as his army was composed of different nations, the parts of his discourse are admirably well suited to their several views in prosecuting the war. He reminds his countrymen, the Macedonians,

[1] *Pro Muraen. c. 6.*

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of their former victories in Europe; and tells them, that Perſia is not to be the boundary of their conqueſts, but they are to extend them farther than either Hercules or Bacchus had done: that Bactra and the Indies would be theirs, and that what they ſaw, was but a ſmall part of what they were to poſſeſs: that neither the rocks of Illyrium, nor the mountains of Thrace, but the ſpoils of the whole eaſt were now before them: that the conqueſt would be ſo eaſy, they would ſcarce have occaſion to draw their ſwords, but they might puſh the enemy with their bucklers. Then he reminds them of their ſubduing the Athenians under his father Philip, and the late conqueſt of Boeotia, the victory at the river Granicus, and the many cities and countries now behind them, and under their ſubjection. When he addreſſes to the Greeks, he tells them, they are now going to ingage with thoſe, who had been the enemies of their country, firſt by the inſolence of Darius, and afterwards of Xerxes, who would have deprived them even of the neceſſaries of life, who deſtroyed their temples, demoliſhed their towns, and violated both their ſacred and civil rights. And then directing his diſcourſe

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courſe to the Illyrians and Thracians, who were accuſtomed to live by plunder, he incourages them with the proſpect of booty, from the rich armour and furniture of the Perſians, which they might be maſters of with the greateſt eaſe: and tells them, they would now exchange their barren mountains and ſnowy hills, for the fertile country and feilds of Perſia [1].

[1] *Lib.* iii. *c.* 10.

IT ſeems unneceſſary to add more examples for the illuſtration of that, which ſo frequently occurs in all good writers, who give us any diſcourſes of this nature. And therefore I ſhall only obſerve further, that not only matters of advice and exhortation, but likewiſe all conſolatory and petitory ſpeeches, come under this head of *diſcourſes*. Beſides we often find thoſe things intermixed, which relate to the *laudatory* kind; as in Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, a conſiderable part of it is imployed in the praiſe of Pompey. But his view in that was only to induce his hearers, to chooſe him for their general, and a diſcourſe ought to receive its name from the principal deſign of the ſpeaker.

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LECTURE IX.

Of Arguments ſuited to Judicial Diſcourſes.

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I COME now to conſider the arguments, proper for the third and laſt ſort of diſcourſes, which relates to *judicial* affairs. And in theſe both the Grecian and Roman youth, who were deſirous to gain a reputation for eloquence, uſed commonly to give the firſt proofs of their genius and ability. The firſt of Cicero's orations now extant, is his defence of Publius Quintius, which he ſpoke in the twenty ſixth year of his age [1]. *Deliberative* diſcourſes were not made before a judge, but in larger aſſemblies, either of the body of the Roman citizens, or the ſenate. And as they generally related to affairs of great importance, and ſuch as reſpected the ſtate; they required ſome authority in the ſpeaker, which he had gained by former proofs of his ability and judgement. The bar therefore (as we call it) was commonly the place, where young orators uſed firſt in public to exerciſe and try their genius. And they took care in a particular manner to prepare themſelves for this, by declaming

[1] *Euſeb. in Chron.* See alſo Cic. *De clar. orat.* c. 90, &c.

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claming before hand either in the ſchools, or under the inſtruction of ſome ſkilful perſon in private. Nor did the greateſt perſons at Rome think it beneath them to aſſiſt young gentlemen in this deſign [1].

[1] Cic. *De clar. orat. c.* 89.

Now in *judicial* controverſies there are two parties, the plaintif or proſecutor, and the defendant or perſon charged. The ſubject of them is always ſomething paſt. And the end propoſed by them Cicero calls *equity*, or *right and equity* [2]; the former of which ariſes from the laws of the country, and the latter from reaſon and the nature of things. For at Rome the praetors had a court of equity, and were impowered, in many caſes relating to property, to relax the rigor of the writen laws. But as this ſubject is very copious, and cauſes may ariſe from a great variety of things, writers have reduced them to three heads, which they call *States*, to ſome one of which all *judicial* procedings may be refered; namely, *whether a thing is, what it is*, or *how it is*. By the *State* of a cauſe therefore is meant the principal queſtion in diſpute, upon which the whole affair depends. Which if it ſtops in the firſt enquiry, and the defendant denies the fact, the *State* is called *conjectural*; but if the

[2] *De orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 31, 38. *Orat. Partit. c.* 37.

fact

fact be acknowledged, and yet denied to be what the adverſary calls it, it is termed *definitive*; but if there is no diſpute either about the fact, or its name, but only the juſtice of it, it is called the *State* of *quality*: as was ſhewn more largely before in a former lecture [1]. But I then conſidered theſe *States* only in a general view, and defered the particular heads of argument, proper for each of them, to this *judicial* kind of diſcourſes; where they moſt frequently occur, and from which examples may eaſily be accommodated to other ſubjects. And this is what I am now particularly to treat of.

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[1] See *Lect.* VI.

ALL *judicial* cauſes are either *private* or *public*. They are called *private*, which relate to the right of particular perſons; and they are likewiſe called *civil* cauſes, as they are converſant about matters of property. *Public* cauſes are thoſe, which relate to public juſtice, and the government of the ſtate; which are alſo called *criminal*, becauſe by them crimes are proſecuted, whether capital, or thoſe of a leſs heinous nature. I ſhall take the heads of the arguments only from this latter kind, becauſe they are more copious, and eaſy to be illuſtrated by examples; from which

ſuch

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ſuch as agree to the former, namely *civil* cauſes, will ſufficiently appear.

AND I ſhall begin with the *conjectural* ſtate, which comes firſt in the order of inquiry. When therefore the accuſed perſon denies the fact, there are three things, which the proſecutor has to conſider: Whether he *would* have done it, whether he *could*, and whether he *did* it [1]. And hence ariſe three topics; from the *Will*, the *Power*, and the *Signs*, or circumſtances, which attended the action. The affections of the mind diſcover the *Will*; as, paſſion, an old grudge, a deſire of revenge, a reſentment of an injury, and the like. Therefore Cicero argues from Clodius's hatred of Milo, that he deſigned his death, and from thence infers, that he was the aggreſſor in the combat between them, wherein Clodius was killed [2]. This is what he principally endeavours to prove, and comes properly under this *State:* for Milo owned that he killed him, but alleged that he did it in his own defence. So that in regard to this point, which of them aſſaulted the other, the charge was mutual. The proſpect of advantage may alſo be alleged to the ſame purpoſe. Hence it is ſaid of L. Caſſius, that whenever he ſat as judge in

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vii. *c.* 2.

[2] *Pro Milon. c.* 13.

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in a caſe of murder, he uſed to adviſe and move the court, to examine, to whom the advantage aroſe from the death of the deceaſed [1]. And Cicero puts this to Antony concerning the death of Caeſar. *If any one*, ſais he, *ſhould bring you upon trial, and uſe that ſaying of Caſſius*, cui bono, *who got by it, look to it, I beſeech you, that you are not confounded* [2]. To theſe arguments may be added, hope of impunity, taken either from the circumſtances of the accuſed perſon, or of him who ſuffered the injury. For perſons, who have the advantage of intereſt, freinds, power, or money, are apt to think they may eaſily eſcape; as likewiſe ſuch, who have formerly commited other crimes with impunity. Thus Cicero repreſents Clodius as hardened in vice, and above all the reſtraint of laws, from having ſo often eſcaped puniſhment upon commiting the higheſt crimes [3]. On the contrary, ſuch a confidence is ſometimes raiſed from the condition of the injured party, if he is indigent, obſcure, timorous, or deſtitute of freinds; much more if he has an ill reputation, or is loaded with popular hatred and reſentment. It was this preſumption of the obſcurity of Roſcius, who lived in the

[1] Aſcon. *ad Cicer. orat. pro Milon.* See alſo Cic. *pro Roſc. Amer. c.* 30.

[2] *Philipp.* ii. *c.* 14. Et *pro Milon. c.* 12.

[3] *Pro Mil. c.* 14.

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the country, and his want of intereſt at Rome, which encouraged his accuſers to charge him with killing his father, as Cicero ſhews in his defenſe of him [1]. Laſtly, the temper of a perſon, his views, and manner of life, are conſiderations of great moment in this matter. For perſons of bad morals, and ſuch who are addicted to vice, are eaſily thought capable of commiting any wickedneſs. Hence Salluſt argues from the evil diſpoſition, and vitious life of Catiline, that he affected to raiſe himſelf upon the ruins of his country [2]. The ſecond head is the *power* of doing a thing; and there are three things which relate to this, the *place*, the *time*, and *opportunity*. As if a crime is ſaid to have been commited in a private place, where no other perſon was preſent; or in the night; or when the injured perſon was unable to provide for his defence. Under this head may likewiſe be brought in the circumſtances of the perſons; as if the accuſed perſon was ſtronger, and ſo able to overpower the other; or more active, and ſo could eaſily make his eſcape. Cicero makes great uſe of this topic in the caſe of Milo, and ſhews, that Clodius had all the advantages of *place*, *time*, and *opportunity*

[1] *In perorat.*

[2] *Bell. Cat. c. 5.*

to

to execute his deſign of killing him [1]. The third head are the *Signs* and circumſtances, which either preceded, accompanied, or followed the commiſſion of the fact. So threats, or the accuſed perſon being ſeen at or near the place before the fact was commited, are circumſtances that may probably precede murder; fighting, crying out, bloodſhed, are ſuch as accompany it; paleneſs, trembling, inconſiſtent anſwers, heſitation or faltering of the ſpeech, ſomething found upon the perſon accuſed, which belonged to the deceaſed, are ſuch as follow. Thus Cicero proves, that Clodius had threatened the death of Milo, and given out that he ſhould not live above three days at the fartheſt. Theſe arguments, taken from conjectures, are called *preſumptions*, which, tho they do not directly prove, that the accuſed perſon commited the fact, with which he is charged; yet, when being laid together they appeared very ſtrong, ſentence by the Roman law might ſometimes be given upon them [2] to convict him.

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[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 19.

[2] *L. ult. de probation.*

THESE are the topics, from which the proſecutor takes his arguments. Now the buſineſs of the defendant is to invalidate theſe. Therefore ſuch as are brought from

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the *Will*, he either endeavours to ſhew are not true, or ſo weak as to merit very little regard. And he refutes thoſe taken from the *Power*, by proving, that he wanted either opportunity, or ability: as, if he can ſhew, that neither the place nor time inſiſted on was at all proper; or that he was then in another place. In like manner he will endeavour to confute the *Circumſtances*, if they cannot directly be denied, by ſhewing that they are not ſuch, as do neceſſarily accompany the fact, but might have proceded from other cauſes, tho nothing of what is alleged had been commited; and it will be of great ſervice to aſſign ſome other probable cauſe. But ſometimes the defendant does not only deny, that he did the fact, but charges it upon another. Thus Cicero in his oration for Roſcius, not only defends him from each of theſe three heads, but likewiſe charges the fact upon his accuſers [1].

[1] *Cap.* 28.

I COME now to the *definitive* ſtate, which is principally concerned in defining and fixing the name proper to the fact. Tho orators ſeldom make uſe of exact definitions, but commonly chooſe larger deſcriptions, taken from various properties of the ſubject, or thing deſcribed.

THE

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THE heads of argument in this *State* are much the ſame to both parties. For each of them defines the fact his own way, and endeavours to refute the other's definition. We may illuſtrate this by an example from Quintilian: *A perſon is accuſed of ſacrilege, for ſtealing money out of a temple, which belonged to a private perſon* [1]. The fact is owned, but the queſtion is, *Whether it be properly ſacrilege?* The proſecutor calls it ſo, becauſe it was taken out of a temple. But ſince the money belonged to a private perſon, the defendant denies it to be ſacrilege, and ſais it is only ſimple theft. Now the reaſon why the defendant uſes this plea, and inſiſts upon the diſtinction, is, becauſe by the Roman law the penalty of theft was only four times the value of what was ſtolen; whereas ſacrilege was puniſhed with death [2]. The proſecutor then forms his definition agreable to his charge, and ſais: *To ſteal any thing out of a ſacred place is ſacrilege.* But the defendant excepts againſt this definition, as defective; and urges, that it does not amount to ſacrilege, unleſs the thing ſtolen was likewiſe ſacred. And this caſe might once perhaps have been a matter of controverſy, ſince we find it expreſsly

[1] See *Lect.* VI. *p.* 81.

[2] *Inſt.* §. 5. *de oblig. quae ex delicto.* *L.* 9. *ff. ad legem Jul. peculat. &c.*

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[1] *L. 5. ff. ad leg. Jul. pecul. &c.*

THE ſecond thing is the proof brought by each party to ſupport his definition, as in the example given us by Cicero, of one, *who carried his cauſe by bribery, and was afterwards proſecuted again upon an action of prevarication* [2]. Now if the defendant was caſt upon this action, he was by the Roman law ſubjected to the penalty of the former proſecution [3]. Here the proſecutor defines prevarication to be, *any bribery or corruption in the defendant, with a deſign to pervert juſtice.* The defendant therefore, on the other hand, reſtrains it to, *bribing only the proſecutor.*

[2] *Orat. Partit. c. 36.*

[3] *L. ult. ff. de praevar.*

AND if this latter ſenſe agree better with the common acceptation of the word, the proſecutor in the third place pleads the intention of the law, which was to comprehend all bribery in judicial matters under the term of prevarication. In anſwer to which the defendant endeavours to ſhew, either from the head of contraries, that a real proſecutor and a prevaricator are uſed as oppoſite terms in the law; or from the etymology of the word, that a prevaricator denotes

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denotes one, who pretends to appear in the proſecution of a cauſe, while in reality he favors the contrary ſide [1]; and conſequently, that money given for this end, only can, in the ſenſe of the law, be called prevarication.

[1] Cic. *Orat. Part. c. 36. L. 1. princ. ff. de praevar.*

LASTLY, the proſecutor pleads, it is unreaſonable, that he, who does not deny the fact, ſhould eſcape by a cavil about a word. But the defendant inſiſts upon his explication, as agreable to the law, and ſais, the fact is miſrepreſented and blackened, by affixing to it a wrong name.

THE third ſtate is that of *quality*, in which the diſpute turns upon the juſtice of an action. And here the defendant does not deny he did the thing, he is charged with; but aſſerts it to be right and equitable, from the circumſtances of the caſe, and the motives which induced him to it.

AND firſt, he ſometimes alleges, the reaſon of doing it was in order to prevent ſome other thing of worſe conſequence, which would otherwiſe have happened. We have an inſtance of this in the life of Epaminondas, who, with two other generals, joined in the command with him, marched the Theban army into Peloponneſus

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neſus againſt the Lacedaemonians; but by the influence of a contrary faction at home, their commiſſions were ſuperſeded, and other generals ſent to command the army. But Epaminondas being ſenſible, that if he obeyed this order at that time, it would be attended with the loſs of the whole army, and conſequently the ruin of the ſtate, refuſed to do it; and having perſuaded the other generals to do the like, they happily finiſhed the war, in which they were engaged; and upon their return home, Epaminondas, taking the whole matter upon himſelf, on his trial was acquited [1]. The arguments proper in this caſe are taken from the juſtice, uſefulneſs, or neceſſity of the action. The accuſer therefore will plead, that the fact was not juſt, profitable, nor neceſſary, conſidered either in itſelf, or comparatively with that, for the ſake of which it is ſaid to have been done. And he will endeavour to ſhew, that what the defendant aſſigns, for the reaſon of what he did, might not have happened, as he pretends. Beſides, he will repreſent of what ill conſequence it muſt be, if ſuch crimes go unpuniſhed. The defendant, on the other hand, will argue from the ſame heads, and endeavour to prove

[1] Nepos *in vit.* 7.

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prove the fact was juſt, uſeful, or neceſſary. And he will further urge, that no juſt eſtimate can be made of any action, but from the circumſtances which attend it; as the deſign, occaſion, and motives for doing it; which he will repreſent in the moſt favorable light to his own cauſe, and endeavour to ſet them in ſuch a view, as to induce others to think, they could not but have done the ſame, in the like circumſtances.

AGAIN, the cauſe of an action is ſometimes charged by the defendant upon the party, who received the damage, or ſome other perſon, who either made it neceſſary, or injoined him to do it. The firſt of theſe was Milo's plea for killing Clodius, becauſe he aſſaulted him, with a deſign to take away his life. Here the fact is not denied, as in the caſe of Roſcius, above mentioned, under the *conjectural* ſtate; but juſtified from the reaſon of doing it. For that an aſſaſſinator might juſtly be killed, Cicero ſhews both from law and reaſon [1]. The accuſer therefore in ſuch a caſe will, if there be room for it, deny the truth of this allegation. So the freinds of Clodius affirmed, that Milo was the aggreſſor, and not Clodius; which Cicero in his defenſe

[1] *Cap.* 4.

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of Milo principally labours to refute. In the second case the prosecutor will say, no one ought to offend, because another has offended first; which defeats the course of public justice, renders the laws useless, and destroys the authority of the magistrate. The defendant, on the other hand, will endeavour to represent the danger and necessity of the case, which required an immediate remedy, and in that manner; and urges, that it was vain and impracticable to wait for redress in the ordinary way, and therefore no ill consequence can arise to the public. Thus Cicero in defending Sextius, who was prosecuted for a riot, in bringing armed men into the forum, shews that his design was only to repel force with force; which was then necessary, there being no other means left for the people to assemble, who were excluded by a mob of the contrary party [1]. Of the third case we have also an example in Cicero, who tells us, that, *in making a league between the Romans and Samnites, a certain young nobleman was ordered by the Roman general to hold the swine (designed for a sacrifice); but the senate afterwards disapproving the terms, and delivering up their general to the Samnites, it was moved, whether this young man*

[1] *Cap.* 35.

man ought not likewiſe to be given up [1]. Thoſe, who were for it, might ſay; that to allege the command of another is not a ſufficient plea for doing an ill action. And this is what the Roman law now expreſsly declares [2]. But in anſwer to that it might be replied; that it was his duty to obey the command of his general, who was anſwerable for his own orders, and not thoſe, who were obliged to execute them; and therefore to give up this young nobleman, would be to puniſh one perſon for the fault of another.

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[1] *De Invent. Lib.* ii. *c.* 30.

[2] *L.* 1. §. 13. *ff. de vi & vi armat.*

LASTLY, a fact is ſometimes rather excuſed, than defended, by pleading that it was not done deſignedly, or with any ill intent. This is called *conceſſion*, and contains two parts, *apology* and *intreaty*. The former repreſents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or neceſſity. Ariſtotle gives us an example of inadvertency or imprudence in a woman at Athens, who gave a young man a love potion, which killed him; for which ſhe was tried, but acquited [3]. Tho afterwards this was made criminal by the Roman law [4]. The caſe of Adraſtus, as related by Herodotus, is an inſtance of chance; who being intruſted by Craeſus with the care of his ſon, as they

[3] *Mag. Moral. Lib.* i. *c.* 17.

[4] *L.* 38. §. 5. *ff. de poenis.*

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they were hunting, killed him accidentally with a javelin, which he threw at a boar [1]. It is neceſſity, when a perſon excuſes his making a default, from ſtreſs of weather, ſickneſs, or the like. Thus Cicero pleaded his illneſs, contracted by the fatigue of a long journey, as an excuſe for not appearing in the ſenate upon the ſummons of Mark Antony; who threatened to oblige him to it by pulling his houſe down [2]. But what the defendant here attributes to inadvertency, chance, or neceſſity, the oppoſite party will attribute to deſign, negligence, or ſome other culpable reaſon; and repreſent it as a matter injurious to the public, to introduce ſuch precedents; and alſo produce inſtances, if that can be done, where the like excuſes have not been admited. On the other hand, the defendant will inſiſt on his innocence, and ſhew the hardſhip and ſeverity of judging mens actions rather by the event, than from the intention: that ſuch a procedure makes no difference between the innocent and the guilty; but muſt neceſſarily involve many honeſt men in ruin and deſtruction, diſcourage all virtuous and generous deſigns, and turn greatly to the prejudice of human ſociety. He will alſo conſider the inſtances

[1] *Lib.* i. *c.* 43.

[2] *Philipp.* i. *c.* 5.

alleged by the accuſer, and ſhew the dif- LECT. IX.
ference between them and his own caſe. And laſtly, he will have recourſe to intreaty, or a ſubmiſſive addreſs to the equity and clemency of the court, or party offended, for pardon; as Cicero has done in his oration to Caeſar, in favor of Ligarius.

THESE inſtances are ſufficient to ſhew the nature of the arguments ſuited, to *judicial* diſcourſes, which are deduced from a variety of the general topics.

LEC-

LECTURE X.

Of the Character and Addreſs of an Orator.

LECT. X. HAVING in ſeveral diſcourſes conſidered and explained the firſt part of invention, which furniſhes the orator with ſuch arguments, as are neceſſary for the proof of his ſubject; I am next to ſhew what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himſelf, and what he ſais to their good opinion and eſteem. For the parts of invention are commonly thus diſtinguiſhed; that the firſt reſpects the *ſubject* of the diſcourſe, the ſecond the *ſpeaker*, and the third the *hearers*. Now the ſecond of theſe, which is what I am at preſent to explain, is by Quintilian called, a *propriety of manners*. And in order to expreſs this, it is neceſſary, as he tells us, *that every thing appear eaſy and natural, and the diſpoſition of the ſpeaker be diſcovered by his words* [1]. We may form an eaſy conception of this from the conduct of ſuch perſons, who are moſt nearly concerned in each others welfare. As when

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 2.

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relations or freinds converſe together upon any affairs of importance, the temper and diſpoſition of the ſpeaker plainly ſhews itſelf by his words and manner of addreſs. And what nature here directs to without colouring or diſguiſe, the orator is to endeavour to perform by his art. Tho indeed, if what a perſon ſais, be inconſiſtent with his uſual conduct and behaviour at other times; he cannot expect it ſhould gain much credit, or make any deep impreſſion upon his hearers. Which may be one reaſon, why the antient rhetoricians make it ſo neceſſary a qualification in an orator, that he be a good man; ſince he ſhould always be conſiſtent with himſelf, and, as we ſay, talk in character. And therefore it is highly requiſite, that he ſhould not only gain the ſkill of aſſuming thoſe qualities, which the nature and circumſtances of his diſcourſe require him to expreſs; but likewiſe, that he ſhould uſe his utmoſt endeavours to get the real habits implanted in his mind. For as by this means they will be always expreſſed with greater eaſe and facility; ſo by appearing conſtantly in the courſe of his life, they will have more weight and influence upon particular occaſions.

Now

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Now there are four qualities, more eſpecially ſuited to the character of an orator, which ſhould always appear in his diſcourſes, in order to render what he ſais acceptable to his hearers; and theſe are, *Wiſdom*, *Integrity*, *Benevolence*, and *Modeſty*.

WISDOM is neceſſary, becauſe we eaſily give into thoſe, whom we eſteem wiſer and more knowing than ourſelves. Knowledge is very agreable and pleaſant to all, but few make very great improvements in it, either by reaſon they are employed in other neceſſary affairs, and the mind of man cannot attend to many things at once; or becauſe the way to knowledge at firſt is hard and difficult, ſo that perſons either do not care to enter upon the purſuit of it, or if they do, they are many times ſoon diſcouraged, and drop it, for want of ſufficient reſolution to ſurmount its difficulties. Such therefore, who either cannot, or do not care to give themſelves the trouble of examining into things themſelves, muſt take up with the repreſentation of others; and it is an eaſe to them to hear the opinion of perſons, whom they eſteem wiſer than themſelves. No one loves to be deceived, and ſuch who are fearful of being miſled, are pleaſed to meet with a perſon, in whoſe

wiſdom,

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wiſdom, as they think, they can ſafely truſt. The character of wiſdom therefore is of great ſervice to an orator, ſince the greater part of mankind are ſwayed by authority, rather than arguments.

BUT this of itſelf is not ſufficient, unleſs the opinion of *Integrity* be joined with it. Nay, ſo far from it, that the greater knowledge and underſtanding a man is ſuppoſed to have, unleſs he likewiſe have the character of an honeſt man, he is often the more ſuſpected. For knowledge without honeſty is generally thought to diſpoſe a perſon, as well as qualify him, to deceive. Quintilian, in treating upon *Narration*, has a very remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe, which I ſhall here tranſcribe. *I muſt not omit*, ſais he, *how much the authority of the ſpeaker gives credit to what he relates, which is to be gained principally by his life, and partly from his manner of ſpeaking. For the more grave and honeſt this appears to be, what he affirms muſt neceſſarily carry with it the greater weight. In this part therefore eſpecially all ſuſpicion of deſign is to be avoided, that nothing ſeem counterfeit, nothing feigned; but all things to flow rather from the nature of the ſubject, than the art of the ſpeaker. But this we cannot away with,*

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with, who think our art loſt, if it does not appear; whereas it ceaſes to be art, when it does appear [1]. And what Quintilian obſerves here with reſpect to *Narration*, the beſt writers all recommend as neceſſary thro the whole conduct of an orator.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 2.

AND to both theſe qualities the appearance of kindneſs and *Benevolence* ſhould likewiſe be added. For tho a perſon have the reputation of wiſdom and honeſty, yet if we apprehend, he is either not well affected to us, or at leaſt regardleſs of our intereſt, we are in many caſes apt to be jealous of him. Mankind are naturally ſwayed by their affections, and much influenced thro love or freindſhip; and therefore nothing has a greater tendency to induce perſons to credit what is ſaid, than intimations of affection and kindneſs. Freinds are mutually concerned for each other's intereſt; and for that reaſon we readily harken to thoſe, who, we think, wiſh us well, becauſe we are perſuaded they ſpeak ſincerely. Indeed, in ſome caſes, our intereſt may happen to be the ſame with his, who, we may apprehend, in other reſpects has no great regard for us; and then we may beleive he will do that for his own ſake, which he would not have done

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done for ours. For nothing more closely unites men to one another, than common interest. The best orators have been always sensible, what great influence the expressions of kindness and benevolence have upon the minds of others, to induce them to beleive the truth of what they say; and therefore they frequently endeavour to impress them with the opinion of it. Thus Demosthenes begins his celebrated oration for Ctesiphon. *It is my hearty prayer*, sais he, *to all the deities, that this my defence may be received by you with the same affection, which I have always expressed for you, and your city.* And it is a very fine image of it, which we have in Cicero, where, in order to influence the judges in favor of Milo, he introduces him speaking thus, as became a brave man, and a patriot, even upon the supposition he should be condemned by them: *I bid my fellow citizens adieu; may they continue flourishing and prosperous; may this famous city be preserved, my most dear country, however it has treated me; may my fellow citizens enjoy peace and tranquillity without me, since I am not to enjoy it with them, tho I have procured it for them; I will withdraw, I will be gone* [1].

[1] *Pro Milon. c. 34.*

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THE fourth and laſt *quality* above mentioned, as neceſſary to the character of an orator, is *Modeſty*. And it is certain, that what is modeſtly ſpoken, is generally better received, than what carries in it an air of boldneſs and confidence. Moſt perſons, tho ignorant of a thing, do not care to be thought ſo, and would have ſome deference paid to their underſtanding. But he who delivers himſelf in an arrogant and aſſuming way, ſeems to upbraid his hearers with ignorance, while he does not leave them to judge for themſelves, but dictates to them, and as it were demands their aſſent, to what he ſais; which is certainly a very improper method to win upon them. For not a few, when convinced of an error in ſuch a way, will not own it; but will rather adhere to their former opinion, than ſeem forced to think right, when it gives another the opportunity of a triumph. For, as Quintilian rightly obſerves: *The mind of man has naturally ſomething in it that is ſublime, haughty, and impatient of a ſuperior. And therefore men readily help and aſſiſt the conquered, and ſuch who ſubmit; becauſe in that they act as ſuperiors: for when emulation ceaſes, humanity takes place. But he who extols himſelf, above what he ought, is*

looked

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looked upon to depreſs and deſpiſe others, and not ſo much to raiſe himſelf, as leſſen them; which excites envy [1]. A prudent orator therefore will behave himſelf with modeſty, that he may not ſeem to inſult his hearers; and will ſet things before them in ſuch an ingaging manner, as may remove all prejudice, either from his perſon, or what he aſſerts. But at the ſame time, firmneſs and reſolution is as neceſſary as modeſty, that he may appear to confide in the juſtice and truth of his cauſe. For to ſpeak timorouſly, and with heſitation, deſtroys the credit of what is offered; and ſo far as the ſpeaker ſeems to diſtruſt, what he ſais himſelf, he often induces others to do the like.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 2.

BUT, as has been ſaid already, great care is to be taken, that theſe characters do not appear feigned and counterfeit. For what is fictitious, can ſeldom be long concealed. And if this be once diſcovered, it makes all that is ſaid ſuſpected, how ſpecious ſoever it may otherwiſe appear. This is very handſomly expreſſed by Virgil, where he introduces Juno thus ſpeaking to Venus, and pretending a reconciliation with Aeneas:

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But ſhall celeſtial diſcord never ceaſe?
Tis better ended in a laſting peace.
You ſtand poſſeſs'd of all your ſoul deſir'd,
Poor Dido with conſuming love is fir'd;
Your Trojan with my Tyrian let us join,
So Dido ſhall be yours, Aeneas mine,
One common kingdom, one united line.
Eliza ſhall a Dardan lord obey,
And lofty Carthage for a dow'r convey [1].

[1] *Aen. Lib* iv. *v.* 98.

What could appear more fair and advantageous, than this propoſal? But yet it would not take. Venus does not credit it, becauſe ſhe perceives the fraud, and, as the poet adds,

cloſely ſmiles
At her vain project, and diſcover'd wiles.

If men always loved truth for its own excellency, it would be ſufficient to propoſe it clearly and plainly; nor would the aſſiſtance of art be neceſſary, in order to induce them to embrace it. But it frequently happens, that truth claſhes with what men account their intereſt, and for that reaſon they will not regard it. An ungrateful truth will either not be heard, or ſoon diſcarded. And many times, where perſons cannot contradict, what is offered; yet, if that contradict their ſettled opinions, they will ſtill ſuppoſe it may not

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be true. Nor is it a difficult thing for perſons to bring themſelves to ſuch a beleif, while they forbear calmly and ſeriouſly to conſider the arguments offered on the other ſide. And ſince matters are thus, it is often neceſſary for the orator to have recourſe to art, in order to obtain that, which otherwiſe he cannot come at. For this purpoſe therefore, it is very ſerviceable to accommodate his diſcourſe to the temper and inclination of his audience, that while they willingly attend to what is pleaſing and agreable to them, they may at the ſame time likewiſe be induced to entertain thoſe things, which, propoſed in another manner, would have been leſs attended to, or heard with prejudice. As phyſicians ſometimes gild over bitter pills, to pleaſe the palate, and by that means benefit the patient. And for this end, it is further neceſſary, that the orator ſhould know the world, and be well acquainted with the different tempers and diſpoſitions of mankind. Nor indeed can any one reaſonably hope to ſuccede in this province, without well conſidering the circumſtances of time and place, with the ſentiments and diſpoſitions of thoſe, to whom he ſpeaks; which, according to Ariſtotle,

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may be distinguished four ways, as they discover themselves by the several *affections*, *habits*, *ages*, and *fortunes* of mankind [1]. And each of these require a different conduct and manner of address.

[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* ii. c. 14, &c.

THE *affections* denote certain emotions of the mind, which, during their continuance, give a great turn to the disposition. For love prompts to one thing, and hatred to another. The like may be said of anger, lenity, and the rest of them; as I shall shew, when I come to treat of them particularly [2].

[2] See *Lect.* XI.

PERSONS differ likewise according to the various *habits* of their mind. So a just man is inclined one way, and an unjust man another; a temperate man to this, and an intemperate man to the contrary.

AND as to the several *ages* of men, Aristotle has described them very accurately, and how persons are differently affected in each of them. I shall content myself with the substance of what he sais, to prevent being tedious. He divides the lives of men, considered as hearers, into three stages; youth, middle age, and old age. Young men, he sais, have generally strong passions, and are very eager to obtain, what they desire; but are likewise very

very mutable, ſo that the ſame thing does not pleaſe them long. They are ambitious of praiſe, and quick in their reſentments. Laviſh of their money, as not having experienced the want of it. Frank and open, becauſe they have not often been deceived; and credulous for the ſame reaſon. They readily hope the beſt, becauſe they have not ſuffered much, and are therefore not ſo ſenſible of the uncertainty of human affairs; for which reaſon they are likewiſe more eaſily deceived. They are modeſt from their little acquaintance with the world. They love company and chearfulneſs, from the briſkneſs of their ſpirits; and think well of their freinds. They imagine they know more than they do, and for that reaſon, are apt to be too poſitive. In a word, they generally excede in what they do, love violenty, hate violently, and act in the ſame manner thro the reſt of their conduct. The diſpoſition of old men is generally contrary to the former. They are cautious, and enter upon nothing haſtily; having in the courſe of many years been often impoſed upon, having often erred, and experienced the prevailing corruption of human affairs; for which reaſon they are likewiſe

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ſuſpicious, and moderate in their affections, either of love or hatred. They purſue nothing great and noble, and regard only the neceſſaries of life. They love money, having learnt by experience the difficulty of geting it, and how eaſily it is loſt. They are fearful, which makes them provident. Commonly full of complaints from bodily infirmities, and a deficiency of ſpirits. Pleaſe themſelves rather with the memory of what is paſt, than any future proſpect, having ſo ſhort a view of life before them, in compariſon of what is already gone; for which reaſon alſo they love to talk of things paſt, and prefer them to what is preſent, of which they have but little reliſh, and know they muſt ſhortly leave them. They are ſoon angry, but not to exceſs. Laſtly, they are compaſſionate, from a ſenſe of their own infirmities, which makes them think themſelves of all perſons moſt expoſed. Perſons of a middle age, betwixt theſe two extremes, as they are freed from the raſhneſs and temerity of youth, ſo they have not yet ſuffered the decays of old age. Hence in every thing they generally obſerve a better conduct. They are neither ſo haſty in their aſſent as the one, nor ſo minutely ſcrupulous as the

other, but weigh the reaſons of things. They regard a decency in their actions, are careful and induſtrious; and as they undertake what appears juſt and laudable upon better and more deliberate conſideration, than young perſons; ſo they purſue them with more vigor and reſolution, than thoſe who are older. LECT. X.

As to the different *fortunes* of mankind, they may be conſidered as noble, rich, or powerful; and the contrary to theſe. Thoſe of high birth, and noble extraction, are generally very tender of their honor, and ambitious to increaſe it; it being natural for all perſons to deſire an addition to thoſe advantages, of which they find themſelves already poſſeſſed. And they are apt to conſider all others as much their inferiors, and therefore expect great regard and deference ſhould be ſhewn them. Riches, when accompanied with a generous temper, command reſpect from the opportunities they give of being uſeful to others; but they uſually elate the mind, and occaſion pride. For as money is commonly ſaid to command all things, thoſe, who are poſſeſſed of a large ſhare of it, expect others ſhould be at their beck; ſince they injoy that, which all deſire, and moſt perſons

make

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make the main purſuit of their lives to obtain. But nothing is more apt to ſwell the mind, than power. This is what all men naturally covet, even when perhaps they would not uſe it. But the views of ſuch perſons are generally more noble and generous, than of thoſe, who only purſue riches, and the heaping up of money. A ſtate contrary to theſe gives a contrary turn of mind, and in lower life, perſons diſpoſitions uſually differ according to their ſtation and circumſtances. A citizen and a courtier, a merchant and a ſoldier, a ſcholar and a peaſant, as their purſuits are different, ſo is generally their turn and diſpoſition of mind.

IT is the orator's buſineſs therefore to conſider theſe ſeveral characters, and circumſtances of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind; that he may ſo conduct himſelf in his behaviour and manner of ſpeaking, as will render him moſt acceptable, and gain him the good eſteem of thoſe, to whom he addreſſes.

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LECTURE XI.

Of the Paſſions.

THE third and laſt part of rhetorical invention relates to the *Paſſions*, of which I am now to diſcourſe. And as it is often highly neceſſary for the orator, ſo it requires his greateſt ſkill, to ingage theſe in his intereſt. Quintilian calls this, *The ſoul and ſpirit of his art* [1]. And doubtleſs, nothing more diſcovers its empire over the minds of men, than this power to excite, appeaſe, and ſway their paſſions, agreably to the deſign of the ſpeaker. Hence we meet with the characters of *admirable*, *divine*, and other ſplendid titles, aſcribed to eloquence by antient writers. It has indeed been objected by ſome, that whatever high encomiums may be given of this art by the admirers of it; it is however diſingenuous to deceive and impoſe upon mankind, as they ſeem to do, who, by ingaging their paſſions, give a bias to their minds, and take them off from the conſideration of the truth; whereas every thing ſhould be judged of from the reaſons brought to ſupport it, by the evidence of which

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[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 2.

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which it ought to ſtand or fall. But in anſwer to this, it may be conſidered, that all fallacy is not culpable. We often deceive children for their good, and phyſicians ſometimes impoſe on their patients to come at a cure. And why therefore, when perſons will not be prevailed with by reaſon and argument, may not an orator endeavour, by ingaging their paſſions, to perſuade them to that, which is for their advantage? Beſides, Quintilian makes it a neceſſary qualification of an orator; that he be an honeſt man, and one who will not abuſe his art [1]. But ſince thoſe of a contrary character will leave no methods untried, in order to carry their point; it is requiſite for thoſe, who deſign well, to be acquainted with all their arts, without which they will not be a match for them. As in military affairs, it is highly advantageous for the general of an army to get himſelf informed of all the deſigns and ſtratagems of the enemy, in order to counteract them. Indeed this part of oratory is not neceſſary at all times, nor in all places. The better prepared perſons are to conſider truth, and act upon the evidence of it, the leſs occaſion there appears for it. But the greater part of mankind, either do not duly weigh the force

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xii. c. 1.

of

of arguments, or refuſe to act agreably to their evidence. And where this is the caſe, that perſons will neither be convinced by reaſon, nor moved by the authority of the ſpeaker; the only way left to put them upon action, is to ingage their paſſions. For the paſſions are to the mind, what the wind is to a ſhip, they move, and carry it forward; and he who is without them, is in a manner without action, dull and lifeleſs. There is nothing great or noble to be performed in life, wherein the paſſions are not concerned. The ſtoics therefore, who were for eradicating the paſſions, both maintained a thing in itſelf impoſſible; and if it was poſſible, would be of the greateſt prejudice to mankind. For while they appeared ſuch zealous aſſertors of the government of reaſon, they ſcarce left it any thing to govern; for the authority of reaſon is principally exerciſed in ruling and moderating the paſſions, which, when kept in a due regulation, are the ſprings and motives to virtue. Thus hope produces patience, and fear induſtry, and the like might be ſhewn of the reſt. The paſſions therefore are not to be extirpated, as the ſtoics aſſerted, but put under the direction and conduct of reaſon. Indeed

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where they are ungovernable, and inſtead of obeying command, they are, as ſome have fitly called them, *diſeaſes of the mind*, and frequently hurry men into vice, and the greateſt misfortunes of life. Juſt as the wind, when it blows moderately, carries on the ſhip; but if it be too boiſterous and violent, may overſet her. The charge therefore brought againſt this art, for giving rules to influence the paſſions, appears groundleſs and unjuſt; ſince the proper uſe of the paſſions is not to hinder the exerciſe of reaſon, but to ingage men to act agreably to reaſon. And if an ill uſe be ſometimes made of this, it is not the fault of the art, but the artiſt. So moraliſts explain the nature both of virtues and vices, that men may know better how to practiſe one, and avoid the other; but if their precepts happen to have a different effect, they are not anſwerable for that.

BUT that an orator may be enabled to manage this part of his province to the beſt advantage, it is neceſſary he ſhould, in ſome meaſure, be acquainted with the nature, cauſes, and objects of the paſſions. Now the paſſions, as defined by Ariſtotle, are, *Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently concerning*

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cerning the ſame things[1]. Thus a thing appears good to him, who deſires it; tho it may not appear ſo to another, or to the ſame perſon at a different time. Writers are not agreed as to the number of the paſſions. But I ſhall wave this diſpute, as the more proper buſineſs of philoſophy, and only conſider them, as they come under the cognizance of the orator. And that I may procede in ſome order, I ſhall treat of them, as they may be ſeparately refered, either to *demonſtrative*, *deliberative*, or *judicial* diſcourſes; tho they are not wholly confined to any of them.

[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

To the *demonſtrative* kind, we may refer *Joy* and *Sorrow*, *Love* and *Hatred*, *Emulation* and *Contempt*.

JOY is an elation of the mind, ariſing from a ſenſe of ſome preſent good. Such a reflection naturally creates a pleaſant and agreable ſenſation, which ends in a delightful calm and ſerenity. This is hightened by a deſcription of former evils, and a compariſon between them and the preſent felicity. Thus Cicero endeavours to excite in the minds of his fellow citizens the higheſt ſenſe of joy and delight at Catiline's departure from Rome, by repreſenting to them the imminent danger,

which

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which threatened both them and the city, while he continued among them [1].

[1] *In Catil. Orat.* ii. *c.* 1.

SORROW, on the contrary, is an uneaſineſs of mind, ariſing from a ſenſe of ſome preſent evil. This paſſion has generally a place in funeral diſcourſes. And it may be hightened like the former by compariſon, when any paſt happineſs is ſet in oppoſition to a preſent calamity. Hence Cicero aggravates the ſorrow at Rome, occaſioned by the death of Metellus, from his character, and great ſervices to the public while living [2].

[2] *Pro Coel. c.* 24.

LOVE excites us to eſteem another for ſome excellency, and to do him all the good in our power. It is diſtinguiſhed from *Freindſhip*, which is mutual; and therefore love may continue, where freindſhip is loſt: that is, the affection may remain on one ſide. And when we aſſiſt a perſon from no other motive, but to do him a kindneſs, Ariſtotle calls this *good will* [3]. Love takes its riſe from a variety of cauſes. Generoſity, benevolence, integrity, gratitude, courteſy, and other ſocial virtues, are great incitements to love any one indued with ſuch qualities. And perſons generally love thoſe, who are of a like diſpoſition with themſelves, and purſue the

[3] *De rhetor. Lib.* ii. *c.* 9.

ſame

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ſame views. It is therefore the cheif art of a flatterer to ſuit himſelf in every thing to the inclination of the perſon, whoſe good graces he courts. When the orator would excite this affection towards any perſon, it is proper to ſhew, that he is poſſeſſed of ſome at leaſt, if not all theſe agreable qualities. When the conſpirators with Catiline were to be brought to juſtice, Cicero was very ſenſible of the envy he ſhould contract on that account, and how neceſſary it was for him to ſecure the love of the Roman ſenate for his ſupport and protection in that critical juncture. And this he endeavours to do in his fourth oration againſt Catiline, by repreſenting to them, in the moſt pathetic manner, that all the labors he underwent, the difficulties he conflicted with, and the dangers to which he was expoſed, on that account, were not for his own ſake, but for their ſafety, quiet, and happineſs [1].

[1] *Cap.* 1.

HATRED is oppoſed to love, and produced by the contrary diſpoſitions. And therefore perſons hate thoſe, who never did them any injury, from the ill opinion they have of their baſe and vitious inclinations. So that the way to excite this paſſion is, by ſhewing that any one has

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commited ſome heinous fact, with an ill intent. And the more nearly affected perſons are by ſuch actions, in what they account of the greateſt concern, the higher in proportion their hatred riſes. Since life therefore is eſteemed the moſt valuable good, Cicero endeavours to render Mark Antony odious to the citizens of Rome, by deſcribing his cruelty [1].

[1] *Philipp.* iv. *c.* 5.

EMULATION is a diſquiet, occaſioned by the felicity of another, not becauſe he enjoys it, but becauſe we deſire the like for ourſelves. So that this paſſion is in itſelf good and laudable, as it ingages men to purſue thoſe things, which are ſo. For the proper objects of emulation are any advantages of mind, body, or fortune, acquired by ſtudy or labor. And perſons are generally excited to an emulation of thoſe, with whom they converſe. So children are often ambitious of the like virtues or honors, which they ſee in their relations or freinds. And therefore it was a very proper queſtion of Andromache to Aeneas, concerning Aſcanius, which we have in Virgil:

What hopes are promis'd from his blooming years?
How much of Hector's ſoul in him appears[2]*?*

[2] *Aen. Lib.* iii. *v.* 342.

Emu-

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Emulation therefore is excited by a lively repreſentation of any deſirable advantages, which appear to be attainable, from the examples of others, who are, or have been poſſeſſed of them. But where the felicity of another occaſions an uneaſineſs, not from the want of it, but becauſe he enjoys it; this paſſion is called *Envy*, which the antients deſcribe as an hideous monſter, feeding upon itſelf, and being its own tormentor [1]. Ariſtotle obſerves, that it moſt uſually affects ſuch perſons, who were once upon a level with thoſe they envy [2]. For moſt men naturally think ſo well of themſelves, that they are uneaſy to ſee thoſe, who were formerly their equals, advanced above them. But as this is a baſe and vitious paſſion, the orator is not to be informed how to excite it, but how to leſſen or remove it. And the method preſcribed by Cicero for this purpoſe is, to ſhew that the things, which occaſioned it, have not happened to the envied perſon undeſervedly; but are the juſt reward of his induſtry or virtue; that he does not ſo much convert them to his own profit or pleaſure, as to the benefit of others; and that the ſame pains and difficulties are neceſſary to preſerve them, with which they were at firſt acquired [3].

[1] *Ovid. Met. Lib.* i. *v.* 760. Athenaeus, *Lib.* i. *c.* 10.

[2] *De rhetor. Lib.* ii. *c.* 12.

[3] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 52.

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CONTEMPT is oppoſed to *Emulation*, and ariſes from miſconduct in things, not of themſelves vitious. As where a perſon either acts below his ſtation and character; or affects to do that, for which he is not qualified. Thus Cicero endeavours to expoſe Caecilius, and bring him into contempt of the court, for pretending to rival him in the accuſation of Verres, for which he was altogether unfit [1].

[1] *Cap.* 12.

To *deliberative* diſcourſes may be refered *Fear*, *Hope*, and *Shame*.

FEAR ariſes from the apprehenſion of ſome great and impending evil. For the greateſt evils, while they appear at a diſtance, do not much affect us. Such perſons occaſion fear, who are poſſeſſed with power, eſpecially if they have been injured, or apprehend ſo. Likewiſe thoſe who are addicted to do injuries, or who bear us an ill will. And the examples of others, who have ſuffered in a like caſe, or from the ſame perſons, help to excite fear. From the circumſtances therefore either of the thing, or perſon, it will not be difficult for the orator to offer ſuch arguments, as may be proper to awaken this paſſion. So Demoſthenes, when he would perſuade the Athenians to put themſelves in a condition

of

of defence againſt king Philip, enumerates the ſeveral acts of hoſtility already commited by him, againſt the neighbouring ſtates [1]. And becauſe mens private concerns generally more affect them, than what relates to the public; it is proper ſometimes to ſhew the neceſſary connection theſe have with each other, and how the ruin of one draws the other after it.

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[1] *Philipp.* iii.

THE contrary paſſion to *Fear* is *Hope*, which ariſes, either from a proſpect of ſome future good, or the apprehenſion of ſafety from thoſe things, which occaſion our fear. Young perſons are eaſily induced to hope the beſt, from the vigor of their ſpirits. And thoſe, who have eſcaped former dangers, are encouraged to hope for the like happy ſucceſs for the future. The examples of others alſo, eſpecially of wiſe and conſiderate men, have often the ſame good effect. To find them calm and ſedate, when expoſed to the like dangers, naturally creates confidence, and the hopes of ſafety. But nothing gives perſons that firmneſs and ſteadineſs of mind, under the apprehenſion of any difficulties, as a conſciouſneſs of their own integrity and innocence. Let dangers come from what quarter they will, they are beſt prepared

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to receive them. They can calmly view an impending tempeſt, obſerve the way of its approach, and prepare themſelves in the beſt manner to avoid it. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, he encourages the Roman citizens to hope for ſucceſs againſt Mithridates, if they choſe Pompey for their general, from the many inſtances of his former ſucceſſes, which he there enumerates. We find in hiſtory, that artful men have frequently made uſe of omens and prodigies with the populace, either to awaken or expel their fears, and that with the greateſt ſucceſs. But ſuch arguments are not much regarded by wiſe and prudent men. In the time of the civil wars between Caeſar and Pompey, when the affairs of Pompey's party were very much broken and ſhattered; one who was in that intereſt, endeavoured to animate the reſt, and excite them to puſh on the war with vigor, from a lucky omen (as it was then thought) of ſeven eagles, which were obſerved to ſettle in their camp. But Cicero, who was then preſent, and knew very well the vanity of ſuch reaſoning, immediately replied: *That ſuch an happy incident might indeed prove of ſervice to them, if they were to fight with jackdaws* [1].

[1] Plut. *in vit. Cicer.*

SHAME

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SHAME ariſes from the apprehenſion of thoſe things, that hurt a perſon's character. *Modeſty* has been wiſely implanted in mankind by the great author of nature, as a guardian of virtue, which ought for this reaſon to be cheriſhed with the greateſt care; becauſe, as Seneca has well obſerved, *if it be once loſt, it is ſcarce ever to be recovered* [1]. Therefore the true cauſe or foundation of ſhame is any thing baſe or vitious; for this wounds the character, and will not bear reflection. And he muſt arrive at no ſmall degree of inſenſibility, who can ſtand againſt ſuch a charge, if he be conſcious to himſelf that it is juſt. Therefore to deter perſons from vitious actions, or to expoſe them for the commiſſion of them, the orator endeavours to ſet them in ſuch a light, as may moſt awaken this paſſion, and give them the greateſt uneaſineſs by the reflection. And becauſe the bare repreſentation of the thing itſelf is not always ſufficient for this purpoſe; he ſometimes inforces it by inlarging the view, and introducing thoſe perſons, as witneſſes of the fact, for whom they are ſuppoſed to have the greateſt regard. Thus when ſome of the Athenians, in an arbitration about certain lands, which had

[1] *In Agamemn.*

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been refered to them by the contending parties, propoſed it as the ſhorteſt way of deciding the controverſy, to take the poſſeſſion of them into their own hands; Cydias, a member of the aſſembly, to diſſuade them from ſuch an unjuſt action, deſired them to imagine themſelves at that time in the general aſſembly of the ſtates of Greece (who would all hear of it ſhortly) and then conſider how it was proper to act [1]. But where perſons labour under an exceſs of modeſty, which prevents them from exerting themſelves in things fit and laudable, it may ſometimes be neceſſary to ſhew, that it is faulty and ill grounded. On the other hand, *immodeſty* or impudence, which conſiſts in a contempt of ſuch things, as affect the reputation, can never be too much diſcouraged and expoſed. And the way of doing this is, to make uſe of ſuch arguments, as are moſt proper to excite ſhame. We have a very remarkable inſtance of it in Cicero's ſecond Philippic, wherein he affixes this character upon Mark Antony, thro every ſcene of his life.

[1] Ariſt. *De Rhet. Lib.* ii. *c.* 8. §. 4.

I COME now to thoſe paſſions, which may be refered to *judicial* diſcourſes. And

theſe are *Anger* and *Lenity*, *Pity* and *In-* LECT. XI.
dignation.

ANGER is a reſentment, occaſioned by ſome affront, or injury, done without any juſt reaſon. Now men are more inclined to reſent ſuch a conduct, as they think they leſs deſerve it. Therefore perſons of diſtinction and figure, who expect a regard ſhould be paid to their character, can the leſs bear any indications of contempt. And thoſe who are eminent in any profeſſion or faculty, are apt to be offended, if reflections are caſt, either upon their reputation, or art. Magiſtrates alſo, and perſons in public ſtations, ſometimes think it incumbent on them to reſent indignities, for the ſupport of their office. But nothing ſooner inflames this paſſion, than if good ſervices are rewarded with ſlights and neglect. The inſtance of Narſites, the Roman general, is remarkable in this kind; who, after he had been very ſucceſsful in his wars with the Goths, falling under the diſpleaſure of the emperor Juſtin, was removed from the government of Italy, and received by the empreſs with this taunt: *That he muſt be ſent to weave among the girls.* Which ſo provoked him, that he ſaid, he would weave ſuch a web, as they ſhould never

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never be able to unravel. And accordingly he ſoon after brought down the Longobards, a people of Germany, into Italy, where they ſettled themſelves in that part of the country, which from them is now called Lombardy [1]. The time and place, in which an injury was done, and other circumſtances that attended it, may likewiſe contribute very much to highten the fact. Hence Demoſthenes, in his oration againſt Midias, endeavours to aggravate the injury of being ſtruck by him, both as he was then a magiſtrate, and becauſe it was done at a public feſtival. From hence it appears, that the perſons, who moſt uſually occaſion this paſſion, are ſuch, who neglect the rules of decency, contemn and inſult others, or oppoſe their inclinations; as likewiſe the ungrateful, and thoſe who violate the ties of freindſhip, or requite favors with injuries. But when the orator endeavours to excite anger, he ſhould be careful not to excede due bounds in aggravating the charge, leſt what he ſais, appear rather to procede from prejudice, than a ſtrict regard to the demerit of the action.

[1] Paul. Diacon. *De geſt. Long. Lib.* ii. *c.* 5.

LENITY is the remiſſion of anger. The deſigns of mens actions are principally to be

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be regarded; and therefore what is done ignorantly, or thro inadvertency, is ſooner forgiven. Alſo to acknowledge a fault, ſubmit, and aſk pardon, are the ready means to take off reſentment. For a generous mind is ſoon cooled by ſubmiſſion. Beſides he, who repents of his fault, does really give the injured party ſome ſatisfaction, by puniſhing himſelf; as all repentance is attended with greif, and uneaſineſs of mind: and this is apt very much to abate the deſire of revenge. As, on the contrary, nothing is more provoking, than when the offender either audaciouſly juſtifies the fact, or confidently denies it. Men are likewiſe wont to lay aſide their reſentment, when their adverſaries happen by ſome other means to ſuffer, what they think a ſufficient ſatisfaction. Laſtly, eaſy circumſtances, a lucky incident, or any thing, which gives the mind a turn to mirth and pleaſure, has a natural tendency to remove anger. For anger is accompanied with pain and uneaſineſs, which very ill ſuit joy and chearfulneſs. The orator therefore, in order to aſſuage and pacify the minds of his auditors, will endeavour to leſſen their opinion of the fault, and by that means to take off the edge of their reſentment. And

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to this purpoſe, it will be proper either to repreſent, that the thing was not deſigned; or that the party is ſorry for it; or to mention his former ſervices; as alſo to ſhew the credit and reputation, which will be gained by a generous forgiveneſs. And this laſt topic is very artfully wrought up by Cicero, in his addreſs to Caeſar, in favor of Ligarius.

PITY ariſes from the calamities of others, by reflecting that we ourſelves are liable to the like misfortunes. So that evils, conſidered as the common lot of human nature, are principally the cauſe of *pity*. And this makes the difference between *pity* and *good-will*, which, as I have ſhewn already, ariſes merely from a regard to the circumſtances of thoſe, who want our aſſiſtance. But conſidering the uncertainty of every thing about us, he muſt ſeem in a manner diveſted of humanity, who has no compaſſion for the calamities of others; ſince there is no affliction, which happens to any man, but either that, or ſome other as great, may fall upon himſelf. But thoſe perſons are generally ſooneſt touched with this paſſion, who have met with misfortunes themſelves. And by how much greater the diſtreſs is, or the perſon appears leſs deſerving it; the

higher

higher pity does it excite: for which reaſon perſons are generally moſt moved at the misfortunes of their relations and freinds, or thoſe of the beſt figure and character. The orator therefore, in order to excite the greater pity, will endeavour to highten the idea of the calamity, from the ſeveral circumſtances, both of the thing itſelf, and the perſon who labours under it. A fine example of this may be ſeen in Cicero's defence of Muraena [1].

[1] *Cap.* 40. *&c.*

INDIGNATION, as oppoſed to *pity*, is an uneaſineſs at the felicity of another, who does not ſeem to deſerve it. But this reſpects only external advantages, ſuch as riches, honors, and the like; for virtues cannot be the object of this paſſion. Ariſtotle therefore ſais, *that pity and indignation are generally to be found in the ſame perſons, and are both evidences of a good diſpoſition* [2]. Now the orator excites this paſſion, by ſhewing the perſon to be unworthy of that felicity which he enjoys. And as, in order to move compaſſion, it is ſometimes of uſe, to compare the former happy ſtate of the perſon, with his preſent calamity; ſo here, the greater indignation is raiſed, by comparing his former mean circumſtances with his preſent advancement:

[2] *De rhetor. Lib.* ii. *c.* 11.

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vancement: as Cicero does in the caſe of Vatinius [1].

[1] *In Vatin. c. 5, &c.*

THESE are the paſſions, with which an orator is principally concerned. In addreſſing to which, not only the greateſt warmth and force of expreſſion is often neceſſary; but he muſt likewiſe firſt endeavour to impreſs his own mind with the ſame paſſion, he would excite in others, agreably to that of Horace:

My greif with others juſt proportion bears,
To make me weep, you muſt be firſt in tears [2].

[2] *Art. Poet. v.* 102.

I HAVE now finiſhed the firſt part of oratory, namely *Invention*; and ſhall proceed to the ſecond, which is *Diſpoſition*, in my next diſcourſe.

LEC-

LECTURE XII.

Of Diſpoſition in general, and particularly of the Introduction.

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IN treating upon the *diviſion* of oratory, I ſhewed, that it conſiſts of four parts; *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Elocution*, and *Pronunciation*. And as I then propoſed to conſider each of theſe in their order, having explained the firſt of them in ſeveral diſcourſes, I ſhall now procede to the ſecond, which is *Diſpoſition*. For agreably to the ſimilitude I formerly obſerved between the arts of ſpeaking and building, as *Invention* ſupplies the orator with neceſſary materials; ſo *Diſpoſition* directs him how to place them in the moſt proper and ſuitable order. And, as in both arts, the firſt conſideration of the artiſt is to collect and prepare his materials, ſo the next is to put them together [1]. *Diſpoſition* therefore, conſidered as a part of oratory, naturally follows *Invention*. And what is here cheifly intended by it is, the placing the ſeveral parts of a diſcourſe in a juſt method, and dependance upon each other. Tho indeed the ſeveral things contained under each part,

[1] See *Lect.* III.

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part, require likewiſe a ſuitable order and diſpoſition, as will be ſhewn in their proper place. Order and regularity is always pleaſant and agreable; we admire it in nature, and it is no leſs beautiful in art, and particularly in diſcourſe. For, as that judicious writer Quintilian has well obſerved: *A diſcourſe that wants diſpoſition, muſt neceſſarily be confuſed, and without connection, liable to frequent tautologies, and omiſſions, and, like one wandering in the dark, be conducted by chance, rather than deſign* [1]. And want of order is certainly a very great prejudice to a diſcourſe in other reſpects. For what is methodically delivered, is heard with more attention, better underſtood, and longer retained. But as *Invention* requires thought, and a lively imagination, ſo judgement and prudence are neceſſary in *Diſpoſition*.

[1] *Inſt orat. Lib.* vii. *prooem.*

WRITERS are not all agreed in determining the parts of an oration; tho the difference is rather in the manner of conſidering them, than in the things themſelves. Ariſtotle mentions four; *Introduction*, *Propoſition*, *Proof*, and *Concluſion* [2]. Two of theſe, that is, *Propoſition* and *Proof*, are always neceſſary. For in every diſcourſe there ought to be ſome ſubject propoſed, which

[2] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. *c.* 13.

which muſt afterwards be proved or illuſtrated. The other two ſeem to have been introduced, not ſo much from neceſſity, as from other conſiderations. For as the tempers of mankind are exceding various, it is often neceſſary to prepare the way for a candid reception of a diſcourſe, by firſt gaining their benevolence, and attention; and after the matter has been fully repreſented, and ſupported by proper arguments, it is further requiſite to engage their paſſions in the purſuit of what has been offered. For theſe reaſons therefore, the uſe of the *Introduction* is to make way for a kind and attentive hearing, and the deſign of the *Concluſion* is to gain that by an addreſs to the paſſions, which perhaps could not be done by cool reaſoning. Quintilian makes five parts, *Introduction*, *Narration*, *Confirmation*, *Refutation*, and *Concluſion* [1]. But Cicero enlarges them to ſix; namely, *Introduction*, *Narration*, *Propoſition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, and *Concluſion* [2]. Tho Ariſtotle may be ſuppoſed to include *Narration* under *Propoſition*, and both *Confirmation* and *Confutation* under *Proof*; as, on the contrary, Quintilian ſeems to have included *Propoſition* under *Narration*. However, I ſhall chooſe to follow

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 9.

[2] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 14.

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Cicero's diviſion, as moſt full and explicit; and treat upon each part in the order now mentioned. Not but that this order is ſometimes changed by the beſt orators, and for good reaſons, as will be ſhewn hereafter.

THE firſt part of a diſcourſe is the *Introduction*, the deſign of which is to prepare the minds of the hearers for a ſuitable reception of the remaining parts, that are to follow. And for this end, three things are requiſite; that the orator gain the *good opinion* of his hearers, that he ſecure their *attention*, and give them ſome *general notion* of his ſubject. I ſhall ſpeak to each of theſe heads ſeparately, begining with *Benevolence*.

Now the topics made uſe of for gaining the eſteem and *good opinion* of the hearers, are *Perſons*, or *Things*.

THE *Perſons* are cheifly the ſpeaker himſelf, or thoſe to whom he addreſſes. When the orator introduces his diſcourſe with his own perſon, he will be careful to do it with modeſty, and ſeem rather to extenuate his virtues and abilities, than to magnify them. And where the nature of the ſubject may ſeem to require it, he will endeavour to ſhew, that ſome juſt and good

reaſon

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reaſon induced him to ingage in it. We have a very fine example of this, in Cicero's *oration* for the poet Aulus Licinius Archias, which begins thus: *If I have any natural genius, which I am ſenſible how ſmall it is; or any ability in ſpeaking, wherein I own I have been very converſant; or any ſkill acquired from the ſtudy and precepts of the beſt arts, to which my whole life has been devoted: this Aulus Licinius has, in a particular manner, a right to demand of me the fruit of all theſe things. For as far back as I can remember, and call to mind what paſſed in my youth, to the preſent time, he has been my cheif adviſer and encourager, both to undertake and purſue this courſe of ſtudies.* When the orator ſets out with the perſons of thoſe, to whom the diſcourſe is made, it is not unuſual to commend them for their virtues, and thoſe eſpecially, which have a more immediate relation to the preſent ſubject. Thus Cicero begins his oration of thanks for the pardon of Marcellus, with an encomium upon the mildneſs, clemency, and wiſdom of Caeſar, to whom it was addreſſed. But ſometimes he expreſſes his gratitude for paſt favors; as Cicero has done in his orations, both to the people and ſenate of

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Rome, after his return from baniſhment. And at other times he declares his concern for them and their intereſt; in which manner Cicero begins his fourth oration againſt Catiline, which was made in the ſenate. *I perceive*, ſais he, *that all your countenances and eyes are turned on me; I perceive that you are ſolicitous, not only for your own danger, and that of the ſtate, but for mine likewiſe, if that ſhould be removed. Your affection for me is pleaſant in misfortunes, and grateful in ſorrow; but I adjure you to lay it aſide, and forgeting my ſafety, conſider yourſelves and your children.* But in *judicial* caſes, both the character of the perſon, whoſe cauſe he eſpouſes, and that of the adverſe party, likewiſe furniſhes the orator with arguments for *Benevolence*. The former, by commemorating his virtues, dignity, or merits; and ſometimes his misfortunes, and calamities. So Cicero in his defence of Flaccus, begins his oration in commending him on the account of his ſervices done to the public, the dignity of his family, and his love to his country. And Demoſthenes, in his oration againſt Midias, ſets out with a recital of his vices, in order to recommend his own cauſe to the favorable opinion of the court. And

Cicero,

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Cicero, in his defence of Quintius, with the ſame view, joins his antagoniſt Hortenſius with Nevius the plaintif: *Both thoſe things*, ſais he, *at preſent make againſt us, which bear the cheif ſway in this city, the greateſt intereſt, and the greateſt eloquence. As I am concerned at the one, ſo I fear the other. For as I am ſomewhat apprehenſive, leſt the eloquence of Hortenſius ſhould prejudice what I ſay; ſo I very much dread, leſt the intereſt of Nevius ſhould prove hurtful to Quintius* [1].

[1] *Cap.* 1.

THE other topic above mentioned, for gaining *Benevolence*, was *Things*. And theſe are principally taken from the ſubject; as its *Juſtice*, *Importance*, *Advantage*, or *Pleaſure*. Thus Cicero recommends the cauſe of Rabirius, whom he defended, from the juſtice of it, when he ſais: *No crime, envy, vice, or inveterate, reaſonable, and heavy reſentments of his fellow citizens, have brought Caius Rabirius in danger of his life; but a deſign to take away that power and authority, which has been delivered to us from our anceſtors, that neither the authority of the ſenate, the commands of the conſul, nor the conſent of good men, ſhould be able to withſtand thoſe, who aim at the ruin and deſtruction of the ſtate* [2]. Again, in his

[2] *Cap.* 1.

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oration for the recovery of his houſe, made to the preiſts, to whom that cauſe was committed, he repreſents the importance of it, with the ſame deſign: *If a weighty cauſe has at any time come under the cognizance and deciſion of the preiſts of the Roman people; this truly is ſo great, that the dignity of the whole ſtate, the ſafety of all the citizens, their lives, liberty, religious rights, both public and private, goods, fortunes, and habitations, ſeem all to be committed and intruſted to your wiſdom, integrity, and power* [1]. And at the entrance of his charge againſt Verres before the ſenate, he endeavours to recommend it to their good opinion, from the advantage it might bring to themſelves. *I have*, ſais he, *undertaken this cauſe with the greateſt approbation and expectation of the Roman people, not to increaſe the envy of your order, but to remove the common infamy, under which it lies.* But in his oration for the Manilian law, he propoſes the ſame thing, from the pleaſure of the ſubject. *It affords me*, ſais he, *a particular delight and ſatisfaction, that in ſpeaking from this place, to which I have not been accuſtomed, I am furniſhed with ſuch a ſubject, in which no one can want matter of diſcourſe. For I am to ſpeak of*

[1] *Cap.* 1.

the

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the ſingular and excellent virtues of Cneius Pompey; in treating upon which, it is more difficult to know how to end, than where to begin [1]. But tho I have repreſented theſe ſeveral ways of gaining *Benevolence* ſeparately, that they might appear in a clearer light; yet ſeveral of them are frequently made uſe of by orators in the ſame introduction.

[1] *Cap.* 1.

THE ſecond thing propoſed in the introduction, is, to gain the *Attention* of the hearers. And in ſpeaking of this head, Cicero ſais: *We ſhall be heard attentively by one of theſe three things; if we propoſe what is great, neceſſary, or for the intereſt of thoſe, to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed* [2]. So that according to him, the topics of *Attention* are much the ſame, with thoſe of *Benevolence*, when taken from the ſubject. And indeed, people are naturally led to attend either to thoſe things or perſons, of which they have entertained a favorable opinion. But in order to gain this point, the orator ſometimes thinks it proper to requeſt the attention of his audience. Thus Cicero, in his defence of Cluentius, after having ſhewn the heinouſneſs of the charge againſt him, concludes his introduction in the following manner, ſpeaking

[2] *Orat Partit. c.* 8.

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to the judges: *Wherefore I intreat, that while I breifly and clearly reply to a charge of many years ſtanding, you will, according to your uſual cuſtom, give me a kind and attentive hearing* [1]. And again, in his ſecond Philippic, addreſſing himſelf to the ſenate: *But as I muſt ſay ſomething for myſelf, and many things againſt Mark Antony; one of theſe I beg of you, that you will hear me kindly, while I ſpeak for myſelf; and the other I will undertake for, that when I ſpeak againſt him, you ſhall hear me with attention* [2]. But tho the introduction be the moſt uſual and proper place for gaining attention; yet the orator finds it convenient ſometimes to quicken and excite his hearers in other parts of his diſcourſe, when he obſerves they flag, or has ſomething of moment to offer.

[1] Cap. 3.

[2] Cap. 5.

THE third thing required in an introduction, is, ſome *general account* of the ſubject of the diſcourſe. This is always neceſſary, which the two others are not. And therefore it muſt be left to the prudence of the orator, when to uſe or omit them, as he ſhall judge proper, from the nature of his diſcourſe, the circumſtances of his hearers, and how he ſtands with them. But ſome account of the ſubject is what

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cannot be neglected. For every one expects to be ſoon informed of the deſign of the ſpeaker, and what he propoſes to treat of. Nor when they are all made uſe of, is it neceſſary they ſhould always ſtand in the order I have here placed them. Cicero ſometimes enters immediately upon his ſubject, and introduces the other heads afterwards. As in his third oration againſt Catiline, made to the body of the Roman people, which begins thus: *You ſee that the ſtate, all your lives, eſtates, fortunes, wives and children, and this ſeat of the greateſt empire, the moſt flouriſhing and beautiful city, having by the favor of heaven towards you, and my labors, counſels, and dangers, been this day reſcued from fire and ſword, and the very jaws of deſtruction, are preſerved and reſtored to you.* And then he procedes to recommend himſelf to their eſteem and benevolence, from the conſideration of theſe benefits.

THESE are the heads, which commonly furniſh matter for this part of a diſcourſe. But orators often take occaſion from the time [1], place [2], largeneſs of the aſſembly [3], or ſome other proper circumſtance [4], to compliment their hearers, recommend themſelves, or introduce the ſubject, upon which

[1] Cic. *Pro Caelio, & Philipp.* v.
[2] *Pro Leg. Man. & Pro reg. Dejotaro.*
[3] *Philipp.* iv.
[4] *Pro Milon.*

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which they are about to treat. Inſtances of each of theſe may be met with in ſeveral of Cicero's orations. And ſometimes they ſet out with ſome remarkable cuſtom, compariſon, ſimilitude, or other ornament, which they accommodate to the occaſion of their diſcourſe. So Pliny begins his panegyric upon the emperor Trajan with an antient cuſtom. *Our anceſtors*, ſais he, *have very well and prudently appointed, that both our actions and ſpeeches ſhould begin with prayers; ſince men can enter upon nothing in a proper and becoming manner, without the aſſiſtance, direction, and favor of the deities. And by whom ought that cuſtom to be more regarded and practiſed, than by the conſul? or on what occaſion, than when by order of the ſenate, and authority of the ſtate, we are ingaged to return thanks to the beſt of princes?* And Iſocrates enters upon his celebrated panegyric in praiſe of his countrymen, the Athenians, with the following compariſon: *I have often wondered, what could be their deſign, who brought together theſe aſſemblies, and inſtituted the gymnical ſports, to propoſe ſo great rewards for bodily ſtrength; and to vouchſafe no honor to thoſe, who applied their private labors to ſerve the public, and ſo*

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ſo cultivated their minds as to be ſerviceable to others, to whom they ought to have ſhewn greater regard. For altho the ſtrength of a champion was doubled, no benefit would from thence accrue to others; but all enjoy the prudence of one man, who will hearken to his advice. But when the ſubject will admit of it, the orator will ſometimes introduce his diſcourſe in a merry and facetious manner. As Cicero has done in his defence of Ligarius, which begins thus: *My kinſman Quintus Tubero has brought a new crime before you, Caius Caeſar, and to this day unheard of, that Quintus Ligarius was in Africa.* But ſuch freedoms are ſcarce to be ventured upon, unleſs by ſpeakers of an eſtabliſhed reputation and authority; which was the caſe of Cicero at that time. Moreover, in ſome caſes, orators have recourſe to a more covert and artful way of opening their ſubject, endeavour to remove jealouſies, apologize for what they are about to ſay, and ſeem to refer it to the candor of the hearers to judge of it as they pleaſe. Cicero appears to have been a perfect maſter of this art, and uſed it with great ſucceſs. I ſhall recite one example of it, from his ſeventh Philippic, where he ſeems to expreſs the greateſt

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greateſt concern, leſt what he was about to ſay, ſhould give any offence to the ſenate, to whom he was ſpeaking: *I*, ſais he, *who always declared for peace, and to whom peace among ourſelves, as it is wiſhed for by all good men, was in a particular manner deſirable; who have employed all my induſtry in the forum, in the ſenate, and in the defence of my freinds, whence I have arrived to the higheſt honors, a moderate fortune, and what reputation I enjoy; I therefore, who owe what I am to peace, and without it could not have been the perſon I am, be that what it will, for I would arrogate nothing to myſelf; I ſpeak with concern and fear, how you will receive what I am going to ſay; but I beg and intreat you from the great regard I have always expreſſed for the ſupport and advancement of your honor, that if any thing ſaid by me ſhould at firſt appear harſh or unfit to be received, you will notwithſtanding pleaſe to hear it without offence, and not reject it, till I have explained myſelf: I then, for I muſt repeat it again, who have always approved of peace, and promoted it, am againſt a peace with Mark Antony* [1]. This is called *Inſinuation*, and may be neceſſary, where a cauſe is in itſelf doubtful, or may be thought ſo from the received notions

[1] *Cap.* 3.

notions of the hearers, or the impreſſions already made upon them by the contrary ſide. An honeſt man would not knowingly ingage in a bad cauſe; and yet thro prevailing prejudice that may be ſo eſteemed, which is not ſo in itſelf. In theſe caſes therefore great caution and prudence are neceſſary to give ſuch a turn to things, and place them in that view, as may be leaſt liable to offence. And becauſe it ſometimes happens, that the hearers are not ſo much diſpleaſed at the ſubject, as the perſon, Quintilian's rule ſeems very proper, when he ſais: *If the ſubject diſpleaſes, the character of the perſon ſhould ſupport it; and when the perſon gives offence, he ſhould be helped by the cauſe* [1].

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[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 1.

I HAVE done with the ſeveral things requiſite to form an introduction; but before I conclude, it may not be amiſs to add a few remarks proper to be obſerved in its compoſition. And firſt, it ought to appear eaſy and natural, and ſo connected with the reſt of the diſcourſe, as the head to the body. Again, it ſhould be ſuited to the length of the diſcourſe; leſt otherwiſe, as we ſay, the porch ſhould not appear proportioned to the building. The language of it ſhould alſo be juſt, eaſy, and pleaſant.

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For the orator has not yet ſecured his hearers, and a little matter may give them a diſtaſte. Whereas afterwards, when their minds are warmed and ingaged in his favor, a ſmall ſlip will be ſooner overlooked, or more eaſily forgiven. And therefore Quintilian facetiouſly compares a faulty introduction to a ſcarred face; which is preſently diſcerned, and very diſagreable. But further, it ought neither to be wholly without paſſions, nor too violent and impetuous. Soft and ſmooth language, with an eaſy and modeſt addreſs, inſenſibly win upon the hearers; when a more vehement and boiſterous attack upon them at firſt may poſſibly alarm them, excite their ſuſpicion, and preclude all acceſs to their minds. Laſtly, it ought not to be too general, or ſo formed, as may equally ſerve both parties, or be turned by the contrary party to his advantage.

BUT altho the introduction be the firſt part of a diſcourſe, yet it is not what the orator ſhould firſt think of, and form in his mind; but when he has laid the whole ſcheme of what he deſigns to ſay in his thoughts, then is the proper time to conſider in what manner to introduce it. And thoſe, who take the contrary method, ſeem

liable to this inconvenience among others, that inſtead of ſuiting the introduction to the body of their diſcourſe, they are many times obliged to accommodate their diſcourſe to the introduction; and in order to prevent being inconſiſtent with themſelves, are forced to ſay, not what they would, but what will beſt agree with thoſe things they had ſaid before. LECT. XII.

I SHALL only add, that as the introduction is not an eſſential part of a diſcourſe, ſo it is ſometimes omited by the beſt orators. We find inſtances of it in Cicero, as in his firſt invective againſt Catiline, and that againſt Piſo, where he begins immediately with his ſubject, without any previous addreſs to his audience. Nay, ſometimes this is not only unneceſſary, but would be very improper; as where the hearers are already appriſed of the ſubject, and expect brevity; or in caſes that require diſpatch. Such are many of the ſpeeches we meet with in Livy, and other hiſtorians, made by generals to their armies, and upon other emergent occaſions.

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Of Narration.

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THE orator having prepared his hearers to receive his diſcourſe with candor and attention, and acquainted them with his general deſign in the *Introduction*, before he procedes directly to his ſubject, often finds it neceſſary to give ſome account of what preceded, accompanied, or followed upon it. And this he does in order to enlarge the view of the particular point in diſpute, and place it in a clearer light. This is called *Narration*, the nature and properties of which I now propoſe to explain.

NARRATION then is a recital of ſomething done, in the order and manner in which it was done. Hence it is eaſy to perceive, what thoſe things are, which properly enter into a narration. And ſuch are the cauſe, manner, time, place, and conſequences of an action; with the temper, fortune, views, ability, aſſociates, and other circumſtances of thoſe concerned in it. Not that each of theſe particulars is neceſſary in every narration; but ſo many

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of them at leaſt, as are requiſite to ſet the matter in a juſt light, and make it appear credible. Beſides, in relating a fact, the orator does not content himſelf with ſuch an account of it, as is barely ſufficient to render what he ſais intelligible to his hearers; but deſcribes it in ſo ſtrong and lively a manner, as may give the greateſt evidence to his relation, and make the deepeſt impreſſion upon their minds. And if any part of it appears at preſent leſs probable, he promiſes to clear up and remove any remaining doubts in the progreſs of his diſcourſe. For the foundation of his reaſoning afterwards is laid in the narration, from whence he takes his arguments for the confirmation. And therefore it is a matter of no ſmall importance, that this part be well managed; ſince the ſucceſs of the whole diſcourſe ſo much depends upon it.

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THERE are four properties required in a good narration; that it be *ſhort*, *clear*, *probable*, and *pleaſant* [1]. I ſhall ſpeak to each of theſe in their order.

[1] Cic. *Orat. Part.* c. 9.

AND firſt, the *brevity* of a narration is not to be judged of barely from its length: for that may be too long, which contains but a little; and that too ſhort, which

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comprehends a great deal. Wherefore this depends upon the nature of the ſubject, ſince ſome things require more words to give a juſt repreſentation of them, and others fewer. That may properly therefore be called a ſhort narration, which contains nothing, that could well have been omited; nor omits any thing, which was neceſſary to be ſaid. Now in order to avoid both theſe extremes, care ſhould be taken not to go further back in the account of things, nor to trace them down lower, than the ſubject requires; to ſay that only in the general, which does not need a more particular explication; not to aſſign the cauſes of things, when it is enough to ſhew they were done; and to omit ſuch things which are ſufficiently underſtood, from what either preceded, or was conſequent upon them. So hiſtorians frequently ſatisfy themſelves with relating how things were ordered to be done, and leave their readers to conclude, they were accordingly executed, or had anſwerable events. But the orator ſhould be careful, leſt while he endeavours to avoid prolixity, he run into obſcurity. Horace was very ſenſible of this danger, when he ſaid:

By ſtriving to be ſhort, I grow obſcure [1].

[1] *Art. Poet. v.* 25.

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THE ſecond property of a narration therefore is *perſpicuity*, which may juſtly be eſteemed the cheif excellency of language. For as the deſign of ſpeech is to communicate our thoughts to others, that muſt be its greateſt excellence, which contributes moſt to this end, and that doubtleſs is perſpicuity [1]. As perſpicuity therefore is requiſite in all diſcourſe, ſo it is particularly ſerviceable in a narration, which contains the ſubſtance of all that is to be ſaid afterwards. Wherefore if this be not ſufficiently underſtood, much leſs can thoſe things, which receive their light from it. Now the following things render a narration clear and plain: proper and ſignificant words, whoſe meaning is well known and determined; ſhort ſentences, tho full and explicit, whoſe parts are not perplexed, but placed in their juſt order; proper particles to join the ſentences, and ſhew their connexion, and dependance on each other; a due regard to the order of time, and other circumſtances neceſſary to be expreſſed; and laſtly, ſuitable tranſitions.

[1] See *Lect.* XXII.

THE third property of a narration is *probability*. And things appear probable, when the cauſes aſſigned for them appear natural; the manner, in which they are

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deſcribed, is eaſy to be conceived; the conſequences are ſuch, as might be expected; the characters of the perſons are juſtly repreſented; and the whole account is well atteſted, conſiſtent with itſelf, and agreable to the general opinion. Simplicity likewiſe in the manner of relating a fact, as well as in the ſtile, without any reſerve or appearance of art, contributes very much to its credibility. For truth loves to appear naked and open, ſtript of all coloring or diſguiſe. The conſpiracy of Catiline was ſo daring and extravagant, that no one, but ſuch a deſperado, could ever have undertaken it with any hopes of ſucceſs. However Cicero's account of it to the ſenate was ſo full and exact, and ſo well ſuited to the character of the perſon, that it preſently gained credit [1]. And therefore, when upon the concluſion of Cicero's ſpeech, Catiline, who was preſent, immediately ſtood up, and deſired they would not entertain ſuch hard thoughts of him, but conſider how much his family had always been attached to the public intereſt, and the great ſervices they had done the ſtate; their reſentments roſe ſo high, that he could not be heard; upon which he im-

[1] *In Catil. c.* 1.

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immediately left the city, and went to his associates [1].

[1] See Flor. *Lib.* iv. *c.* 1. *& ibi* Camert.

THE last thing required in a narration is, that it be *pleasant* and entertaining. And this is more difficult, because it does not admit of that accurate composition, and pompous dress, which delight the ear, and recommend some other parts of a discourse. For it certainly requires no small skill in the speaker, while he endeavours to express every thing in the most natural, plain, and easy manner, not to grow flat, and tiresome. For Quintilian's remark is very just, that, *the most experienced orators find nothing in eloquence more difficult, than what all, who hear it, fansy they could have said themselves* [2]. And the reason of this seems very obvious. For as all art is an imitation of nature, the nearer it resembles that, the more perfect it is in its kind. Hence unexperienced persons often imagine that to be easiest, which suits best with those natural ideas, to which they have been accustomed; till, upon trial, they are convinced of their mistake. Wherefore to render this part of a discourse pleasant and agreable, recourse must be had to variety, both in the choice of words, and turns of the expression. And therefore

[2] *Inst. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 2.

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queſtions, admirations, interlocutions, imagery, and other familiar figures, help very much to diverſify and inliven a narration, and prevent it from becoming dull and tedious, eſpecially when it is carried on to any conſiderable length.

HAVING given a breif account of the nature and properties of a narration, I ſhall now procede to conſider the uſes of it.

LAUDATORY orations are uſually as it were a ſort of continued narration, ſet off and adorned with florid language and fine images, proper to grace the ſubject, which is naturally ſo well fited to afford pleaſure and entertainment. Wherefore a ſeparate narration is more ſuited to *deliberative* and *judicial* diſcourſes. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law (which is of the former kind) the deſign of the narration is to ſhew the Roman people the neceſſity of giving Pompey the command of the army againſt king Mithridates, by repreſenting the nature of that war, which is done in the following manner. *A great and dangerous war*, ſais he, *threatens your revenues and allies from two very powerful kings, Mithridates and Tigranes; one of whom not being purſued after his defeat, and the other pro-*

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provoked, think they have an opportunity to ſeize Aſia. Letters are daily brought from thoſe parts to worthy gentlemen of the equeſtrian order, who have large concerns there in farming your revenues; they acquaint me, as freinds, with the ſtate of the public affairs, and danger of their own; that many villages in Bithynia, which is now your province, are burnt down; that the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, which borders upon your revenues, is intirely in the enemies power; that Lucullus, after ſeveral great victories, is withdrawn from the war; that he who ſuccedes him, is not able to manage it; that all the allies and Roman citizens wiſh and deſire the command of that war may be given to one particular perſon; and that he alone, and no other, is dreaded by the enemies. You ſee the ſtate of the caſe, now conſider what ought to be done [1]. Here is an unhappy ſcene of affairs, which ſeemed to call for immediate redreſs. The cauſes and reaſons of it are aſſigned, in a very probable manner, and the account well atteſted by perſons of character and figure. And what the conſequences would be, if not timely prevented, no one could well be ignorant. The only probable remedy ſuggeſted in general is, the commiting that

[1] *Cap.* 2.

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affair to one certain perſon, which he afterwards ſhews at large could be no other than Pompey. But in Cicero's defence of Milo (which is of the *judicial* kind) the deſign of the narration, which is greatly commended by Quintilian, is to prove, that in the combat between Clodius and Milo, the former was the aggreſſor. And in order to make this appear, he gives a ſummary account of the conduct of Clodius the preceding year, and from the courſe of his actions and behaviour ſhews the inveterate hatred he bore to Milo, who obſtructed him in his wicked deſigns. For which cauſe he had often threatened to kill him, and given out, that he ſhould not live beyond ſuch a time. And accordingly he went from Rome without any other apparent reaſon, but that he might have an opportunity to attack him in a convenient place near his own houſe, by which he knew Milo was then obliged to paſs. Milo was in the ſenate that day, where he ſtaid till they broke up, then went home, and afterwards ſet forward on his journey. When he came to the place, in which he was to be aſſaulted, Clodius appeared every way prepared for ſuch a deſign, being on horſeback, and attended

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with a company of desperate ruffians, ready to execute his commands. Whereas Milo was with his wife in a chariot, wraped up in his cloak, and attended with servants of both sexes. These were all circumstances, which preceded the fact. And as to the action itself, with the event of it, the attack, as Cicero sais, was begun by the attendants of Clodius, from an higher ground, who killed Milo's coachman. Upon which, Milo throwing off his cloak, leaped out, and made a brave defence, against Clodius's men, who were got about the chariot. But Clodius in the heat of the skirmish, giving out that Milo was killed, was himself slain by the servants of Milo, to avenge, as they thought, the death of their master. Here seems to be all the requisites proper to make this account credible. Clodius's open and avowed hatred of Milo, which proceded so far as to threaten his life, the time of his leaving Rome, the convenience of the place, his habit and company so different from those of Milo, joined with his known character of a most profligate and audacious wretch, could not but render it very probable, that he had formed that design to kill Milo. And which of them began the

attack,

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attack, might very reaſonably be credited from the advanced ground, on which Clodius and his men were placed; the death of Milo's coachman at the begining of the combat; the ſkirmiſh afterwards at the chariot; and the reaſon of Clodius's own death at laſt, which does not appear to have been intended, till he had given out that Milo was killed. It would be eaſy to ſhew, that all the other properties of a fine narration are likewiſe to be found in this. But that could not be done without tranſcribing the whole; which would be too long to recite here, and therefore I can only refer to it as ſuch, upon the authority of Quintilian.

BUT a diſtinct and ſeparate narration is not always neceſſary in any kind of diſcourſe. For if the matter was well known before, a ſet and formal narrative will be tedious to the hearers. Or if one party has done it already, it is needleſs for the other to repeat it. But there are three occaſions eſpecially, in which it may ſeem very requiſite; when it will bring light to the ſubject, when different accounts have already been given out concerning it, or when it has been miſrepreſented by the adverſe party. If the point in controverſy

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be of a dubious nature, or not ſufficiently known to the hearers, a diſtinct account of the matter, with the particular circumſtances attending it, muſt be very ſerviceable, in order to let them into a true ſtate of the caſe, and inable them to judge of it with greater certainty. At the time of the Mithridatic war, Pompey had ſo large a ſhare in the adminiſtration of affairs, and his power was ſo great, that ſome good freinds to the conſtitution began to grow uneaſy at it. And therefore had not Cicero firſt repreſented the greatneſs and danger of that war, and the neceſſity of commiting it to Pompey, as the only general then equal to ſo important a truſt; it would have been very difficult for him to prevail with the Roman people to make choice of him. And in the caſe of Milo ſo many ſtories had been raiſed, and ſuch different relations induſtriouſly divulged by the freinds of Clodius concerning that action; that Cicero could not but think it neceſſary to obviate them, by ſo large and particular a narrative of the fact. Moreover, where the oppoſite party has ſet the matter in a falſe light by ſome artful and invidious turn, or loaded it with any odious circumſtances, it ſeems no leſs neceſſary that

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that endeavours ſhould be uſed to remove any ill impreſſions, which otherwiſe might remain upon the minds of the hearers, by a different and more favorable repreſentation. And if any thing can be fixed upon to make the contrary account appear abſurd or incredible, it ought particularly to be remarked. Thus Cicero in his defence of Sextus Roſcius, ſhews that he was many miles diſtant from Rome, at the time he was charged to have killed his father there. *Now*, ſais he, *while Sextus Roſcius was at Ameria, and this Titus Roſcius* [his accuſer] *at Rome, Sextus Roſcius* [the father] *was killed at the baths on mount Palatine, returning from ſupper. From whence I hope there can be no doubt, who ought to be ſuſpected of the murder. And was not the thing plain of itſelf, there is this further ſuſpicion to fix it upon the proſecutor, that after the fact was committed, one Manlius Glaucia, an obſcure fellow, the freedman, client, and familiar of this Titus Roſcius, firſt carried the account of it to Ameria, not to the ſon of the deceaſed, but to the houſe of Titus Capito his enemy. And the fact being done in the evening, this meſſenger arrived at Ameria by break of day, having rode fifty ſix miles in a chaiſe in ten hours*

hours by night, to carry this acceptable news[1]. With more to the ſame purpoſe. But what I bring it for is to ſhew the uſe, which Cicero makes of this narration, for retorting the crime upon the proſecutors.

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[1] *Cap.* 7.

BUT the orator ſhould be very careful in conducting this part, to avoid every thing which may prejudice the cauſe he eſpouſes. Falſehood and a miſrepreſentation of facts are not to be juſtified; but no one is obliged to ſay thoſe things, which may hurt himſelf. I ſhall juſt mention one inſtance of this from Cicero, where he has ſhewn great ſkill in this reſpect, in pleading before Caeſar, for the pardon of Ligarius, who had joined with Pompey in the civil war. For Ligarius having been repreſented by the adverſe party as an enemy to Caeſar, and ſo eſteemed by Caeſar himſelf; Cicero very artfully endeavours in his narration to take off the force of this charge, by ſhewing, that when the war firſt broke out, he refuſed to ingage in it, which he would not have done, had he borne any perſonal hatred to Caeſar. *Quintus Ligarius*, ſais he, *before there was any ſuſpicion of a war, went into Africa as a legate to the proconſul Caius Conſidius, in which office he ſo approved himſelf, both to*

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the Roman citizens and allies, that when Conſidius left the province, the inhabitants would not be ſatisfied he ſhould leave the government in the hands of any other perſon. Therefore Quintus Ligarius having excuſed himſelf in vain for ſome time, accepted of the government againſt his will, which he ſo managed during the peace, that both the citizens and allies were greatly pleaſed with his integrity and juſtice. The war broke out on a ſudden, which thoſe in Africa did not hear of, till it was begun; but upon the news of it, partly thro inconſiderate haſte, and partly from blind fear, they looked out for a leader, firſt for their own ſafety, and then as they were affected; when Ligarius thinking of home, and deſirous to return to his freinds, would not be prevailed on to ingage in any affairs. In the mean time, Publius Accius Varus, the pretor, who was formerly governor of Africa, coming to Utica, recourſe was immediately had to him, who very eagerly took upon himſelf the government. If that can be called a government, which was confered on a private man, by the clamor of the ignorant multitude, without any public authority. Ligarius therefore, who endeavoured to avoid every thing of that kind, ceaſed to act ſoon after the arrival of Varus[1]. Here

[1] Cap. 1.

Cicero

Cicero ends his narrative. For tho Ligarius afterwards joined with Pompey's party, yet to have mentioned that, which was nothing more than what many others had done, whom Caesar had already pardoned, could have served only to increase his displeasure against him. And therefore he doubtless shewed great skill in so managing his account, as to take off the main force of the accusation, and by that means make way for his pardon, which he accordingly obtained.

SECT.

LEC-

LECTURE XIV.

Of the Propoſition.

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IN every juſt and regular diſcourſe, the ſpeaker's intention is to prove or illuſtrate ſomething. And when he lais down the ſubject, upon which he deſigns to treat, in a diſtinct and expreſs manner, this is called the *Propoſition*. But as I ſhewed before concerning the *Introduction*, that it is the laſt thing, which comes under the conſideration of the orator, tho it be firſt pronounced [1]; ſo the propoſition is what firſt imploys his thoughts, altho it uſually follows both the introduction and narration in the order of the diſcourſe. For this is the baſis and foundation of his whole deſign, and his main view is to ſupport and maintain it thro his whole oration. It is therefore neceſſary, in the firſt place, that this be duly weighed, and repreſented to his mind in all the different views, in which he can place it; that he well conſider the nature of it, the ſeveral parts of which it conſiſts, and the particular force of each part. By this means he will be the better inabled to offer ſuch arguments, as may be proper

[1] See *Lect.* XII.

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proper in its defence; and to refute any objections, which may be brought againſt it. For, as it ſometimes happens, that perſons, by wanting a command of language, are at a loſs to convey their thoughts to others, even of ſuch things, whereof they themſelves have very right ſentiments; ſo it muſt be much more difficult for any one to demonſtrate that clearly to another, of which he has only a confuſed and imperfect notion himſelf. And therefore Iſocrates ſais: *I have been uſed to tell my hearers, that they ought firſt to conſider, how the ſubject and each part of it is to be treated; and when that has been duly weighed and examined, then to think of arguments, and a proper dreſs to ſupport and recommend it, that it may anſwer the end we propoſe by it* [1]. This was certainly very good advice, for unleſs the ſpeaker be maſter of his ſubject, and every branch of it, the moſt he can hope to do, is to entertain his hearers with fine language, and a florid harangue, not much to the purpoſe.

[1] *Epiſt. 6. ad Jaſonis liberos.*

ORATORS uſe ſeveral ways in laying down the ſubject of their diſcourſes. Sometimes they do it in one general propoſition. We have an inſtance of this in Cicero's *ſpeech to the ſenate*, the day after

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Caeſar was killed (as it is given us by Dion Caſſius [1]) in which his deſign was to perſuade them to peace and unanimity. *This*, ſais he, *being the ſtate of our affairs, I think it neceſſary that we lay aſide all the diſcord and enmity, which have been among us, and return again to our former peace and agreement.* And then he procedes to offer his reaſons for this advice.

[1] *Lib.* xliv. *p.* 250 *ed. Leunclav.* See alſo Fabric. *Bibl. Lat. Tom.* i. *p.* 148. *ed.* 4*to.*

AT other times, to give a clearer and more diſtinct view of their diſcourſe, they ſubjoin to the propoſition the general heads of argument, by which they endeavour to ſupport it. This method Cicero uſes in his *ſeventh Philippic*, where he ſais: *I who have always commended and adviſed to peace, am againſt a peace with Mark Antony. But why am I averſe to peace? Becauſe it is baſe, becauſe it is dangerous, and becauſe it is impracticable. And I beſeech you to hear me with your uſual candor, while I make out theſe three things* [2].

[2] *Cap.* 3.

BUT when the ſubject relates to ſeveral different things, which require each of them to be ſeparately laid down in diſtinct propoſitions, it is called a *Partition*. Tho ſome have made two kinds of *Partition*; one of which they call *Separation*, and the other *Enumeration*. By the former of theſe, the

the orator ſhews in what he agrees with his adverſary, and wherein he differs from him. So in the caſe I formerly mentioned, of a perſon accuſed of ſacrilege for ſtealing private money out of a temple, he who pleads for the defendant ſais: *He owns the fact; but it being private money, the point in queſtion is, whether this be ſacrilege* [1]. And in the *cauſe of* Milo, Cicero ſpeaking of Clodius ſais: *The point which now comes before the court, is not, whether he was killed, or not, that we confeſs; but whether juſtly or unjuſtly* [2]. Now in reality here is no partition, ſince the former branch of the propoſition is what is agreed upon, and given up; and conſequently it is only the latter, that remains to be diſputed. It is called *Enumeration*, when the orator acquaints his hearers with the ſeveral parts of his diſcourſe, upon which he deſigns to treat. And this alone properly ſpeaking is a *Partition*. Thus Cicero ſtates his plea in his *defence of* Muraena: *I perceive the accuſation conſiſts of three parts: the firſt reſpects the conduct of his life; the ſecond his dignity; and the third contains a charge of bribery* [3]. But as it is frequent with him in every part of his diſcourſe, not barely to inform his hearers, but likewiſe

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[1] See *Lect.* IX.

[2] *Cap.* 11.

[3] *Cap.* 5.

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to endeavour ſo to influence their minds, as may beſt anſwer his deſign; ſometimes he diſcovers a peculiar air of modeſty in dividing and laying down the ſeveral branches of his ſubject. For by this means, while he ſeems as it were diſtruſtful of himſelf, and to appeal to them for the equity of his procedings; he artfully removes all ſuſpicion of deſign to ſuppreſs any thing, which might make againſt himſelf; or to advance what was improper. In his *defence of* Sextus Roſcius, he thus beſpeaks the judges: *As far as I am able to perceive, there are three things, which make againſt Roſcius; the crime he is charged with, the boldneſs, and the power of his adverſaries. And of each of theſe I think it will be proper for me to ſpeak, tho not in the ſame manner: for the firſt belongs to my province, the other two the Roman people have injoined upon you: I muſt clear him of the crime; and it will depend on you to check the inſolence, and break the pernicious and inſufferable power of thoſe men, as ſoon as poſſible* [1]. But elſewhere, when he thinks it for his purpoſe, he takes the contrary method, and addreſſes either his adverſary, the judges, or the whole audience with that frankneſs, as if he was already aſſured of his cauſe.

[1] *Cap.* 13.

We

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We have a remarkable inſtance of this in his *defence of* Quintius, where he ſais: *I will do what I have always obſerved you to do, Hortenſius, I will divide my whole cauſe into certain parts. You always do this, becauſe you always can do it; I ſhall do it in this caſe, becauſe I think I can. What nature inables you to do at all times, that my cauſe inables me to do at preſent. I ſhall preſcribe to myſelf certain bounds and limits, which I cannot excede, if I would: that I myſelf may be at a certainty what to ſpeak to; and you, what to anſwer; and you likewiſe, Caius Aquilius, may be appriſed before hand, what you are to hear. We deny, Sextus Nevius, that you was admitted to the poſſeſſion of the eſtate of Publius Quintius by the pretor's edict. This is what we have ingaged to conteſt with you. And firſt, I ſhall ſhew, that you had no juſt cauſe to deſire the pretor would admit you to the poſſeſſion of the eſtate of Publius Quintius; then, that you could not poſſeſs it by the edict; and laſtly, that you did not ſo poſſeſs it. And I beſeech you, Caius Aquilius, and the reſt of the judges, that you would be careful to remember what I have promiſed; for by this means you will better underſtand what I ſay, and more eaſily prevent me from exceding*

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thoſe bounds I have marked out for myſelf. I deny that he had any foundation to ſolicit for poſſeſſion: I deny that he could have poſſeſſion by the edict: and I deny that he had poſſeſſion by it. And when I have proved theſe three things, I ſhall conclude [1]. That air of aſſurance, which Cicero here diſcovers in ſtating the caſes, and his addreſſing in ſo frank a manner, both to his antagoniſt, and the judges, was doubtleſs deſigned to intimidate the one, and induce the other to a favorable opinion of what he propoſed to ſay.

[1] *Cap.* 10.

THERE are three things requiſite in a good *Partition*; that it be *ſhort*, *complete*, and conſiſt but of a *few members*.

A PARTITION is ſaid to be *ſhort*, when each propoſition contains in it nothing more, than what is neceſſary. So that the brevity here required is different from that of a narration; for that conſiſts cheifly in things, this in words. And, as Quintilian juſtly obſerves, brevity ſeems very proper here, where the orator does not ſhew what he is then ſpeaking of, but what he deſigns to diſcourſe upon [1].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 5.

AGAIN, it ought to be *complete* and perfect. And for this end, care muſt be taken to omit no neceſſary part in the enumeration.

BUT

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BUT however there ſhould be as few heads, as is conſiſtent with the nature of the ſubject. The antient rhetoricians preſcribe three or four at the moſt. And I do not remember that Cicero ever excedes that number. But it is certain, the fewer they are, the better, provided nothing neceſſary be omitted. For as it is the deſign of the partition to give the hearers a ſummary view of the ſeveral things, on which the orator propoſes to treat, which they may carry in their minds thro the whole diſcourſe; the fewer they are, the better they will be able to retain them, and too large a number is apt to introduce that confuſion, which partition is deſigned to prevent.

I HAVE been hitherto ſpeaking only of thoſe heads, into which the ſubject, or general argument of the diſcourſe, is at firſt divided. For it is ſometimes convenient to divide theſe again, or at leaſt ſome of them, into ſeveral parts or members. And when this happens, it is beſt done, as the ſpeaker comes to each of them, in the order at firſt laid down; by which means the memory of the hearers will be leſs burdened, than by a multitude of particulars at one and the ſame

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time. Thus Cicero in his *oration for the Manilian law*, compriſes what he deſigns to ſay, under three general heads. *Firſt*, ſais he, *I ſhall ſpeak of the nature of the war, then of its greatneſs, and laſtly, about the choice of a general.* And when he comes to the firſt of theſe, he divides it again into four branches, and ſhews, *how much the glory of the Romans, the ſafety of their allies, their greateſt revenues, and the fortunes of many of their citizens, were all concerned in that war* [1]. The ſecond head, in which he conſiders the greatneſs of the war, has no diviſion. But when he comes to the third head, concerning the choice of a general, he divides that likewiſe into four parts, and ſhews, that ſo many virtues are neceſſary in a conſummate general, ſuch an one as was proper to have the management of that war, namely: *ſkill in military affairs, courage, authority, and ſucceſs* [2], all which he attributes to Pompey. And this is the ſcheme of that celebrated oration. But in making the partition, it is of great ſervice ſo to diſpoſe the ſeveral parts, that they may appear to have a natural dependance upon each other. For, as by this means, what goes before will give light to that which follows; ſo, on the other hand,

[1] *Cap.* 2.

[2] *Cap.* 11.

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it will receive ſtrength and ſupport from it. And the ſeveral heads ought to be treated on in the ſame order, wherein they were at firſt laid down, from which the hearers form to themſelves a ſcheme of the diſcourſe. LECT XIV.

As the properties above mentioned are neceſſary to a good partition, ſo whatever is contrary to them, muſt be a fault. But there are likewiſe ſome other miſtakes incident to a partition, which ought to be avoided. And firſt, care ſhould be taken not to inſert any thing ſuperfluous. And therefore, as Quintilian informs us, ſome have blamed Cicero's partition in his *defence of* Cluentius on this account. Cluentius had formerly proſecuted his father in law for a deſign to poiſon him, and got him convicted. But afterwards lay under the reproach of having bribed ſome of the judges in that proſecution. And being now himſelf proſecuted upon a like charge of poiſon, Cicero thought it requiſite to clear him of the former ſcandal. And this he propoſes to do under three heads, by ſhewing, *that no one was ever proſecuted upon better evidence than his father in law; that ſome of his accomplices had been convicted before him; and that he had bribed*

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the judges, and not Cluentius [1]. Now if this laſt head could be proved, the two former were thought by ſome to be ſuperfluous. But Cicero had doubtleſs his reaſons to inſiſt on them at that time, tho they might not be ſo obvious afterwards. Again, it is wrong to mix things of a different order. As if a perſon ſhould ſay; *My deſign is to treat of virtue, juſtice, and temperance.* For juſtice and temperance are two particular virtues, and therefore ought not to be placed in the ſame order with virtue in general. But further, ſome divide their ſubject into two parts; and propoſe to treat upon it *negatively* and *poſitively*; by ſhewing firſt what it is not, and then what it is. But while they are imployed to prove what it is not, they are not properly treating upon that, but ſomething elſe; which ſeems as irregular, as it is unneceſſary. For he who proves what a thing is, does at the ſame time ſhew what it is not. However in facts there is a ſort of diviſion by affirmation and negation, which may ſometimes be conveniently uſed. As if a perſon, charged with killing another, ſhould thus ſtate his defence: *I had done right if I had killed him, but I did not kill him.* Here indeed, if the latter

[1] *Cap.* 4.

can

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can be plainly made to appear, it may ſeem needleſs to inſiſt upon the former. But if that cannot be ſo fully proved, but there may be room left for ſuſpicion, it may be proper to make uſe of both: for all perſons do not ſee things in the ſame light, and he who beleives the fact, may likewiſe think it juſt; while he who thinks it unjuſt, may not beleive it, but rather ſuppoſe, had it really been committed by the party, he would not have denied it, ſince he looked upon it as defenſible. And this method of proceding Quintilian compares to a cuſtom often uſed in traffic, when perſons make a large demand at firſt, in order to gain a reaſonable price [1]. Cicero uſes this way of reaſoning, in his *defence of* Milo, but in the contrary order, that is, he firſt anſwers the charge, and then juſtifies the fact, upon the ſuppoſition that the charge was true. For he proves firſt, that Clodius was the aggreſſor, and not Milo, as the contrary party had aſſerted [2]; and then to give the greater advantage to his cauſe, he procedes to ſhew, that if Milo had been the aggreſſor, it would however have been a glorious action to take off ſuch an abandoned wretch, who was not only a common ene-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 5.

[2] *Cap.* 12.

my

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my to mankind, but had likewiſe often threatned his life.

A GOOD and juſt partition is attended with conſiderable advantages. For it gives both light and ornament to a diſcourſe. And it is alſo a great releif to the hearers, who, by means of theſe ſtops and reſts, as I may call them, are much better inabled to keep pace with the ſpeaker without confuſion, and by caſting their thoughts either way, from what has been ſaid, both know, and are prepared for what is to follow. And as perſons in travelling a road, with which they are acquainted, go on with greater pleaſure and leſs fatigue, becauſe they know how far it is to their journey's end; ſo to be appriſed of the ſpeaker's deſign, and the ſeveral parts of his diſcourſe, which he propoſes to treat on, contributes very much to releive the hearer, and keep up his attention. This muſt appear very evident to all, who conſider how difficult it is to attend long and cloſely to one thing, eſpecially when we do not know how long it may be, before we are like to be releaſed. Whereas, when we are before hand acquainted with the ſcheme, and the ſpeaker procedes regularly from one thing to another, opportu-

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nity is given to eaſe the mind, by relaxing the attention, and recalling it again when neceſſary. LECT. XIV.

BUT ſome orations, eſpecially of the *demonſtrative* kind, do not require any particular propoſition, being, as I obſerved in my laſt diſcourſe, little more than a continued narrative or illuſtration of the ſubject. Of this ſort is that of Cicero, in which he *returns thanks to* Caeſar, in the name of the ſenate, *for pardoning* Marcellus; and his *invective againſt* Piſo; as likewiſe Pliny's *panegyric in praiſe of the emperor* Trajan. Not but that ſuch diſcourſes are diſpoſed in a regular order, and under proper heads, tho they are not laid down at firſt in diſtinct propoſitions. Thus Cicero, in his *oration* for Marcellus, firſt commends the clemency of Caeſar, and then removes his ſuſpicions of any deſigns formed againſt him. And the *invective* againſt Piſo likewiſe contains two parts, his public and private views; as Pliny's panegyric does the public and private virtues of Trajan, which he there highly extols. Beſides, as Quintilian obſerves [1], orators ſometimes avoid laying down any direct propoſition, when the cheif thing they have in view, may be diſagreable to thoſe,

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 5.

to

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to whom they addreſs; for which reaſon they take them off from attending to it, till they have firſt prepared them for it, by offering ſomething elſe, which, when proved, the other may with leſs difficulty be admited. Cicero makes uſe of this art in his *defence* of Ligarius, where his cheif deſign was to perſuade Caeſar, that Ligarius had not acted againſt him in the late war from any perſonal enmity. However he does not directly undertake the proof of this, which he was ſenſible, would have been an ungrateful ſubject; but endeavours to convince him of it as a neceſſary conſequence of his conduct at that time, as was ſhewn more at large in my laſt diſcourſe. Again, at other times orators omit ſomething in their partition, which they deſign in a particular manner to impreſs upon their hearers, and afterwards introduce it, by ſaying: *But I muſt not omit, or I muſt by no means forget:* or ſome ſuch expreſſion, that may excite their regard and cloſer attention to it; which will be the more eaſily gained, by the ſudden and unexpected manner of propoſing it. But as this does not often happen, it muſt be left to the prudence of the ſpeaker, when it may be proper to make uſe of it.

LEC-

LECTURE XV.

Of Confirmation by Syllogiſm and Enthymem.

THE orator having acquainted his hearers in the *Propoſition* with the ſubject, on which he deſigns to diſcourſe, uſually procedes either to prove or illuſtrate, what he has there laid down. For ſome diſcourſes require nothing more than an inlargement or illuſtration, to ſet them in a proper light, and recommend them to the hearers. For which reaſon likewiſe they have often no diſtinct propoſition, as was obſerved in my laſt lecture. But where arguments are brought in defence of the ſubject, this is properly *Confirmation*. For, as Cicero defines it, *Confirmation is that, which gives proof, authority and ſupport to a cauſe by reaſoning* [1]. And for this end, if any thing in the propoſition ſeems obſcure, or liable to be miſunderſtood, the orator firſt takes care to explain it, and then goes on to offer ſuch arguments for the proof of it, and repreſent them in ſuch a light, as may be moſt proper to gain the aſſent of his hearers. But we muſt diſtinguiſh

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[1] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 24.

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ſtinguiſh here between the *Arguments* themſelves, and *Argumentation*, or the various ways of reaſoning from them. Tho in common ſpeech, the word *Argument* is often uſed for both. But *Arguments*, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, are the medium, by which other things are proved, and belong to *Invention*, which as I have formerly ſhewn, directs to the ſeveral topics or heads, from whence they may be taken [1].

[1] See *Lect.* V.

My preſent buſineſs therefore is to treat of *Argumentation*, or the ſeveral forms and methods of reaſoning made uſe of by orators. For there are different ways of reaſoning ſuited to different arts. The mathematician treats his ſubject after another manner than the logician, and the orator in a method different from them both. Now as to theſe forms of reaſoning uſed by orators, the Greek writers make them four; *Syllogiſm*, *Enthymem*, *Induction*, and *Example*. But Cicero reduces them to two, which he calls *Ratiocination* and *Induction*; comprizing both *Syllogiſm* and *Enthymem* under *Ratiocination*, and *Example* under *Induction*: ſo that the difference lies cheifly in their manner of dividing them. I ſhall follow the diviſion of the Greeks, as more plain and diſtinct.

A

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A SYLLOGISM then (for I ſhall begin with that) is a form of reaſoning, which conſiſts of three propoſitions, the laſt of which is deduced from the two former. The firſt of theſe is called the *major Propoſition*, or, for brevity, the *Major*: the ſecond, the *minor Propoſition*, or *Minor*: and the third, the *Concluſion*. But as the laſt is oppoſed to the other two jointly, they are called the *Premiſes*, and this the *Concluſion*. So we may reduce Cicero's argument, by which he endeavours to prove, that Clodius aſſaulted Milo, and not Milo Clodius, to a ſyllogiſm in this manner:

He was the aggreſſor, whoſe advantage it was to kill the other.

But it was the advantage of Clodius to kill Milo, and not Milo's to kill him.

Therefore Clodius was the aggreſſor, or he aſſaulted Milo.

The thing to be proved was, that Clodius aſſaulted Milo, which therefore comes in the concluſion: and the argument, by which it is proved, is taken from the head of profit or advantage. Thus the logician would treat this argument, and if either of the premiſes was queſtioned, he would ſupport it with another ſyllogiſm. But

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this ſhort and dry way of reaſoning does not at all ſuit the orator, who, not only for variety changes the order of the parts, begining ſometimes with the minor, and at other times with the concluſion, and ending with the major; but likewiſe cloaths each part with ſuch ornaments of expreſſion, as are proper to inliven the ſubject, and render it more agreable and entertaining. And he frequently ſubjoins, either to the major propoſition, or minor, and ſometimes to both, one or more arguments to ſupport them; and perhaps others to confirm or illuſtrate them, as he thinks it requiſite. Therefore as a logical ſyllogiſm conſiſts of three parts or propoſitions, a rhetorical ſyllogiſm frequently contains four, and many times five parts. And Cicero reckons this laſt the moſt complete [1]. But all that is ſaid in confirmation of either of the premiſes, is accounted but as one part. This will appear more evident by examples: and therefore I ſhall endeavour to explain it by an inſtance or two from Cicero. By a ſhort ſyllogiſm then he thus proves, that the Carthaginians were not to be truſted: *Thoſe who have often deceived us, by violating their engagements, ought not to be truſted. For if we receive any damage*

[1] *De invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 37.

by

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by their treachery, we can blame no body but ourſelves. But the Carthaginians have often ſo deceived us. Therefore it is madneſs to truſt them [1]. Here the major propoſition is ſupported by a reaſon. The minor needed none; becauſe the treachery of the Carthaginians was well known. So that this ſyllogiſm conſiſts of four parts. But by a ſyllogiſm of five parts he proves ſomewhat more largely and elegantly, that the world is under the direction of a wiſe governor. The major is this: *Thoſe things are better governed, which are under the direction of wiſdom, than thoſe which are not.* This he proves by ſeveral inſtances: *A houſe managed with prudence has every thing in better order, and more convenient, than that which is under no regulation. An army commanded by a wiſe and ſkilful general, is in all reſpects better governed, than one which has a fool or a madman at the head of it. And the like is to be ſaid of a ſhip, which performs her courſe beſt under the direction of a ſkilful pilot.* Then he procedes to the minor thus: *But nothing is better governed than the univerſe.* Which he proves in this manner: *The riſing and ſeting of the heavenly bodies keep a certain*

[1] *De invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 93.

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determined order; and the ſeveral ſeaſons of the year do not only neceſſarily return in the ſame manner, but are ſuited to the advantage of the whole; nor did the viciſſitudes of night and day ever yet become prejudicial, by altering their courſe. From all which he concludes, *That the world muſt be under the direction of a wiſe governor* [1]. In both theſe examples, the regular order of the parts is obſerved. I ſhall therefore produce another, in which the order is directly contrary; for begining with the concluſion, he procedes next to the minor propoſition, and ſo ends with the major. This method is not uncommon with Cicero, but the example I ſhall fix on, is in his *defence of* Coelius. His deſign is to prove that Coelius had not led a looſe and vicious life, with which his enemies had charged him. And this he does, by ſhewing he had cloſely followed his ſtudies, and was a good orator. This may probably at firſt ſight appear but a weak argument; tho to him who conſiders, what Cicero every where declares neceſſary to gain that character, it may perhaps be thought otherwiſe. The ſenſe of what he ſais here may be reduced to this ſyllogiſm.

[1] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 34.

Thoſe

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Thoſe who have purſued the ſtudy of oratory, ſo as to excel in it, cannot have led a looſe and vicious life.

But Coelius has done this.

Therefore his enemies charge him wrongfully.

But let us hear Cicero himſelf. He begins, as I ſaid, with the concluſion, thus: *Coelius is not chargeable with profuſeneſs, extravagancy, contracting of debts, or intemperance, a vice which age is ſo far from abating, that it rather increaſes it. Nay, he never ingaged in amours, and thoſe pleaſures of youth, as they are called, which are ſoon thrown off, as reaſon prevails.* Then he procedes to the minor, and ſhews from the effects, that Coelius had cloſely applied himſelf to the beſt arts, by which he means thoſe neceſſary for an orator: *You have now heard him make his own defence, and you formerly heard him ingaged in a proſecution (I ſpeak this to vindicate, not to applaud him) you could not but perceive his manner of ſpeaking, his ability, his good ſenſe, and command of language. Nor did he only diſcover a good genius, which will oftentimes do much of itſelf, when it is not improved by induſtry; but what he ſaid (if my affection for him did not bias my judgement) appeared*

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to be the effect of learning, application, and ſtudy. And then he comes to the major: *But be aſſured, that thoſe vices charged upon Coelius, and the ſtudies upon which I am now diſcourſing, cannot meet in the ſame perſon. For it is not poſſible that a mind diſturbed by ſuch irregular paſſions, ſhould be able to go thro what we orators do, I do not mean only in ſpeaking, but even in thinking.* And this he proves by an argument taken from the ſcarcity of good orators. *Can any other reaſon be imagined, why ſo few, both now, and at all times, have ingaged in this province, when the rewards of eloquence are ſo magnificent, and it is attended with ſo great delight, applauſe, glory, and honor? All pleaſures muſt be neglected; diverſions, recreations, and entertainments omitted; and even the converſation of all our freinds muſt in a manner be laid aſide. This it is which deters perſons from the labor and ſtudy of oratory; not their want of genius, or education* [1]. But ſometimes, as I hinted above, ſeveral arguments, and thoſe of a different kind, are brought to ſupport each propoſition, which draw out the ſyllogiſm to a great length. Nay ſometimes a whole diſcourſe ſhall be formed upon one principal ſyllogiſm. It is neceſſary therefore to obſerve, what

[1] *Cap.* 19.

what the orator cheifly deſigns to prove; and for what end every particular argument is offered; and whether it be immediately connected with either of the propoſitions, or with ſomething brought to ſupport them: for the propoſitions may both be true, and the concluſion fairly deduced from them; tho ſome of the reaſons brought to ſupport them, conſidered ſeparately, appear weak and inconcluſive. For in popular diſcourſes, orators often interſperſe ſome things in the courſe of their reaſoning, which they know to be agreable to the ſentiments of their hearers, tho in themſelves of leſs weight, and which they would not offer upon other occaſions. LECT. XV.

BUT orators do not often uſe complete ſyllogiſms, but moſt commonly *Enthymems*, which make the ſecond kind of reaſoning, I propoſed to explain. Now an *Enthymem* is an imperfect ſyllogiſm, conſiſting of two parts; the *Concluſion*, and one of the *Premiſes*. And in this kind of ſyllogiſm, that propoſition is omitted, whether it be the major or minor, which is ſufficiently manifeſt of itſelf, and may eaſily be ſupplied by the hearers. But the propoſition that is expreſſed, is uſually called the *Antecedent*,

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and the concluſion the *Conſequent*. So if the major of that ſyllogiſm be omitted, by which Cicero endeavours to prove, that Clodius aſſaulted Milo, it will make this *Enthymem*:

The death of Milo would have been an advantage to Clodius.

Therefore Clodius was the aggreſſor;

or, therefore he aſſaulted Milo [1].

[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 12.

In like manner that other ſyllogiſm above mentioned, by which he ſhews that the Carthaginians ought not to be truſted, by omitting the minor, may be reduced to the following *Enthymem*:

Thoſe who have often broke their faith, ought not to be truſted.

For which reaſon the Carthaginians ought not to be truſted.

Every one would readily ſupply the minor, ſince the perfidiouſneſs of the Carthaginians was known to a proverb. But it is reckoned a beauty in *Enthymems*, when they conſiſt of contrary parts: becauſe the turn of them is moſt acute and pungent. Such is that of Micipſa in Salluſt: *What ſtranger will be faithful to you, who are an enemy to your freinds* [2]? And ſo likewiſe that of Cicero for Milo, ſpeaking of Clodius: *You ſit as avengers of his death;*

[2] *Bell Jug. c.* 10.

whoſe

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whoſe life you would not reſtore, did you think it in your power [1]. Orators manage *Enthymems* in the ſame manner they do ſyllogiſms, that is, they invert the order of the parts, and confirm the propoſition by one or more reaſons: and therefore a rhetorical *Enthymem* frequently conſiſts of three parts, as a ſyllogiſm does of five. Tho ſtrictly ſpeaking, a ſyllogiſm can conſiſt of no more than three parts, and an *Enthymem* but of two; and the arguments brought to ſupport either of the propoſitions conſtitute ſo many new *Enthymems*, of which the part they are deſigned to prove is the concluſion. I will endeavour to illuſtrate this by the following example:

[1] *Cap.* 29.

An honeſt man thinks himſelf under the higheſt obligations to his country.
Therefore he ſhould ſhun no danger to ſerve it.

In this *Enthymem* the major is wanting, which would run thus: *He who is under the higheſt obligations to another, ſhould ſhun no danger in order to ſerve him.* This laſt propoſition is founded upon the common principle of gratitude, which requires, that to the utmoſt of our power, a return ſhould be made in proportion to the kindneſs re-

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ceived. And this being a maxim generally allowed, it is omitted by the orator. But now this *Enthymem*, conſiſting of the minor and concluſion, might be managed in ſome ſuch manner as this, begining with the concluſion: *An honeſt man ought to ſhun no danger, but readily expoſe his life for the ſafety and preſervation of his country.* Then the reaſon for this conduct might be added, which is the antecedent of the *Enthymem*, or minor of the ſyllogiſm: *For he is ſenſible, that his obligations to his country are ſo many, and ſo great, that he can never fully requite them.* And this again might be confirmed by an enumeration of particulars: *He looks upon himſelf indebted to his country for every thing he enjoys, for his freinds, relations, all the pleaſures of life, and even for life itſelf.* Now the orator, as I have ſaid, calls this one *Enthymem*, tho in reality there are two. For the ſecond reaſon or argument added to the firſt becomes the antecedent of a new *Enthymem*, of which the firſt reaſon is the conſequent. And if theſe two *Enthymems* were expreſſed ſeparately in the natural order of the parts, the former would ſtand thus: *An honeſt man thinks himſelf under the higheſt obligations to his country. Therefore he ought to ſhun no dan-*

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ger for its preſervation. The latter thus: *An honeſt man eſteems himſelf indebted to his country for every thing he injoys. Therefore he thinks he is under the higheſt obligations to it.* The ſame thing might be proved in the like way of reaſoning, by arguments of a different kind. From compariſon thus: *As it would be thought baſe and ungrateful in a ſon not to hazard himſelf for the preſervation of his father; an honeſt man muſt certainly eſteem it ſo, when his country is in danger.* Or from an example in this manner: *An honeſt man in like circumſtances would propoſe to himſelf the example of Decius, who freely gave up his life for the ſervice of his country. He gave up his life indeed, but did not loſe it; for he cannot be ſaid to have loſt his life, who lives in immortal honor.* And orators frequently intermix ſuch arguments to adorn and illuſtrate their ſubject, with others taken from the nature and circumſtances of things. And now, if we conſider a little this method of reaſoning, we ſhall find it the moſt plain and eaſy imaginable. For when any propoſition is laid down, and one or more reaſons ſubjoined to prove it, each reaſon joined with the propoſition makes a diſtinct *Enthymem*, of which the propoſition is the concluſion.

Thus

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Thus Cicero in his ſeventh Philippic, lais down this as the foundation of his diſcourſe. *That he is againſt a peace with Mark Antony.* For which he gives three reaſons: *Becauſe it is baſe, becauſe it is dangerous, and becauſe it is impracticable* [1]. Theſe ſeverally joined with the propoſition form three *Enthymems*, and upon each of theſe he diſcourſes ſeparately, which make up that oration. And this method is what perſons for the moſt part naturally fall into, who know nothing of the terms *Syllogiſm* or *Enthymem*. They advance ſomething, and think of a reaſon to prove it, and another perhaps to ſupport that, and ſo far as their invention will aſſiſt them, or they are maſters of language, they endeavour to ſet what they ſay in the plaineſt light, give it the beſt dreſs, embelliſh it with proper figures, and different turns of expreſſion, and, as they think convenient, illuſtrate it with ſimilitudes, compariſons, and the like ornaments, to render it moſt agreable, till they think what they have advanced ſufficiently proved. As this method of arguing therefore is the moſt plain, eaſy and natural; ſo it is what is moſt commonly uſed in oratory. Whereas a ſtrict ſyllogiſtical way of diſcourſing is dry and jejune, cramps the mind, and does not admit

[1] *Cap.* 3.

admit of thoſe embelliſhments of language, which are a great advantage to the orator: for which reaſon he ſeldom uſes complete ſyllogiſms, and when he does, it is with great latitude. However ſyllogiſtical reaſoning is very uſeful, tho not in popular diſcourſes: for every argument may be reduced to a ſyllogiſm, and if it will not hold in that form, there is certainly ſome flaw in it, which by that means will moſt eaſily be diſcovered.

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I HAVE now gone thro the two firſt ways of reaſoning made uſe of by orators; there are two others yet remaining, but theſe I muſt defer to my next diſcourſe.

LEC-

LECTURE XVI.

Of Confirmation by Induction and Example.

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THAT there are different ways of reaſoning, ſuited to different arts, was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe. The forms made uſe of by orators are four; *Syllogiſm*, *Enthymem*, *Induction*, and *Example*: the two firſt of which I then explained, and ſhall now procede to conſider the other two, begining with *Induction*.

Now it is called *Induction*, when one thing is infered from ſeveral others, by reaſon of the ſimilitude between them. And this way of reaſoning is often very uſeful in popular diſcourſes. For many perſons are ſooner moved by examples, and ſimilitudes, than by arguments taken from the nature of things. Every one either endeavours to think right, or at leaſt would be eſteemed ſo to do. But it is often no eaſy matter to take in the force of an argument, eſpecially for thoſe, who have not been accuſtomed to examine things cloſely, and weigh them duly in their minds. And therefore when this cannot be done without ſome pain and uneaſineſs to the mind,

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till it become habitual by practice; it is not to be wondred at, if ſuch perſons are beſt pleaſed with that way of reaſoning, by which they imagine they can form a judgement of things with the greateſt eaſe and facility. But tho inductions are made from all kinds of ſimilitudes; yet thoſe uſually carry the greateſt force with them, which are drawn from like facts. Such is that of Cicero in his *oration for the Manilian law*. For when ſome perſons objected to Pompey's being intruſted with the Mithridatic war, as a thing not cuſtomary to put ſuch an acceſſion of power into the hands of one man: Cicero removes that objection, by producing ſeveral inſtances of the like nature, and particularly ſhews, that more new honors had already been confered on Pompey, than upon any other Roman citizen before him, which had all been employed to the advantage of the ſtate. *I will not*, ſais he, *take notice that two very great wars, the Punic and Carthaginian, were both managed by one general; and two very powerful cities, which threatned this empire moſt, Carthage and Numantia, both deſtroyed by the ſame Scipio. I will not obſerve, that both you and your fathers thought fit to place the ſafety of*

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the government alone in Caius Marius, and that the ſame perſon ſhould carry on the war with Jugurtha, with the Cimbrians, and the Teutons. You remember how many new powers have already been confered on Pompey; which he then procedes to enumerate, and from thence infers, that the objection of novelty was no juſt reaſon againſt his being intruſted with the conduct of that important war [1]. And as to other ſimilitudes, it may thus be ſhewn by *Induction*, that virtuous habits are gained and improved by practice: Bodily ſtrength is increaſed and confirmed by daily exerciſe. All manual arts are acquired by repeated trials and experiments. The liberal ſciences are alſo attained by conſtant ſtudy and application. And in like manner the mind is formed to virtue, and improved in it, by the continued practice of right actions.

[1] *Pro Leg. Man. c. 20.*

BUT there is one particular form of *Induction*, called *Socratic*; becauſe Socrates very frequently uſed that way of reaſoning. It procedes by ſeveral queſtions, which being ſeparately granted, the thing deſigned to be infered is afterwards put, which, by reaſon of its ſimilitude with the ſeveral caſes allowed before, cannot be denied. But this is a captious way of reaſoning,

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ning, for while the reſpondent is not aware of what is deſigned to be infered, he is eaſily induced to make thoſe conceſſions, which otherwiſe he would not. Beſides, it is not ſo well ſuited to continued diſcourſes, as to thoſe which are interlocutory; and therefore we meet with it oftener in the *Socratic dialogues* both of Plato and Xenophon. However it may be made uſe of in oratory by a figure called *Subjection*[1], when the ſame perſon firſt puts the queſtion, and then makes the anſwer. So in the famous *cauſe of* Epaminondas, general of the Thebans, who was accuſed for refuſing to ſurrender his command to his ſucceſſor, appointed by the ſtate, till after he had engaged the enemy, and given them a total defeat. Cicero thus repreſents his accuſer pleading for the words of the law againſt Epaminondas, who alleged the intention of it in his defence: *Should Epaminondas add that exception to the law, which, he ſais, was the intention of the writer, namely:* Except any one refuſe to give up his command, when it is for the intereſt of the public he ſhould not, *Would you admit of it? I beleive not. Should you yourſelves, which is a thing moſt remote from your juſtice and wiſdom, to ſkreen him,*

[1] See *Lect.* XXXII. *in Hypobole.*

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him, order this exception to be added to the law, without the command of the people, Would the Thebans ſuffer it to be done? No certainly. Can it be right then to come into that, as if it was writen, which it would be a crime to write? I know it cannot be agreable to your wiſdom to think ſo [1].

[1] *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 33.

I COME now to the fourth and laſt manner of reaſoning above mentioned, and that is *Example*. But rhetoricians uſe this word in a different ſenſe from the common acceptation. For that is uſually called an example, which is brought either to prove or illuſtrate ſome general aſſertion. As if any one ſhould ſay, that *human bodies may be brought to ſuſtain the greateſt labors by uſe and exerciſe*; and in order to prove this ſhould relate, what is ſaid of Milo of Croton, that *by the conſtant practice of carrying a calf ſeveral furlongs every day, he could carry it as far after it was grown to its full ſize* [2]. But in oratory the word *Example* is uſed for any kind of ſimilitude: or, as Voſſius defines it, *When one thing is infered from another, by reaſon of the likeneſs which appears between them* [3]. Hence it is called an *imperfect Induction*, which infers ſomething from ſeveral others of a like nature. But, as was obſerved before,

[2] Eraſm. *Chil. p.* 193.

[3] *Orat. Partit. Lib.* iii. *c.* 7. §. 16.

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in ſpeaking of induction, ſo likewiſe in examples, thoſe have the greateſt force in reaſoning, which are taken from facts. Now facts may be compared with reſpect to ſome agreement or ſimilitude between them, which in themſelves are either equal or unequal. Of the former kind this is an inſtance: *Cato acted as became a patriot, and a lover of his country's liberty, in oppoſing the arms of Caeſar; and therefore ſo did Cicero.* The reaſon of the inference is founded in the parity of the caſe, which equally concerned all good ſubjects of the Roman government at that time. For all were alike obliged to oppoſe a common enemy, who endeavoured to ſubvert the conſtitution, and ſubject them to his own arbitrary power. But tho an example conſiſts in the compariſon of two ſingle facts, yet ſeveral perſons may be concerned in each fact. Of this kind is that which follows: *As Pompey, Caeſar, and Craſſus, acted illegally in the firſt triumvirate, by ingroſſing the ſole power into their own hands, and by that means violating the public liberty; ſo likewiſe did Auguſtus, Mark Antony, and Lepidus, in the ſecond triumvirate, by purſuing the ſame meaſures.* But when Cicero defends Milo

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for killing Clodius, from the like inſtances of Ahala Servilius, Scipio Naſica, Lucius Opimius, and others, that is not an example, but an induction; becauſe one thing is there infered from its ſimilitude to ſeveral others. But when a compariſon is made between two facts that are unequal, the inference may be either from the greater to the leſs, or from the leſs to the greater. From the greater to the leſs in this manner: *Caeſar had no juſt pretenſions to the Roman government, and therefore much leſs had Antony.* The reaſon lies in the difference between the two perſons. Caeſar had very much enlarged the bounds of the Roman empire by his conqueſts, and greatly obliged the populace by his generoſity; but as he had always acted by an authority from the ſenate and people of Rome, theſe things gave him no claim to a power over them. Much leſs then had Antony any ſuch pretence, who always acted under Caeſar, and had never performed any ſignal ſervices himſelf. Cicero has deſcribed the difference between them in a very beautiful manner in his *ſecond Philippic*, thus ſpeaking to Antony: *Are you in any thing to be compared to him? He had a genius, ſagacity, memory, learning,*

care,

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care, thought, diligence; he had performed great things in war, tho detrimental to the ſtate; he had for many years deſigned to get the government into his hands, and obtained his end by much labor and many dangers; he gained over the ignorant multitude by public ſhows, buildings, congiaries, and feaſts; obliged his freinds by rewards, and his enemies by a ſhew of clemency. In a word, he ſubjected a free ſtate to ſlavery, partly thro fear, and partly compliance. I can liken you to him for ambition of power, but in other things you are in no reſpect to be compared with him [1]. By a compariſon from the leſs to the greater, Cicero thus argues againſt Catiline: *Did the brave Scipio, when a private man, kill Tiberius Gracchus, for attempting to weaken the ſtate; and ſhall we conſuls bear with Catiline endeavouring to deſtroy the world by fire and ſword* [2]? The circumſtances of theſe two caſes were very different; and the compariſon runs between a private man, and a conſul intruſted with the higheſt authority; between a deſign only to raiſe a tumult, and a plot to deſtroy the government: whence the orator juſtly infers, that what was eſteemed lawful in one caſe, was much more ſo in the other. The like way of

[1] *Cap.* 45.

[2] *In Catil.* i. *c.* 1.

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reaſoning is ſometimes uſed from other ſimilitudes, which may be taken from things of all kinds, whether animate or inanimate. Of the former ſort is that of Cicero ſpeaking of Muraena, when candidate for the conſulſhip, after he had himſelf gone thro that office: *If it is uſual*, ſais he, *for ſuch perſons, who are ſafely arrived in port, to give thoſe, who are going out, the beſt account they can, with relation to the weather, pirates, and coaſts; becauſe thus nature directs us to aſſiſt thoſe, who are entering upon the ſame dangers, which we ourſelves have eſcaped: how ought I, who now after a great ſtorm am brought within a near proſpect of land, to be affected towards him, who, I perceive, muſt be expoſed to the greateſt tempeſts of the ſtate*[1]? He alludes to the late diſturbances and tumults occaſioned by the conſpiracy of Catiline, which had been ſo happily ſuppreſſed by him in the time of his conſulate. Of the latter kind is that of Quintilian: *As the ground is made better and more fruitful by culture, ſo is the mind by inſtruction*[2]. There is both a beauty and juſtneſs in this ſimile.

[1] *Pro Muraen. c.* 2.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 3.

BUT compariſons are ſometimes made between facts and other things, in order

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to infer ſome difference or oppoſition between them. In comparing two facts, on the account of ſome diſagreement and unlikeneſs, the inference is made from the difference between one and the other in that particular reſpect only. As thus: *Tho it was not eſteemed cruelty in Brutus to put his two ſons to death, for endeavouring to betray their country; it might be ſo in Manlius, who put his ſon to death, only for ingaging the enemy without orders, tho he gained the victory.* The difference between the two facts, lies in the different nature of the crime. The ſons of Brutus entered into a conſpiracy to betray their country, and tho they miſcarried in it, yet the intention and endeavours they uſed to accompliſh it were criminal in the higheſt degree. But young Manlius could only be charged with raſhneſs. His deſign was honorable, and intended for the intereſt of his country; only it was irregular, and might have proved of ill conſequence to military diſcipline. Now in all ſuch caſes, the force of the argument is the ſtronger, the greater the difference appears. But the ſame facts, which differ in one reſpect, may agree in many others. As in the example

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here mentioned, Brutus and Manlius were both magiſtrates as well as fathers; they both killed their ſons, and that for a capital crime by the Roman law: in any of which reſpects they may be compared in a way of ſimilitude. As, *If Brutus might lawfully put his ſon to death for a capital crime; ſo might Manlius.* But now contrary facts do not only differ in ſome certain reſpect, but are wholly oppoſite to each other; ſo that what is affirmed of the one, muſt be denied of the other; and if one be a virtue, the other is a vice. Thus Cicero compares the conduct of Marcellus and Verres in a way of oppoſition. *Marcellus,* ſais he, *who had engaged, if he took Syracuſe, to erect two temples at Rome, would not beautify them with the ſpoils he had taken: Verres, who had made no vows to honor and virtue, but to Venus and Cupid, endeavoured to plunder the temple of Minerva. The former would not adorn the gods with the ſpoils of other deities: the latter carried the ornaments of Minerva, a virgin, into the houſe of a ſtrumpet* [1]. If therefore the conduct of Marcellus was laudable and virtuous, that of Verres muſt bear the contrary character. But this way of reaſoning has likewiſe place in other re-

[1] *In Verr.* iv. *c.* 55.

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reſpects. Thus Cicero in the quarrel between Caeſar and Pompey, adviſed to peace from the difference between a foreign and domeſtic war: That the former might prove beneficial to the ſtate; but in the latter, which ever ſide conquered, the public muſt ſuffer. And thus the ill effects of intemperance may be ſhewn in a way of oppoſition. That as temperance preſerves the health of the body, keeps up the vigor of the mind, and prolongs life; ſo exceſs muſt neceſſarily have the contrary effects.

FROM what has been ſaid upon theſe heads of *Induction* and *Example*, they appear to conſiſt of three parts; the thing deſigned to be proved, that which is brought to prove it, and the ſimilitude or diſſimilitude between them according to the nature of the inference. And great care muſt be taken, that what is introduced, on the account of which it is expected ſome other thing ſhould be granted, be itſelf very plain and evident. The ſimilitude likewiſe or diſſimilitude between that, and the thing it is brought to prove, ought to be no leſs obvious. For in every induction and example, the thing or things, from a compariſon with which we infer

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our concluſion, carries in it the force of a medium or argument, and the whole induction or example has the nature of an *Enthymem* or imperfect ſyllogiſm. However rhetoricians have thought fit to ſeparate theſe from other *Enthymems*, becauſe they ſeemed to require a diſtinct and particular explication.

THUS I have given a breif account of the principal ways of reaſoning commonly made uſe of by orators. And it is very proper to vary them in a diſcourſe, and not keep too cloſe to the ſame form; for a want of variety in this, as well as in other caſes, will ſoon create a diſreliſh. As to the diſpoſition of arguments, or the order of placing them, ſome adviſe to put the weaker, which cannot wholly be omitted, in the middle; and ſuch as are ſtronger, partly in the begining, to gain the eſteem of the hearers, and render them more attentive; and partly at the end, becauſe what is laſt heard, is likely to be retained longeſt: but if there are but two arguments, to place the ſtronger firſt, and then the weaker; and after that to return again to the former, and inſiſt principally upon that. But this muſt be left to the prudence of the ſpeaker, and the nature of the ſubject.

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ject. Tho to begin with the ſtrongeſt, and ſo gradually deſcend to the weakeſt, can never be proper, for the reaſon laſt mentioned. Nor ought arguments to be crouded too cloſe upon one another; for that takes off from their force, as it breaks in upon the attention of the hearers, and does not leave them ſufficient time duly to conſider them. Nor indeed ſhould more be uſed than are neceſſary, becauſe the fewer they are, the more eaſily they are remembered. And the obſervation of a great maſter of eloquence upon this ſubject is certainly very juſt, that, *Arguments ought rather to be weighed, than numbered* [1].

[1] Cic. *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 76.

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Of Confutation.

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CONFIRMATION, of which I laſt diſcourſed, is often attended with a *Confutation* of what either has been, or may be advanced to the contrary. And in treating of *Diſpoſition*, rhetoricians generally place this after *Confirmation*, which ſeems agreable to the natural method of thinking upon any ſubject. For perſons firſt endeavour to find out ſuch arguments, as are proper to maintain that ſide of a queſtion, which they eſpouſe, before they conſider, what objections may be offered againſt it. Tho in ſpeaking it may be requiſite to vary the order, according to the nature of the diſcourſe. And the method preſcribed by Quintilian is this, that, *If we bring a charge, we ſhould firſt prove it, and then anſwer objections; but if we ſtand upon the defence, we ought to begin with confutation* [1]. And there ſeems to be good reaſon for this different procedure. For he who either ſpeaks alone, or firſt, endeavours to ſupport what he ſais with reaſon and arguments; and till that be done,

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 13.

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done, there is no room to move objections. But, on the contrary, to confute what another has before offered, is ſometimes ſufficient to carry a cauſe. And when it is otherwiſe, it is however frequently neceſſary to take off the force of what has been advanced, in order to make way for a candid reception of the oppoſite opinion. Wherefore, unleſs there be ſome particular reaſon to the contrary, it ſeems generally moſt commodious to follow this method, which from ſeveral orations of Cicero appears to have been his uſual cuſtom.

THE forms of reaſoning are the ſame here, as have been already explained under *Confirmation*. And therefore what I propoſe at preſent, is only to give a breif account of the different ways of *Confutation* made uſe of by orators, which is often the more difficult taſk; becauſe he, who is to prove a thing, comes uſually prepared; but he, who is to confute it, is frequently left to a ſudden anſwer. For which reaſon in *judicial* caſes Quintilian ſais: *It is as much eaſier to accuſe, than to defend; as it is to make a wound, than to heal it*[1]. Therefore not only a good judgement, but a readineſs of thought alſo, ſeems neceſſary for this province. But in all diſputes it is

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

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is of the greateſt conſequence to obſerve, where the ſtreſs of the controverſy lies. For without attending to this, perſons may cavil about different matters without underſtanding each other, or deciding any thing. And in confutation, what the adverſary has advanced ought carefully to be conſidered, and in what manner he has expreſſed himſelf. As to the things themſelves; whether they immediately relate to the matter in diſpute, or are foreign to it. Thoſe things that are foreign to the ſubject, may either be paſt over in ſilence, or in a very few words ſhewn to be inſignificant. And there ought likewiſe to be a diſtinction made between ſuch things as relate to the ſubject, according to their importance. Thoſe that appear to have no great weight, ſhould be ſlightly remarked. For to inſiſt largely upon ſuch matters is both tireſome to the hearers, and apt to bring the judgement of the ſpeaker into queſtion. And therefore things of that nature are generally better turned off with an air of neglect, a pungent queſtion, or an agreable jeſt; than confuted by a ſerious and laboured anſwer. But thoſe things, which relate to the merits of the cauſe, may be confuted either by *contradicting*

tradicting them, or by ſhewing ſome *miſtake* in the reaſoning, or their *invalidity* when granted. LECT. XVII.

THINGS may be *contradicted* ſeveral ways. What is apparently falſe, may be expreſsly *denied*. Thus Cicero in his *defence of* Cluentius: *When the accuſer had ſaid, that the man fell down dead, after he had drunk off his cup; denies, that he died that day* [1]. And things which the adverſary cannot prove, may likewiſe be denied. Of which we have alſo an inſtance in Cicero, who firſt upbraids Mark Antony as guilty of a breach not only of good breeding, but likewiſe of freindſhip, for reading publicly a private letter he had ſent him. And then adds: *But what will you ſay now, if I ſhould deny that ever I ſent you that letter? How will you prove it? By the hand writing? In which I confeſs you have a peculiar ſkill, and have found the benefit of it. But how can you make it out? For it is in my ſecretary's hand. I cannot but envy your maſter, who had ſo great a reward for teaching you to underſtand juſt nothing. For what can be more unbecoming not only an orator, but even a man, than for any one to offer ſuch things, which if the adverſary denies, he has nothing more*

[1] *Cap.* 60.

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to ſay [1]? It is an handſome way of contradicting a thing, by ſhewing, that the adverſary himſelf maintained the contrary. So when Oppius was charged with defrauding the ſoldiers of their proviſions, Cicero refutes it, by proving, that the ſame perſons charged Oppius with a deſign to corrupt the army by his liberality [2]. An adverſary is never more effectually ſilenced, than when you can faſten contradictions upon him; for this is ſtabing him with his own weapon. Sometimes a thing is not in expreſs terms denied, but repreſented to be utterly incredible. And this method expoſes the adverſary more than a bare denial. So when ſome perſons reproached Cicero with cowardice, and a ſhameful fear of death; he recites their reaſons in ſuch a manner, that any one would be inclined to think the charge entirely falſe. *Was it becoming me*, ſais he, *to expect death, with that compoſedneſs of mind, as ſome have imagined? Well, and did I then avoid it? Nay, was there any thing in the world that I could apprehend more deſirable? Or when I had done the greateſt things in ſuch a crowd of ill minded perſons about me, do you think baniſhment, and death, were not always in my view? and continually*

[1] *Philipp.* ii. *c.* 4.

[2] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 13.

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nually ſounding in my ears, as my certain fate, while I was ſo employed? Was life deſirable, when all my freinds were in ſuch ſorrow, and myſelf in ſo great diſtreſs, deprived of all the gifts both of nature and fortune? Was I ſo unexperienced, ſo ignorant, ſo void of reaſon and prudence? Had I never ſeen, nor heard any thing in my whole life? Did all I had read, and ſtudied avail nothing? What? did not I know that life is ſhort, but the glory of generous actions permanent? When death is appointed for all, does it not ſeem eligible, that life, which muſt be wreſted from us, ſhould rather be freely devoted to the ſervice of our country, than reſerved to be worn out by the decays of nature. Was not I ſenſible, there has been this controverſy among the wiſeſt men, that ſome ſay, the minds of men and their conſciouſneſs utterly periſh at death; and others, that the minds of wiſe and brave men are then in their greateſt ſtrength and vigor, when they are ſet free from the body? The firſt ſtate is not greatly to be dreaded, to be void of ſenſe; but the other, of injoying larger capacities, is greatly to be deſired. Therefore ſince I always aimed at dignity, and thought nothing was worth living for without it; how ſhould I, who am

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paſt the conſulſhip, and did ſo great things in it, be afraid to die [1]? Thus far Cicero. There is likewiſe an ironical way of contradicting a thing, by retorting that and other things of the like nature upon the adverſe party. Thus Cicero in his *oration againſt* Vatinius ſais: *You have objected to me, that I defended Cornelius, my old freind, and your acquaintance. But pray why ſhould I not have defended him? Has Cornelius carried any law contrary to the omens? Has he violated any law? Has he aſſaulted the conſul? Did he take poſſeſſion of a temple by force of arms? Did he drive away the tribune, who oppoſed the paſſing a law? Has he thrown contempt upon religion? Has he plundered the treaſury? Has he pillaged the ſtate? No, theſe, all theſe, are your doings* [2]? Such an unexpected return is ſometimes of great ſervice to abate the confidence of an adverſary.

[1] *Pro Sext. c. 21.*

[2] *Cap. 2.*

A SECOND way of *Confutation* is, by obſerving ſome *flaw* in the reaſoning of the adverſe party. I ſhall endeavour to illuſtrate this from the ſeveral kinds of reaſoning, treated of before under *Confirmation*. And firſt as to *Syllogiſms*, they may be refuted either by ſhewing ſome miſtake in the premiſes, or that the concluſion

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cluſion is not juſtly deduced from them. So when the Clodian party contended, that Milo ought to ſuffer death for this reaſon, becauſe he had confeſſed that he had killed Clodius, that argument reduced to a ſyllogiſm, would ſtand thus:

He who confeſſes he has killed another, ought not to be allowed to ſee the light.

But Milo confeſſes this.

Therefore he ought not to live.

Now the force of this argument lies in the major or firſt propoſition, which Cicero refutes by proving, that the Roman people had already determined contrary to what is there aſſerted: *In what city*, ſais he, *do theſe men diſpute after this weak manner? In that wherein the firſt capital trial was in the caſe of the brave Horatius, who, before the city enjoyed perfect freedom, was ſaved by the ſuffrages of the Roman people, tho he confeſſed, that he killed his ſiſter with his own hand* [1]. But when Cicero accuſed Verres for male adminiſtration in his government of Sicily, Hortenſius, who defended him, being ſenſible the allegations brought againſt him could not be denied, had no other way left to bring him off, but by pleading his military virtues in abatement, which at that time were much

[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 3.

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wanted, and very ſerviceable to the ſtate. The form of the argument was this:

That the Romans then wanted good generals.

That Verres was ſuch.

And conſequently, that it was for the intereſt of the public he ſhould not be condemned.

But Cicero, who knew his deſign, ſtates the argument for him in his charge, and then anſwers it by denying the conſequence, ſince the crimes of Verres were of ſo heinous a nature, that he ought by no means to be pardoned, on the account of any other qualifications. Tho indeed he afterwards refutes the minor or ſecond propoſition, and ſhews that he had not merited the character of a good general [1]. *Enthymems* may be refuted, either by ſhewing that the antecedent is falſe, or the conſequent not juſtly infered from it. As thus, with reſpect to the former caſe:

[1] *Lib.* 5. *in Verr. c.* 1.

A ſtrict adherence to virtue has often proved detrimental.

Therefore virtue ought not conſtantly to be embraced.

Here the antecedent may be denied. For virtue is always beneficial to thoſe, who ſteadily adhere to it, both in the preſent ſa-

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ſatisfaction it affords them, and the future rewards they may certainly expect from it. And as to the latter caſe in this manner:

She is a mother.

Therefore ſhe loves her children.

Now as the certainty of that inference depends upon this general aſſertion, That all mothers love their children, which is not true, the miſtake of the reaſoning may be ſhewn from the inſtance of Medea and others, who deſtroyed their own children. As to *Induction* and *Example*, by which the truth or equity of a thing is proved from its likeneſs to one or more other things, the reaſoning in either is invalid, if the things ſo compared can be ſhewn not to have that ſimilitude or agreement, on which the inference is founded. One inſtance therefore may ſerve for both. As when Cicero, after the death of Caeſar, pleaded for the continuance of his laws, but not of thoſe, which were made afterwards by Mark Antony. Becauſe tho both were in themſelves invalid, and impoſitions upon the public liberty; yet ſome of Caeſar's were uſeful, and others could not be ſet aſide without diſturbance to the ſtate, and injuring particular perſons; but

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those of Antony were all detrimental to the public [1].

[1] *Philipp.* ii. *c.* 9.

THE laſt method of *Confutation* before mentioned was, when the orator does in ſome ſenſe *grant* the adverſary his argument, and at the ſame time ſhews its *invalidity*. And this is done by a variety of ways, according to the different nature of the ſubject. Sometimes he allows what was ſaid may be true, but pleads, that what he contends for is neceſſary. This was the method, by which Hortenſius propoſed to bring off Verres, as I have already ſhewn from Cicero, whoſe words are theſe, addreſſing himſelf to the judges: *What ſhall I do? which way ſhall I bring in my accuſation? where ſhall I turn myſelf? for the character of a brave general is placed like a wall againſt all the attacks I can make. I know the place, I perceive where Hortenſius intends to diſplay himſelf. He will recount the hazards of war, the neceſſities of the ſtate, the ſcarcity of commanders; and then he will intreat you, and do his utmoſt to perſuade you, not to ſuffer the Roman people to be deprived of ſuch a commander, upon the teſtimony of the Sicilians; nor the glory of his arms to be ſullied by a charge of avarice* [2]. At other times the orator pleads, that

[2] *in Verr. Lib.* v. *c.* 1.

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that altho the contrary opinion may ſeem to be attended with advantage, yet that his own is more juſt or honorable. Such was the caſe of Regulus, when his freinds endeavoured to prevail with him to continue at Rome, and not return to Carthage, where he knew he muſt undergo a cruel death. But as this could not be done without violating his oath, he refuſed to hearken to their perſuaſions [1]. Another way of *Confutation* is, by retorting upon the adverſary his own argument. Thus Cicero in his *defence of* Ligarius ſais: *You have, Tubero, that which is moſt deſirable to an accuſer, the confeſſion of the accuſed party; but yet ſuch a confeſſion, that he was on the ſame ſide that you, Tubero, choſe yourſelf, and your father too, a man worthy the higheſt praiſe. Wherefore, if there was any crime in this, you ought firſt to confeſs your own, before you attempt to faſten any upon Ligarius* [2]. The orator takes this advantage, where an argument proves too much, that is, more than the perſon deſigned it for, who made uſe of it. Not much unlike this is, what they call *Inverſion*, by which the orator ſhews, that the reaſons offered by the oppoſite party make for him. So when Caecilius

[1] See *Lect.* VIII.

[2] *Cap.* 1.

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urged, that the province of accuſing Verres ought to be granted to him, and not to Cicero, becauſe he had been his treaſurer in Sicily, at the time thoſe crimes were committed, with which he was charged, and conſequently knew moſt of that affair: Cicero turns the argument upon him, and ſhews, for that very reaſon he was the moſt unfit of any man to be intruſted with his proſecution; ſince having been concerned with him in his crimes, he would certainly do all in his power to conceal, or leſſen them [1]. Again, ſometimes the charge is acknowledged, but the crime ſhifted off to another. Thus when Sextius was accuſed of ſedition, becauſe he had got together a body of gladiators, and brought them into the forum, where a warm engagement happened between them and Clodius's faction; Cicero owns the fact, but charges the crime of ſedition upon Clodius's party in being the aggreſſors [2]. Another method made uſe of for the ſame purpoſe is, to alleviate the charge, and take off the force of it, by ſhewing, that the thing was not done with that intention, which the adverſary inſinuates. Thus Cicero in his *defence of king* Dejotarus, owns

[1] *In Caecil. c.* 18.

[2] *Pro Sext. c.* 36.

owns he had raiſed ſome forces, tho not to invade the Roman territories, as had been alleged, but only to defend his own borders, and ſend aid to the Roman generals [1]. Some other ways might be mentioned, eſpecially in *judicial* caſes; but I have formerly treated ſo largely upon them in their proper place, that I need not here repeat them. LECT. XVII.

[1] *Cap.* 8.

I HAVE hitherto been ſpeaking of the methods of *Confutation* uſed by orators, in anſwering thoſe arguments, which are brought by the contrary party. But ſometimes they raiſe ſuch objections themſelves, to what they have ſaid, as they imagine may be made by others; which they afterwards anſwer, the better to induce their hearers to think, that nothing conſiderable can be offered againſt what they have advanced, but what will admit of an eaſy reply. I ſhall endeavour to illuſtrate this by one inſtance. When Cicero, at the requeſt of the Sicilians, had undertaken the accuſation of Verres, it came under debate, whether he, or Caecilius, who had been Verres's quæſtor in Sicily, ſhould be admitted to that province. Cicero therefore in order to ſet

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him aſide, among other arguments, ſhews his incapacity for ſuch an undertaking, and for that end recounts at large the qualifications neceſſary for an orator. Which he repreſents to be ſo many and great, that he thought it neceſſary to ſtart the following objection, to what he had himſelf ſaid upon that ſubject. *But you will ſay perhaps: Have you all theſe qualifications?* To which he thus replies: *I wiſh I had; but it has been my conſtant ſtudy from my youth to gain them. And if from their greatneſs and difficulty I have not been able to attain them, who have done nothing elſe thro my whole life; how far do you imagine, you muſt be from it, who never thought of them before; and even now, when you are entering upon them, have no apprehenſion, what, and how great they are*[1]? This is an effectual way of defeating an adverſary, when the objection is well founded, and clearly anſwered. But I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this matter more largely hereafter, under the figure *Prolepſis*, to which it properly relates.

[1] *In Caecil. c.* 12.

As to the order and diſpoſition of the arguments, proper to be uſed in confutation:

tion: whether to follow the adverſe party, or alter his method, and range them in a different manner, as likewiſe whether to attack the weakeſt, or ſtrongeſt arguments firſt; theſe things muſt be left to the diſcretion of the ſpeaker. LECT. XVII.

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Of the Concluſion.

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IN ſpeaking, ſais Cicero, *nature itſelf preſcribes this method, to ſay ſomething before we come to our ſubject, then to propoſe the ſubject, after that to ſupport it by our own arguments, and refute thoſe brought againſt it, and ſo to conclude* [1]. And in this order I propoſed to treat of the ſeveral parts, which conſtitute a complete and regular diſcourſe; and have accordingly gone thro each of them, except the laſt, namely, the *Concluſion*, which at preſent remains to be conſidered. Now as the deſign of the *Introduction* is to prepare the hearers for a favorable regard and attention, to what the ſpeaker propoſes to ſay; ſo in the *Concluſion* his view is to prevail with them, to fall in with what he has ſaid. And agreably to the methods proper for this purpoſe, rhetoricians make the *Concluſion* of a diſcourſe to conſiſt of two parts: *Recapitulation*, and *an addreſs to the Paſſions*.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 76.

RECAPITULATION is a ſummary account of what the ſpeaker has before offered in maintenance of his ſubject; and

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is deſigned both to refreſh the memory of the hearers, and to bring the principal arguments together into a narrow compaſs, that they may appear in a ſtronger light. Now there are ſeveral things neceſſary to a good repetition.

AND firſt, it muſt be ſhort and conciſe, ſince it is deſigned to refreſh the memory, and not to burden it. For this end therefore the cheif things only are to be touched upon; thoſe on which the cauſe principally depends, and which the orator is moſt deſirous ſhould be regarded by his hearers. Now theſe are the general heads of the diſcourſe, with the main arguments brought to ſupport them. But either to inſiſt particularly upon every minute circumſtance, or to inlarge upon thoſe heads, which may be thought proper to mention, carries in it not ſo much the appearance of a repetition, as of a new diſcourſe.

AGAIN, it is convenient in a repetition to recite things in the ſame order, in which they were at firſt laid down. By this means the hearers will be enabled much better to keep pace with the ſpeaker, as he goes along; and if they happen to have forgot any thing, they will the more readily recall it. And beſides, this method

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appears moſt ſimple and open, when the ſpeaker reviews what he has ſaid in the ſame manner it was before delivered, and ſets it in the cleareſt light, for others to judge of it. And hence he ſometimes uſes ſuch expreſſions as theſe: *This I have ſhewn:* and, *This I hope, has been made very evident* [1]. And, at other times, as it were appealing to his hearers, he inquires: *Whether any thing has been omitted:* or, *If he has not fully made out his point.* But tho a repetition contains only the ſame things, which had been more largely treated of before; yet it is not neceſſary they ſhould be expreſſed in the ſame words. Nay this would many times be tireſome, and unpleaſant to the hearers; whereas a variety of expreſſion is grateful, provided the ſenſe be the ſame. Beſides every thing ought now to be repreſented in the ſtrongeſt terms, and in ſo lively a manner, as may at the ſame time both entertain the audience, and make the deepeſt impreſſion upon their minds. We have a very exact and accurate example of repetition in Cicero's oration for Quintius. Cicero was then a young man, and ſeems to have kept more cloſely to the rules of art, than afterwards, when by uſe and practice he had gained

[1] Cic. *De Invent. Lib.* i. *c.* 52.

gained a greater freedom of ſpeaking. I formerly cited the partition of this ſpeech upon another occaſion [1], which runs thus: *We deny, Sextus Nevius, that you was put into the poſſeſſion of the eſtate of P. Quintius, by the pretor's edict. This is the diſpute between us. I will therefore ſhow firſt, that you had no juſt cauſe to apply to the pretor for poſſeſſion of the eſtate of P. Quintius: Then, that you could not poſſeſs it by the edict: And laſtly, that you did not poſſeſs it. When I have proved theſe three things I will conclude.* Now Cicero begins his concluſion with a repetition of thoſe three heads, and a ſummary account of the ſeveral arguments he made uſe of under each of them [2]. But I am obliged here to refer to the original, and muſt forbear to give a tranſlation of it, by reaſon of its length. In his *oration for the Manilian law*, his repetition is very ſhort. He propoſed in the partition to ſpeak to three things: *The nature of the war againſt king Mithridates, the greatneſs of it, and what ſort of general was proper to be intruſted with it* [3]. And when he has gone thro each of theſe heads, and treated upon them very largely, he reduces the ſubſtance of what he had ſaid to this general and ſhort

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[1] See *Lect.* XIV. *p.* 213.

[2] *Cap.* 28.

[3] See *Lect.* XIV.

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ſhort account: *Since therefore the war is ſo neceſſary, that it cannot be neglected; and ſo great, that it requires a very careful management; and you can intruſt it with a general of admirable ſkill in military affairs, of ſingular courage, the greateſt authority, and eminent ſucceſs: do you doubt to make uſe of this ſo great bleſſing, confered and beſtowed upon you by heaven, for the preſervation and inlargement of the Roman ſtate*[1]?

[1] *Cap.* 16.

Indeed this repetition is made by Cicero, before he procedes to the confutation, and not at the end of his diſcourſe, where it is uſually longer, and more particular; however this may ſerve to ſhew the nature of ſuch a recital.

BUT ſometimes a repetition is made, by runing a compariſon between the ſpeaker's own arguments, and thoſe of the adverſe party; and placing them in oppoſition to each other. And this method Cicero takes in the concluſion of his *third oration upon the Agrarian law*[2]. And here ſometimes the orator takes occaſion to find fault with his adverſary's management, in theſe and ſuch like expreſſions: *This part he has entirely dropt. To that he has given an invidious turn, or a falſe coloring. He leaves arguments, and flies to intreaties; and not*

[2] *Cap.* 4.

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not without good reaſon, if we conſider the weakneſs of his cauſe [1].

BUT when the diſcourſe is very long, and the arguments inſiſted on have been many, to prevent the hearers growing out of patience by a more particular recital, the orator ſometimes only juſt mentions ſuch things, which he thinks of leaſt conſequence, by ſaying that, he *omits* or *paſſes over them*, till he comes to what is of greater moment, which he repreſents more fully. This method Cicero has taken in his *defence of* Cluentius; where, having run over ſeveral leſſer heads in the manner now deſcribed, he then alters his expreſſion, and introduces what was of more importance, by ſaying: *What I firſt complain of, is that wickedneſs, which is now diſcovered.* And ſo he procedes more particularly to recite thoſe things, which immediately related to Cluentius [2]. And this is what the writers upon this art call *Preterition*. But thus much may ſerve for repetition or *Recapitulation*.

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

[2] *Cap.* 66.

I NOW procede to the other part of the concluſion, which conſiſts in *an addreſs to the Paſſions*. Indeed the orator ſometimes endeavours occaſionally to work upon the paſſions of his hearers in other parts of

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his diſcourſe, but more eſpecially in the concluſion, where he is warmeſt himſelf, and labours to make them ſo. For the main deſign of the *Introduction* is to conciliate the hearers, and gain their attention; of the *Narration*, *Propoſition*, and *Confirmation* to inform them; and of the *Concluſion* to move them. And therefore, to uſe Quintilian's words: *Here all the ſprings of eloquence are to be opened. It is here we ſecure the minds of the hearers, if what went before was well managed. Now we are paſt the rocks and ſhallows, all the ſails may be hoiſted. And as the greateſt part of the concluſion conſiſts in illuſtration, the moſt pompous language, and ſtrongeſt figures have place here* [1]. Now the paſſions, to which the orator more particularly addreſſes, differ according to the nature of the diſcourſe. In *demonſtrative* orations, when laudatory, love, admiration, and emulation are uſually excited; but in invectives hatred, envy, and contempt. In *deliberative* ſubjects, either the hope of gratifying ſome deſire is ſet in view; or the fear of ſome impending evil. And in *judicial* diſcourſes, almoſt all the paſſions have place, but more eſpecially reſentment and pity; inſomuch that moſt of the antient rhe-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

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rhetoricians mention only theſe two. But I have treated upon the nature of the paſſions, and the methods ſuited both to excite and allay them, in a former diſcourſe [1]; and therefore at preſent I ſhall only add a few general obſervations, which may not be improper in this place, where the ſkill of the orator in addreſſing to them is more eſpecially required.

[1] See *Lect.* XI.

Now the objects of the *Paſſions* are either *Things* or *Perſons*, and orators make uſe of both, for puting in motion theſe ſprings of the human mind. With regard to *Things*, the nature and circumſtances of them are to be conſidered; and different paſſions applied to, in order to induce people either to purſue or avoid them. *Perſons* may be conſidered either as agents or patients. In the former ſenſe, different regards are due to them, according to the different qualities, with which they are poſſeſſed, and a ſuitable courſe of actions. So becauſe virtue excites eſteem, and vice hatred; anſwerable regards are paid to virtuous, or vicious men. But in conſidering them as patients, whatever befals them according to their demerits, be the thing good or ill, others are generally pleaſed; and if the contrary happens, it

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gives them an uneaſineſs. So that if ſome good thing accrues to one, who does not deſerve it, it cauſes indignation; and where a misfortune happens to a good man, it occaſions pity. And thus perſons are apt to be affected with reſpect to the circumſtances of others. But every one is naturally inclined to think well of himſelf, that every proſperous occurrence is but anſwerable to his merit, and that every misfortune comes undeſervedly. And ſometimes there is joined with the occurrence the conſideration of the agent, or perſon, who occaſioned it; and the deſign in doing it is often more regarded, than the thing itſelf. The orator therefore will obſerve what circumſtances either of things, or perſons, or both, will furniſh him with motives, proper to apply to thoſe paſſions, he deſires to excite in the minds of his hearers. Thus Cicero in his *orations for* Plancus and Sylla, moves his hearers from the circumſtances of the men; but in his *accuſation of* Verres very frequently from the barbarity and horrid nature of his crimes; and from both in his *defence of* Quintius.

BUT the ſame paſſion may be excited by very different methods. This is plain from the writings of thoſe Roman ſatyriſts, which

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which are yet extant; for they have all the ſame deſign, and that is to ingage men to a love of virtue, and hatred of vice; but their manner is very different, ſuited to the genius of each writer. Horace endeavours to recommend virtue, by laughing vice out of countenance. Perſius moves us to an abhorrence and deteſtation of vice, with the gravity and ſeverity of a philoſopher. And Juvenal by open and vehement invectives. So orators make uſe of all theſe methods in exciting the paſſions, as may be ſeen by their diſcourſes, and particularly thoſe of Cicero. But it is not convenient to dwell long upon the ſame paſſion. For the image thus wrought up in the minds of the hearers, does not laſt a great while, but they ſoon return to reflection. When the emotion therefore is once carried as high as it well can be, they ſhould be left under its influence, and the ſpeaker procede to ſome new matter, before it declines again [1]. Moreover, orators ſometimes endeavour to raiſe contrary paſſions to each other, as they are concerned for oppoſite parties. So the accuſer excites anger and reſentment, but the defendant pity and compaſſion. At other times, one thinks it ſufficient to allay and

[1] See Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

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take off that paſſion, which the other has raiſed, and bring the hearers to a calm and ſedate conſideration of the matter before them.

BUT this eſpecially is to be regarded, that the orator expreſs the ſame paſſion himſelf, with which he endeavours to affect others, and that not only in his action, and voice, but likewiſe in his language; and therefore his words, and manner of expreſſion, ſhould be ſuited to that perturbation and diſorder of mind, which he deſigns to repreſent. However a decency and propriety of character is always carefully to be obſerved. For as Cicero very well remarks: *A neglect of this is not only very culpable in life, but likewiſe in diſcourſe. Nor do the ſame things equally become every ſpeaker, or every audience; nor every time, and every place* [1]. And therefore he greatly commends that painter, who deſigning to repreſent in a picture the ſacrifice of Iphigenia, Agamemnon's daughter, drew Calchas the preiſt with a ſad countenance; Ulyſſes, her father's great freind, more dejected; and her uncle Menelaus, moſt diſconſolate; but threw a veil over the face of Agamemnon himſelf, as being unable to expreſs that exceſs of ſorrow, which he thought

[1] *Orat. Cap.* 21.

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thought was proper to appear in his countenance [1]. And this juſtneſs of character is admirably well obſerved by Cicero himſelf, in his *defence of* Milo. For as Milo was always known to be a man of the greateſt reſolution, and moſt undaunted courage, it was very improper to introduce him, as the uſual method then was in capital caſes, moving pity, and beging for mercy. Cicero therefore takes this part upon himſelf, and what he could not do with any propriety in the perſon of Milo, he performs in his own, and thus addreſſes the judges: *What remains, but that I intreat and beſeech you, that you would ſhew that compaſſion to this brave man, for which he himſelf does not ſolicit, but I, againſt his inclination, earneſtly implore and requeſt. Do not be leſs inclined to acquit him, if in this our common ſorrow, you ſee no tear fall from Milo's eyes; but perceive in him the ſame countenance, voice, and language, as at other times, ſteady and unmoved. Nay I know not whether for this reaſon you ought not much ſooner to favour him. For if in the conteſts of gladiators, perſons of the loweſt condition and fortune in life, we are wont to be diſpleaſed with the timorous, and ſuppliant, and thoſe who beg for their life; but interpoſe*

[1] *Ibid. c.* 22.

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in favor of the brave, and courageous, and ſuch who expoſe themſelves to death; and we ſhew more compaſſion to thoſe, who do not ſue for it, than to ſuch who do: with how much greater reaſon ought we to act in the ſame manner towards the braveſt of our fellow citizens? And as theſe words were agreable to his own character, while ſoliciting in behalf of another; ſo immediately after he introduces Milo ſpeaking like himſelf, with a generous and undaunted air: *Theſe words of Milo,* ſais he, *quite ſink and diſpirit me, which I daily hear from him. Farewell, farewell, my fellow citizens farewell; may you be happy, flouriſh, and proſper; may this renowned city be preſerved, my moſt dear country, however it has treated me; may it continue in peace, tho I cannot continue in it, to whom it ows its peace. I will retire, I will be gone* [1].

[1] *Cap.* 34.

BUT as perſons are commonly more affected with what they ſee, than what they hear, orators ſometimes call in the aſſiſtance of that ſenſe in moving the paſſions. For this reaſon it was uſual among the Romans in *judicial* caſes, for accuſed perſons to appear with a dejected air, and a ſordid garb, attended by their parents, children, or other relations and freinds, with the like dreſs

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and aſpect; as likewiſe to ſhew their ſcars, wounds, bloody garments, and other things of the like nature, in open court. So when upon the death of Caeſar Mark Antony harangued the populace, he at the ſame time expoſed to their view the garment, in which he was ſtabed, fixed upon a pole; at which ſight they were ſo inraged, that immediately they ran with lighted torches to ſet fire to the houſes of the conſpirators [1]. But this cuſtom at laſt became ſo common, and was ſometimes ſo ill conducted, that the force of it was greatly abated, as we learn from Quintilian [2]. However, if the Romans proceded to an exceſs on the one hand; the ſtrictneſs of the Areopagites at Athens may perhaps be thought too rigid on the other. For in that court, if the orator began to ſay any thing, which was moving, an officer immediately ſtood up, and bad him be ſilent [3]. There is certainly a medium between theſe two extremes, which is ſometimes not only uſeful, but even neceſſary. For, as Quintilian very juſtly ſays: *It it neceſſary to apply to the paſſions, when thoſe things which are true, juſt, and of common benefit, cannot be come at any other way* [4].

[1] Suet. *in Vit. c.* 84.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

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To conclude in an handſom and decent manner, is doubtleſs of great conſequence to an orator; ſince, as we ſay: *It is the end, which crowns the work.* And it can neither be for the advantage of his cauſe, nor his own character, to be cold and lifeleſs, where the greateſt warmth and ſpirit is neceſſary. But a ſet and diſtinct concluſion is not always requiſite. For to what end ſhould he make a recital, where his diſcourſe is but ſhort, or conſiſts but of a few particulars? Nor is it at all proper to inflame the paſſions on light ſubjects, or where the hearers are already ingaged in his favor. And beſides to overact a thing is often of ill conſequence, and apt to raiſe a jealouſy of ſome wrong deſign. Wherefore in this, and all other caſes, the rules of art muſt ſubmit to the conduct of reaſon and prudence; leſt by being miſapplied, they both fail in their intention, and loſe their eſteem.

LEC-

LECTURE XIX.

Of Digreſſion, Tranſition, and Amplification.

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THE number, order, and nature of the parts, which conſtitute a complete and regular oration, I have endeavoured to explain in ſeveral preceding lectures. But there are two or three things yet remaining, very neceſſary to be known by an orator, which ſeem moſt properly to come under the ſecond branch of his art. And theſe are *Digreſſion*, *Tranſition*, and *Amplification*, upon each of which I ſhall now treat; not that they are connected with each other, but becauſe I think all, that is requiſite to be ſaid concerning them, may be compriſed in one diſcourſe.

DIGRESSION then, as defined by Quintilian, is, *A going off from the ſubject we are upon to ſome different thing, which may however be of ſervice to it* [1]. We have a very beautiful inſtance of this in Cicero's *defence of* Coelius, who was accuſed of having firſt borrowed money of Clodia, and then ingaging her ſervants to poiſon her. Now as the proof of the fact depended upon ſeveral circumſtances, the orator examines

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 3.

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amines them ſeparately; and ſhews them to be all highly improbable. *How*, ſais he, *was the deſign of this poiſon laid? Whence came it? how did they get it? by whoſe aſſiſtance, to whom, or where was it delivered?* Now to the firſt of theſe queries he makes the accuſer give this anſwer: *They ſay Coelius had it at home, and tried the force of it upon a ſlave provided on purpoſe, whoſe ſudden death proved the ſtrength of the poiſon.* Now, as Cicero repreſents the whole charge againſt Coelius as a fiction of Clodia, invented out of revenge for ſome ſlights he had put upon her; to make this the more probable he inſinuates, that ſhe had poiſoned her huſband, and takes this opportunity to hint it, that he might ſhew how eaſy it was for her to charge another with poiſoning a ſervant, who had done the ſame to her own huſband. But not contented with this, he ſteps out of his way, and introduces ſome of the laſt words of her huſband Metellus, to render the fact more barbarous and ſhocking, from the admirable character of the man. This digreſſion is brought in immediately upon the words I laſt read from Cicero, in the following manner: *O immortal gods, why do you ſometimes wink at the greateſt crimes*

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of mankind, or delay the punishment of them to futurity! For I saw, I myself saw (and it was the dolefulest scene of my whole life) when Q. Metellus was taken from the bosom of his country; and when he, who thought himself born to be serviceable to this state, within three days after he had appeared with such advantage in the senate, in the forum, and every where in public, was snatched from us in the flower of his age, and prime of his strength and vigor. At which time, when he was about to expire, and his mind had lost the sense of other things, still retaining a concern for the public, he looked upon me, as I was all in tears, and intimated in broken and dying words, how great a storm hung over the city, and threatened the whole state, often striking the wall, which separated his house from that of Quintus Catulus, and frequently calling both upon him and me, and seeming to greive not so much at the approach of his own death, as that both his country and I should be deprived of his assistance. Had he not been wickedly taken off on a sudden, how would he after his consulship have withstood the fury of his kinsman, Publius Clodius, who, while in that office, threatened, in the hearing of the senate, to kill him with his own hand, when he first

began

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began to break out. And will this woman dare to come out of thoſe doors, and talk of the force of poiſon? will not ſhe fear, leſt the houſe itſelf ſhould ſpeak the villainy? will not ſhe dread the conſcious walls, nor that ſad and mournful night? But I return to the accuſation [1]. And then he procedes to conſider, and refute the ſeveral circumſtances of the accuſation. What I have therefore cited here, was no part of his argument; but having mentioned the charge of poiſon, he immediately takes occaſion to introduce it, in order to excite the indignation of the hearers againſt Clodia, and invalidate the proſecution, as coming from a perſon of her character. *Digreſſion* cannot properly be ſaid to be a neceſſary part of a diſcourſe, but it may ſometimes be very convenient, and that upon ſeveral accounts.

[1] *Cap.* 24.

As firſt, where a ſubject is of itſelf flat and dry, or requires cloſe attention, it is of uſe to releive and unbend the mind by ſomething agreable and entertaining. For which reaſon Quintilian obſerves, that the orators of his time generally made an excurſion in their harangues upon ſome pleaſing topic, between the narration and the proof. But he condemns the practice, as

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too general; for while they ſeemed to think it neceſſary, it obliged them ſometimes to bring in things trifling and foreign to the purpoſe [1]. Beſides, a *Digreſſion* is confined to no one part of a diſcourſe, but may come in any where, as occaſion offers; provided it fall in naturally with the ſubject, and be made ſome way ſubſervient to it. We never meet with it in Cicero, without ſome evident and good reaſon. I have already ſhewn the uſe he makes of it, in the example above mentioned. So in his *proſecution of* Verres, for his barbarous and inhuman outrages againſt the Sicilians, he takes an occaſion to launch out into a beautiful deſcription of the iſland, and to recount the advantages, which accrued from it to the Romans. His ſubject did not neceſſarily lead him to this, but his view in it was to highten and aggravate the charge againſt Verres [2].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 3.

[2] *Lib.* ii. *init.*

AGAIN, as a *Digreſſion* ought not to be made without ſufficient reaſon, ſo neither ſhould it be too frequent. And he who never does it, but where it is proper and uſeful, will not often ſee occaſion for it. Frequently to leave the ſubject, and go off to other things, breaks the thread of the diſ-

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diſcourſe, and is apt to introduce confuſion. Indeed ſome kinds of writing admit of a more frequent uſe of digreſſions than others. In hiſtory they are often very ſerviceable. For as that conſiſts of a ſeries of facts, and a long continued narrative without variety is apt to grow dull and tedious; it is neceſſary at proper diſtances to throw in ſomething entertaining, in order to inliven it, and keep up the attention. And accordingly we find the beſt hiſtorians often imbelliſh their writings with deſcriptions of cities, rivers, and countries, as likewiſe with the ſpeeches of eminent perſons upon important occaſions, and other ornaments, to render them the more pleaſing and delightful. Poets ſtill take a greater liberty in this reſpect; for as their principal view is moſt commonly to pleaſe, they do not attend ſo cloſely to connection; but as an image offers itſelf, which may be agreably wrought up, they bring it in, and go off more frequently to different things, than other writers.

ANOTHER property of a *Digreſſion* is, that it ought not to be too long, leſt the hearers forget what preceded, before the ſpeaker returns again to his ſubject. For a digreſſion being no principal part of a

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diſcourſe, nor of any further uſe, than as it ſerves ſome way or other to inforce, or illuſtrate the main ſubject; it cannot anſwer this end, if it be carried to ſuch a length, as to cauſe that either to be forgot, or neglected. And every one's memory will not ſerve him to connect together two parts of a diſcourſe, which lie at a wide diſtance from each other. The better therefore to guard againſt this, it is not unuſual with orators, before they enter upon a digreſſion of any conſiderable length, to prepare their hearers, by giving them notice of it, and ſometimes deſiring leave to divert a little from the ſubject. And ſo likewiſe at the concluſion they introduce the ſubject again by a ſhort tranſition. Thus Cicero in the example cited above, when he has finiſhed his digreſſion concerning the death of Metellus, procedes to his ſubject again with theſe words: *But I return to the accuſation.*

INDEED we find orators ſometimes, when ſore preſſed, and the cauſe will not bear a cloſe ſcrutiny, artfully run into digreſſions with a deſign to divert the attention of the hearers from the ſubject, and turn them to a different view. And in ſuch caſes, as they endeavour to be unobſerved, ſo

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they do it tacitly without any tranſition, or intimation of their deſign; their buſineſs being only to get clear of a difficulty, till they have an opportunity of entering upon ſome freſh topic. I do not mention this as a conduct proper for imitation, tho it is fit to be remarked, in order to guard againſt it.

BUT as *Tranſitions* are often uſed not only after a *Digreſſion*, but likewiſe upon other occaſions, I ſhall explain the nature of them a little more particularly. A *Tranſition* therefore is, *A form of ſpeech, by which the ſpeaker in a few words tells his hearers both what he has ſaid already, and what he next deſigns to ſay* [1]. Where a diſcourſe conſiſts of ſeveral parts, this is often very proper in paſſing from one to another, eſpecially when the parts are of a conſiderable length; for it aſſiſts the hearers to carry on the ſeries of the diſcourſe in their mind, which is a great advantage to the memory. It is likewiſe a great releif to the attention, to be told when an argument is finiſhed, and what is to be expected next. And therefore we meet with it very frequently in hiſtory. But I conſider it at preſent only as made uſe of by orators. Cicero, as I have had occaſion

[1] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 6. §. 3.

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to obſerve formerly, divides his *oration for the Manilian law* into three parts, and propoſes to ſpeak, *firſt of the nature of the war againſt king Mithridates, then of its greatneſs, and laſtly of the choice of a general* [1]. And when he has gone thro the firſt head, which is pretty long, he connects it with the ſecond, by this ſhort tranſition: *Having ſhewn the nature of the war, I ſhall now ſpeak a few things of its greatneſs* [2]. And again, at the concluſion of his ſecond head, he reminds his hearers of his method in the following manner: *I think I have ſufficiently ſhewn the neceſſity of this war from the nature of it, and the danger of it from its greatneſs. What remains is to ſpeak concerning the choice of a general, proper to be intruſted with it* [3]. And in his *ſecond oration againſt* Catiline, who had then left Rome, having at large deſcribed his conduct and deſigns, he adds: *But why do I talk ſo long concerning one enemy, and ſuch an one; who owns himſelf an enemy, and whom I do not fear, ſince, what I always deſired, there is now a wall between us; and ſay nothing of thoſe, who conceal themſelves, who remain at Rome, and are among us* [4]. And then he procedes to give an account of the other conſpirators.

[1] *Cap.* 2.

[2] *Cap.* 8.

[3] *Cap.* 10.

[4] *Cap.* 8.

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BUT ſometimes in paſſing from one thing to another, a general hint of it is thought ſufficient to prepare the hearers, without particularly ſpecifying what has been ſaid, or is next to follow. Thus Cicero in his *ſecond Philippic* ſais: *But thoſe things are old, this is yet freſh* [1]. And again: *But I have inſiſted too long upon trifles, let us come to things of greater moment* [2]. And at other times, for greater brevity, the tranſition is imperfect, and mention made only of the following head, without any intimation of what has been ſaid already. As in Cicero's *defence of* Muraena, where he ſais: *I muſt now proceed to the third part of my oration concerning the charge of bribery* [3]. And ſoon after: *I come now to Cato, who is the ſupport and ſtrength of this charge* [4].

[1] *Cap.* 11.

[2] *Cap.* 32.

[3] *Cap.* 26.

[4] *Cap.* 28.

THE third and laſt head, to which I propoſed to ſpeak, is *Amplification*. Now by *Amplification* is meant not barely a method of inlarging upon a thing; but ſo to repreſent it in the fulleſt and moſt comprehenſive view, as that it may in the livelieſt manner ſtrike the mind, and influence the paſſions. Cicero ſpeaking of this, calls it, *The greateſt commendation of eloquence*; and obſerves, *that it conſiſts not only in magnifying*

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fying and hightening a thing, but likewiſe in extenuating and leſſening it [1]. But tho it conſiſts of theſe two parts, and may be applied either way, yet to amplify is not to ſet things in a falſe light; but to paint them in their juſt proportion and proper colors, ſuitable to their nature, and qualities. Rhetoricians have obſerved ſeveral ways of doing this, the cheif of which I ſhall here mention.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 26.

ONE is to aſcend from a particular thing to a general. Thus Cicero in his *defence of* Archias, having commended him as an excellent poet, and likewiſe obſerved, that all the liberal arts have a connection with each other, and a mutual relation between them, in order to raiſe a juſt eſteem of him in the minds of his hearers, takes occaſion to ſay many things in praiſe of polite literature in general, and the great advantages, that may be received from it. *You will aſk me*, ſais he, *why we are ſo delighted with this man? Becauſe he ſupplies us with thoſe things, which both refreſh our minds after the noiſe of the forum, and delight our ears, when wearied with contention. Do you think we could either be furniſhed with matter for ſuch a variety of ſubjects, if we did not cultivate our minds with lear-*

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ning; or bear ſuch a conſtant fatigue, without affording them that refreſhment. I own I have always purſued theſe ſtudies; let thoſe be aſhamed, who have ſo given up themſelves to learning, as neither to be able to convert it to any common benefit, nor diſcover it in public. But why ſhould it ſhame me, who have ſo lived for many years, that no advantage or eaſe has ever diverted me, no pleaſure allured me, nor ſleep retarded me from this purſuit. Who then can blame me, or who can juſtly be diſpleaſed with me, if I have imployed that time in reviewing theſe ſtudies, which has been ſpent by others in managing their affairs, in the celebration of feſtivals, or other diverſions, in refreſhments of mind and body, in unſeaſonable banquets, in dice, or tennis? And this ought the rather to be allowed me, becauſe my ability as an orator has been improved by theſe purſuits, which, ſuch as it is, was never wanting to aſſiſt my freinds. And if it be eſteemed but ſmall, yet I am ſenſible from what ſpring I muſt draw thoſe things, which are of the greateſt importance [1]. With more to the ſame purpoſe, from which he draws this inference: *ſhall I not therefore love this man? ſhall I not admire him? ſhall I not by all means defend him* [2]?

[1] *Cap.* 6.

[2] *Cap.* 8.

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A CONTRARY method to the former is to deſcend from a general to a particular. As if any one, while ſpeaking in commendation of eloquence, ſhould illuſtrate what he ſais from the example of Cicero, and ſhew the great ſervices he did his country, and the honors he gained to himſelf by his admirable ſkill in oratory. Our common way of judging of the nature and importance of things is from what we obſerve in particular inſtances, by which we form general notions concerning them. When therefore we conſider the character of Cicero, and the figure he made in the world, it leads us to conclude, there muſt be ſomething very admirable in that art, by which he became ſo celebrated. And this method he has taken himſelf in his *oration for the Manilian law*, where having firſt intimated the ſcarcity of good generals at that time among the Romans, he then deſcribes the virtues of a complete commander as a proof of it, and ſhews how many and great qualifications are neceſſary to form ſuch a character, as courage, prudence, experience, and ſucceſs; all which he afterwards applies to Pompey [1].

[1] *Cap.* 10.

A THIRD method is by an enumeration of parts. So when Cicero upon the defeat

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of Mark Antony before Mutina, propoſed that a funeral monument ſhould be erected in honor of the ſoldiers, who were killed in that battle, as a comfort to their ſurviving relations, he does it in this way, to give it the greater weight. *Since*, ſais he, *the tribute of glory is paid to the beſt and moſt valiant citizens by the honor of a monument, let us thus comfort their relations, who will receive the greateſt conſolation in this manner; their parents, who produced ſuch brave defenders of the ſtate; their children, who will enjoy theſe domeſtic examples of fortitude; their wives, for the loſs of ſuch huſbands, whom it will be more fiting to extol than lament; their brethren, who will hope to reſemble them no leſs in their virtues, than their aſpect. And I wiſh we may be able to remove the greif of all theſe by our reſolutions* [1]. Such repreſentations greatly in-

[1] *Philipp.* xiv. *c.* 13

large the image of a thing, and afford the mind a much clearer view of it, than if it were contracted into one ſingle propoſition.

AGAIN, another method not much unlike the former is, when any thing is illuſtrated from a variety of cauſes. Thus Cicero juſtifies his behaviour in retiring, and not oppoſing his enemies, when they

ſpirited

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ſpirited up the mob in order to baniſh him, from the following reaſons, which at that time determined him to ſuch a conduct. *When*, ſais he, *unleſs I was given up, ſo many armed fleets ſeemed ready to attack this ſingle ſhip of the ſtate, toſſed with the tempeſts of ſeditions and diſcords, and the ſenate was now removed from the helm; when baniſhment, murder, and outrage were threatened; when ſome from an apprehenſion of their own danger would not defend me, others were incited by an inveterate hatred to all good men, others thought I ſtood in their way, others took this opportunity to expreſs their reſentment, others envied the peace and tranquillity of the ſtate, and upon all theſe accounts I was particularly ſtruck at: ſhould I have choſen rather to oppoſe them (I will not ſay to my own certain deſtruction, but to the greateſt danger both of you and your children) than alone to ſubmit to, and undergo what threatened us all in common*[1]? Such a number of reaſons brought together muſt ſet a thing in a very ſtrong and clear light,

[1] *Pro Sext. c.* 20.

THE like may be ſaid of a number and variety of effects. Thus Cicero deſcribes the force and excellence of oratory from its great and ſurprizing effects, when he ſais:

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Nothing ſeems to me more excellent than by diſcourſe to draw the attention of an whole aſſembly, delight them, and ſway their inclinations different ways at pleaſure. This in every free ſtate, and eſpecially in times of peace, and tranquillity, has been always in the higheſt eſteem and reputation. For what is either ſo admirable, as for one only, or a very few, out of a vaſt multitude to be able to do that, which all have a natural power of doing? or ſo delightful to hear, as a judicious and ſolid diſcourſe in florid and polite language? or ſo powerful and grand, as to influence the populace, the judges, the ſenate, by the charms of eloquence? Nay, what is ſo noble, ſo generous, ſo munificent, as to afford aid to ſupplicants, to ſupport the afflicted, give ſafety, deliver from dangers, and preſerve from exile? Or what is ſo neceſſary, as to be always furniſhed with arms to guard yourſelf, aſſert your right, or repel injuries? and not to confine our thoughts wholly to the courts of juſtice, or the ſenate; what is there in the arts of peace more agreable and entertaining, than good language, and a fine way of ſpeaking? For it is this eſpecially, wherein we excel other animals, that we can diſcourſe together, and convey our thoughts to each other by words. Who therefore would not eſteem, and in a par-

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ticular manner endeavour to ſurpaſs others in that, wherein mankind principally excels brute beaſts? But to procede to its cheif advantages: what elſe would have drawn men into ſocieties; or taken them off from a wild and ſavage life, and ſoftened them into a polite and civilized behaviour; or when ſettled in communities have reſtrained them by laws[1]? Who but after ſuch a deſcription muſt conceive the ſtrongeſt paſſion for an art, attended with ſo many great and good effects?

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 8.

A THING may likewiſe be illuſtrated by its oppoſite. So the bleſſings and advantages of peace may be recommended from the miſeries and calamities of war. And thus Cicero endeavours to throw contempt upon Catiline and his party, by comparing them with the contrary ſide: *But if omitting all theſe things, with which we abound, and they want, the ſenate, the knights, the populace, the city, treaſury, revenues, all Italy, the provinces, and foreign nations, if, I ſay, omitting theſe things, we compare the cauſes themſelves, in which each ſide is ingaged, we may learn from thence how deſpicable they are. For on this ſide modeſty is ingaged, on that impudence; on this chaſtity, on that lewdneſs; on this integrity, on that fraud; on this piety, on that profaneneſs;*

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neſs; on this conſtancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baſeneſs; on this moderation, on that unbridled paſſion; in a word equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues contend with injuſtice, luxury, cowardiſe, raſhneſs, and all vices; plenty with want, reaſon with folly, ſobriety with madneſs, and laſtly good hope with deſpair. In ſuch a conteſt did men deſert us, would not heaven ordain, that ſo many, and ſo great vices ſhould be defeated by theſe moſt excellent virtues [1].

[1] *In Catil.* ii. *c.* 11.

GRADATION is another beautiful way of doing this. So when Cicero would aggravate the cruelty and barbarity of Verres, for crucifying a Roman citizen; which was a ſort of puniſhment only inflicted upon ſlaves; he chooſes this way of doing it. *It is a crime*, ſais he, *to bind a Roman citizen, wickedneſs to whip him, and a ſort of parricide to kill him; what then muſt I call it to crucify him? No name can ſufficiently expreſs ſuch a villany* [2]. And the images of things may thus be hightened, either by aſcending, as in this inſtance, or deſcending, as in that which follows, relating to the ſame action of Verres: *Was I not to complain of, or bewail theſe things to Roman citizens, nor the freinds of our ſtate, nor*

[2] *Lib.* v. *c.* 66.

nor thoſe who had heard of the Roman name, LECT. XIX.
nay if not to men but beaſts; or to go yet further, if in the moſt deſert wilderneſs to ſtones and rocks; even all mute and inanimate creatures would be moved by ſo great and heinous cruelty [1].

[1] *Cap.* 67.

AND to name no more, facts may be amplified from their circumſtances, as time, place, manner, event, and the like. But inſtances of this would carry me too far, and therefore I ſhall only add, that as the deſign of *amplification* is not barely to prove or evince the truth of things, but alſo to adorn and illuſtrate them, it requires a florid and beautiful ſtile, conſiſting of ſtrong and emphatical words, flowing periods, harmonious numbers, lively tropes, and bright figures. But the conſideration of theſe things will come under the third part of oratory, namely *Elocution*, upon which I ſhall enter in my next diſcourſe.

LEC-

LECTURE XX.

Of Elocution in general, and particularly of Elegance, and Purity.

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CICERO tells us, *An orator ought to conſider three things, what to ſpeak, in what order, and in what manner* [1]. As it is therefore the deſign of the art of rhetoric to prepare and form the orator, it ought to treat of each of theſe. On which account I have formerly had occaſion more than once to obſerve its ſimilitude with the art of building; in which the workman firſt collects his materials, then puts them together in their proper order, and laſtly gives them ſuch ornaments, as are ſuited to the nature of the ſtructure. But ſince the manner of ſpeaking reſpects both the *Language* and *Pronunciation*, this art is uſually divided into four parts: *Invention*, which teaches what to ſpeak; *Diſpoſition*, which reſpects the order; *Elocution*, which regards the propriety and ornaments of language; and *Pronunciation*, which gives rules for a graceful delivery. I have hitherto, in the courſe of theſe lectures, treated upon the two firſt of theſe, and ſhall

[1] *Orat. c.* 14.

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ſhall now procede to the third, which is *Elocution*.

Now *Elocution* directs us to ſuit both the words and expreſſions of a diſcourſe to the nature of the ſubject, or to ſpeak with propriety and decency. This faculty is in one word called *Eloquence*, and thoſe perſons, who are poſſeſſed of it, are therefore ſtiled *eloquent*. This has always been eſteemed ſo neceſſary and eſſential to an orator, that ſome have placed the whole art of oratory only in *Elocution*. That it is the moſt difficult part is very certain, and ſo peculiar to it, that the rules for it are given no where elſe; but it is evident from what I have formerly ſaid both upon *Invention* and *Diſpoſition*, that this art contains many other things, beſides what particularly relates to *Elocution*. And therefore when Cicero, in his *Book of a perfect orator*, tells us, that *to invent what things are proper to ſay, and to diſpoſe them in a juſt order, are indeed great matters, and like the ſoul in the body; but yet more proper to prudence, than eloquence*; he immediately adds: *But what cauſe can be ſupported without prudence? Let the orator therefore, who would excel, be acquainted with the heads of invention*[1]. From whence it is

[1] *Cap.* 14.

plain,

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plain, that Cicero did not think the whole art of an orator to conſiſt in *Eloquence* or *Elocution*. But Quintilian has expreſſed himſelf more fully upon this head. I ſhall recite the paſſage, by which you will perceive his judgement concerning it. *Without elocution*, ſais he, *invention and diſpoſition are uſeleſs, and like a ſword in the ſcabbard. This is therefore what is principally taught; this no one can arrive at, but by the help of art; this requires ſtudy, practice, and obſervation; this is the exerciſe of our whole life; by this one orator excels another; this gives one kind of eloquence the preference to another; what is either commendable, or culpable in oratory, is found here.* But he adds: *However the whole care is not to be employed about words. For I muſt declare againſt thoſe, who neglect all concern about things, which are the nerves of a cauſe; and ſpend their whole age in a vain attendance to words. And this they do for the ſake of being exact, which in my opinion is very ornamental in ſpeaking; but when it appears natural, and without affectation* [1]. Thus far Quintilian. It appears therefore from the authority of theſe great maſters of oratory, that perſons may run into an extreme either way. And a little obſervation will con-

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *prooem.*

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convince us, that thoſe orators, who attend only to the matter of their diſcourſe, and the truth of their reaſoning, and neglect all beauty and decency of expreſſion; tho they inform their hearers, yet it is in ſuch a way, as neither to delight, nor move them. And accordingly, as what is ſaid gives them leſs entertainment, their attention muſt neceſſarily flag; by which means the main end deſigned is in proportion fruſtrated, which was *Perſuaſion*. And we often find that a ſpeech ſet off with good language, and agreable turns of expreſſion, tho perhaps but weak arguments, ingages the minds of the hearers, and is received with applauſe; while more juſt and cloſe reaſoning, but expreſſed in a coarſe and unpolite manner, is leſs attended to, and diſregarded. For many perſons are of that make, that you muſt pleaſe their ears in order to impreſs their minds; and truth muſt be ſet off in a very agreable dreſs, before it will be received by them. So that a due attention to words, and this part of oratory, ſeems neceſſary for all thoſe, who would render what they ſay acceptable to others. But, on the other hand, to regard ſounds only, and the flowers of language; and to be more ſoli-

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citous about the turn of a period, than the ſenſe of it; is a ſign of a weak mind, and trifling genius. And beſides, an anxious concern about words cools the imagination, and checks the mind in its purſuits of things; and by that means commonly produces either a ſtiffneſs, or levity of expreſſion. A medium therefore in this caſe is undoubtedly the beſt. And what Quintilian adviſes here is worth remarking. *Be as careful*, ſais he, *as you pleaſe about your language, only remember, that nothing is to be done merely for the ſake of words; ſince words were firſt invented for the ſake of things. And they ſeem to be moſt preferable, which beſt expreſs our ideas, and moſt affect the minds of the hearers* [1]. This part of oratory was much more cultivated by the antients, than it has been of late ages; and by none more than Cicero, who is generally largeſt upon it in his treatiſes upon this art. And in all his writings he appears to have been very exact and careful of his language; but always ſhews an equal regard to good ſenſe, and ſolid reaſoning. And therefore he tells us, that, *wiſdom is the foundation of eloquence* [2]. And in another place, that, *eloquence is nothing elſe, but copious and florid wiſdom* [3]. And indeed where

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

[2] *Orat. c.* 21.

[3] *Orat. Partit. c.* 23.

where theſe two do not meet, the one wants a neceſſary ornament to recommend it; and the other is of little value with wiſe men, tho it has often a conſiderable influence in popular harangues. But where they are united, they make one of the higheſt accompliſhments of human nature.

ELOCUTION is twofold, *general* and *particular*. The former treats of the ſeveral properties and ornaments of language in common; the latter conſiders them, as they are made uſe of to form different ſorts of ſtile. I ſhall begin with general elocution, which rhetoricians make to conſiſt of three parts: *Elegance*, *Compoſition*, and *Dignity*. *Elegance* reſpects the purity, and clearneſs of the language. *Compoſition* regards the turn and harmony of the periods. And *Dignity* explains the nature and various kinds of tropes and figures. A diſcourſe, which has all theſe properties ſuitably adjuſted, muſt, with reſpect to the language, be perfect in its kind, and delightful to the hearers.

ELEGANCE, which makes the firſt part of *Elocution*, conſiſts, as we have ſeen, in two things; *Purity*, and *Perſpicuity*: and both theſe, as well with reſpect to ſingle

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words, as their conſtruction in ſentences. Theſe properties in language give it the name of *elegant*; for a like reaſon that we call other things ſo, which are clean and neat in their kind. But in the common uſe of our tongue, we are apt to confound elegance with eloquence, and ſay, *a diſcourſe is elegant*; when we mean by the expreſſion, that it has all the properties of fine language.

Now by *purity* (upon which I propoſe to treat at preſent) we are to underſtand the choice of ſuch words and phraſes, as are ſuited and agreable to the uſe of the language, in which we ſpeak. And ſo grammarians reduce the faults, they oppoſe to it, to two ſorts, which they call *barbariſm* and *ſoleciſm*; the former of which reſpects ſingle words, and the latter their conſtruction. But I ſhall conſider them jointly, and in a manner different from grammarians. For with them all words are eſteemed pure, which are once adopted into a language, and authoriſed by uſe. And as to phraſes, or forms of expreſſion, they allow them all the ſame claim, which are agreable to the analogy of the tongue. But in oratory neither all words, nor all expreſſions are ſo called, which occur in

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any language; but ſuch only, as come recommended by the authority of thoſe, who ſpeak or write with accuracy and politeneſs. Indeed it is a common ſaying, *that we ſhould think with the learned, and ſpeak with the vulgar.* But the meaning of that expreſſion is no more, than that we ſhould ſpeak agreably to the common uſage of the tongue, that every one may underſtand us; and not chooſe ſuch words or expreſſions, as are either difficult to be underſtood, or may carry in them an appearance of affectation and ſingularity. But in order to ſet this matter in a clearer light, I ſhall here recount the principal things, which vitiate the purity of language.

AND firſt, it often happens, that ſuch words and forms of ſpeaking, as were introduced by the learned, are afterwards dropt by them, as mean and ſordid, from a ſeeming baſeneſs contracted by vulgar uſe. For polite and elegant ſpeakers diſtinguiſh themſelves by their diſcourſe, as perſons of figure do by their garb; one being the dreſs of the mind, as the other is of the body. And hence it comes to paſs, that both have their different faſhions, which are often changed; and as the vul-

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gar affect to imitate thoſe above them in both, this frequently occaſions an alteration, when either becomes too trite and common. But beſides theſe ſordid words and expreſſions, which are rendered ſo by the uſe of the vulgar; there is another ſort firſt introduced by them, which is carefully to be avoided by all thoſe, who are deſirous to ſpeak well. For the vulgar have their peculiar words and phraſes, ſuited to their circumſtances, and taken from ſuch things, as uſually occur in their way of life. Thus in the old comedians, many things are ſpoken by ſervants, agreable to their character, which would be very unbecoming from the mouth of a gentleman. And we cannot but daily obſerve the like inſtances among ourſelves.

AGAIN, this is common to language with all other human productions, that it is in its own nature liable to a conſtant change and alteration. For as Horace has juſtly obſerved:

All human works ſhall waſte:
Then how can feeble words pretend to laſt [1]?

[1] *Art Poet.* v. 68.

Nothing could ever pleaſe all perſons, or at leaſt for any length of time. And there is nothing, from which this can leſs be

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expected, than language. For as the thoughts of men are exceding various, and words are the ſigns of their thoughts; they will be conſtantly inventing new ſigns to expreſs them by, in order to convey their ideas with more clearneſs, or greater beauty. If we look into the different ages of the Latin writers, what great alterations and changes do we find in their language? How few now underſtand the remaining fragments of the *twelve tables?* Nay how many words do we meet with even in Plautus, the meaning of which has not yet been fixed with certainty by the ſkill of the beſt critics? And if we conſider our own language, it will appear to have been in a manner intirely changed, from what it was a few ages ſince. To mention no others, our celebrated Chaucer is to moſt perſons now almoſt unintelligible, and wants an expoſitor. And even ſince our own memory, we cannot but have obſerved, that many words and expreſſions, which a few years ago were in common uſe, are now in a manner laid aſide and antiquated; and that others have conſtantly, and daily do ſuccede in their room. So true is that obſervation of the ſame poet:

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Some words that have, or elſe will feel decay,
Shall be reſtor'd, and come again in play;
And words now fam'd, ſhall not be fancied long,
They ſhall not pleaſe the ear, nor move the tongue;
As uſe ſhall theſe approve, and thoſe condemn,
Uſe the ſole rule of ſpeech, and judge ſupreme [1].

[1] *Ibid. v.* 70.

We muſt therefore no leſs abſtain from antiquated, or obſolete words and phraſes, than from ſordid ones. Tho all old words are not to be thought antiquated. By the former I mean ſuch, which tho of an antient ſtanding, are not yet entirely diſuſed, nor their ſignification loſt. It is the opinion of Quintilian, that theſe may ſometimes be admitted, tho ſparingly. *Not only the beſt judges,* ſais he, *allow the uſe of old words; but they give both a majeſty, and an agreable pleaſure to a diſcourſe. For they have the authority of antiquity, and a kind of novelty from their diſuſe. But they ought neither to be frequent, nor glaring; becauſe nothing is more diſtaſteful than affectation: nor muſt they be ſuch, as are entirely antiquated, and thro length of time wholly forgot.*

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got [1]. We are not therefore in the opinion of this judicious writer, to be wholly debared from the uſe of old words, eſpecially when they appear more ſignificant, than any others we can fix upon. But as to phraſes or expreſſions, greater caution ſeems ſtill neceſſary, and ſuch as are old, ſhould doubtleſs, if at all, be uſed more ſparingly. The Latin tongue was brought to its greateſt perfection in the reign of Auguſtus, or ſomewhat ſooner; and he himſelf ſtudied it very carefully. For, as Suetonius tells us: *He applied himſelf to eloquence, and the ſtudy of the liberal arts, from his childhood, with great diligence and labor. He choſe a manner of ſpeaking, which was ſmooth and elegant; and avoided the ill ſavour, as he uſed to call it, of antiquated words. And he was wont to blame Tiberius for his affectation of them* [2]. In our own language, ſuch words are to be eſteemed antiquated, which the moſt polite perſons have droped, both in their diſcourſe, and writings; whoſe example we ſhould follow, unleſs we would be thought to converſe rather with the dead, than the living.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 6.

[2] *Suet. in Vit.* 84. *&c.*

BUT further, as on the one hand we muſt avoid obſolete words and phraſes; ſo on the other, we ſhould refrain from new ones;

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ones; or ſuch, whoſe uſe has not been yet ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, at leaſt among thoſe of the beſt taſte. Cuſtom rules here, but, as we have obſerved before, every cuſtom is not to be followed: a diſtinction muſt be made between the uſe of the vulgar, and that of the learned. Quintilian has very well determined this matter, when he ſais: *We muſt ſettle firſt, what that is, which we call cuſtom. Which, if it take its name from that, which moſt perſons practiſe, it will be an ill guide, not only in language; but what is of greater conſequence, in life. For when has the world been ſo happy, that what is right, has pleaſed the majority? Therefore that is not to be taken for a rule in language, which many have corruptly fallen into. But I ſhall call the conſent of the learned the cuſtom of language, as the conſent of the good the cuſtom of living* [1]. A language is not the progeny of one age. It requires a much longer ſeries of time to complete it, and bring it to perfection. And beſides, there is a certain agrement and harmony both in the words, and modes of expreſſion, proper to every language, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from others. Therefore when any thing new is introduced, it often ſeems harſh at firſt,

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 6.

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firſt, and diſpleaſing to the ear; till time has ſoftened it, and the uſe of the learned, as it were, wrought it into the language. The antient Romans, while their language continued in its purity, were very ſcrupulous of admitting any thing new into it, by which it might be vitiated. Nor would they preſently ſubmit to the greateſt authority in this caſe. *So when Pomponius, who* (as Suetonius informs us) *was a moſt zealous defender of the purity of the Latin tongue, once excepted to an expreſſion, which was uſed by the emperor Tiberius; and Atteius Capito attempted to defend it, by ſaying that it was Latin, or at leaſt would then be ſo, ſince the emperor had uſed it: Capito is miſtaken, replied Pomponius; for tho you, Caeſar, can make men free, you cannot make words free* [1]. Now words may be conſidered as new in two reſpects; either when they are firſt brought into a language, or when they are uſed in a new ſenſe. As the former of theſe may ſometimes leave us in the dark, by not being underſtood; ſo the latter are moſt apt to miſlead us: for when we hear a word, that has been familiar to us, we are preſently led to fix that idea to it, with which it

[1] *De illuſtr. gram.* 22.

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it has uſually been attended. And therefore in both caſes, ſome previous intimation may be neceſſary. Cicero, who perhaps inlarged the furniture of the Roman tongue more than any one perſon beſides, appears always very cautious, how he introduces any thing new, and generally gives notice of it, when he attempts it; as appears in many inſtances ſcattered thro his works. What bounds we are now to fix to the purity of the Latin tongue, in the uſe of it, the learned are not well agreed. It is certain our furniture is much leſs, than when it was a living language, and therefore the greater liberty muſt of neceſſity be ſometimes taken. So that their opinion ſeems not unadviſable, who direct us to make choice principally of what we are furniſhed with from the writers of the Auguſtan age, and where we cannot be ſupplied from them, to make uſe of ſuch authors as lived neareſt to them, either before, or ſince. And as to our own tongue, it is certainly prudent to be as careful, how we admit any thing into it, that is uncouth, or diſagreable to its genius; as the antient Romans were into theirs: for the perfection of a language

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guage does in a great meaſure conſiſt in a certain analogy, and harmony runing thro the whole, by which it may be capable of being brought to a ſtandard.

BUT beſides thoſe things already mentioned, any miſtake in the ſenſe of words, or their conſtruction, is oppoſed to purity. For to ſpeak purely, is to ſpeak correctly. And ſuch is the nature of theſe faults in elocution, that they are often not ſo eaſy to be obſerved by hearing, as by reading. Whence it is, that many perſons are thought to ſpeak better, than they write; for while they are ſpeaking, many ſlips and inaccuracies eſcape diſregarded, which in reading would preſently appear. And this is more eſpecially the caſe of perſons unacquainted with arts and literature; who, by the aſſiſtance of a lively fancy, and flow of words, often ſpeak with great eaſe and freedom, and by that means pleaſe the ear; when, at the ſame time, what they ſay, would not ſo well bear reading.

I SHALL only add, that a diſtinction ought likewiſe to be made between a poetic diction, and that of proſe writers. For poets in all languages have a ſort of

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of peculiar dialect, and take greater liberties, not only in their figures, but alſo in their choice and diſpoſition of words; ſo that what is a beauty in them, would often appear unnatural and affected in proſe.

LEC-

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Of Perſpicuity.

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ELEGANCE, as I have already obſerved, conſiſts of two parts, *Purity* and *Perſpicuity:* the former of which renders a diſcourſe correct, and the latter makes it intelligible. As the one therefore is agreable and pleaſant, the other is neceſſary, and for that reaſon principally to be regarded. For the moſt accurate and exact language is of little uſe, if it be not ſufficiently clear; ſince it is much the ſame thing not to ſpeak at all, and not to be underſtood, when we do ſpeak. And therefore Quintilian ſeems very juſtly to place the cheif excellency of ſpeech in perſpicuity [1]. Tho to render a diſcourſe entertaining, as well as clear, eſpecially to perſons of a good taſte, both theſe properties muſt be joined. They expect to be pleaſed, at the ſame time they are informed; and think, that the beſt ſenſe always deſerves the beſt language: but ſtill the cheif regard is to be had to perſpicuity.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 2.

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I TREATED of *Purity* in my laſt diſcourſe, and ſhall therefore now procede to ſpeak of *Perſpicuity*. And this, as well as the former, conſiſts partly in *ſingle words*, and partly in their *conſtruction*.

As to *ſingle words*, thoſe are generally cleareſt and beſt underſtood, which are uſed in their proper ſenſe. But it requires no ſmall attention and ſkill to be well acquainted with the force and propriety of words; which ought to be duly regarded, ſince the perſpicuity of a diſcourſe depends ſo much upon it. Caeſar ſeems plainly to have been of this mind, when he tells us, *The foundation of eloquence conſiſts in the choice of words* [1]. It may not be amiſs therefore to lay down ſome few obſervations, by which the diſtinct notions of words, and their peculiar force may more eaſily be perceived. Indeed it is the buſineſs of a grammarian to give us all the different ſenſes of words, and ſupport them with good authorities; I ſhall therefore content myſelf with offering a few general hints, in order to regulate our choice in the uſe of them. Now all words may be divided into *proper words* and *tropes*. Thoſe are called *proper words*, which are expreſſed in their proper and uſual ſenſe.

[1] Ap. Cic. *De clar. orat. c. 72.*

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And tropes are ſuch words, as are applied to ſome other thing, than what they properly denote, by reaſon of ſome ſimilitude, relation, or contrariety between the two things. So when a ſubtle artful man is called a *fox*, the reaſon of the name is founded in a ſimilitude of qualities. If we ſay, *Cicero will always live*, meaning *his works*, the cauſe is transfered to the effect. And when we are told, *Caeſar conquered the Gauls*, we underſtand that he did it with the aſſiſtance of his army; where a part is put for the whole from the relation between them. And when Cicero calls Antony, *a fine guardian of the ſtate*, every one perceives, he means the contrary. But I ſhall explain the nature and uſe of tropes more fully hereafter in their proper place. All words muſt at firſt have had one original and primary ſignification, which, ſtrictly ſpeaking, may be called their proper ſenſe. But it ſometimes happens thro length of time, that words loſe their original ſignification, and aſſume a new one, which then becomes their proper ſenſe. So *hoſtis* in the Latin tongue at firſt ſignified a *ſtranger*; but afterwards that ſenſe of the word was entirely laid aſide, and it was uſed to denote a *public*

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enemy. And in our language it is well known, that the word *knave* antiently ſignified a *ſervant*. The reaſon of the change ſeems to be much the ſame, as in that of the Latin word *latro*, which firſt ſignified a *ſoldier*, but afterwards a *robber*. Beſides, in all languages it has frequently happened, that many words have gradually varied from their firſt ſenſe to others ſomewhat different; which may notwithſtanding all of them, when rightly applied, be looked upon as proper. Nay, in proceſs of time, it is often difficult to ſay, which is the original, or moſt proper ſenſe. Again, ſometimes two or more words may appear to have the ſame ſignification with each other, and may therefore be uſed indifferently; unleſs the beauty of the period, or ſome other particular reaſon, determine to the choice of one, rather than another. Of this kind are the words *enſis* and *gladius* in the Latin tongue, and in ours *pity* and *compaſſion*. And there are other words of ſo near an affinity to each other, or at leaſt appear ſo from vulgar uſe, that they are commonly thought to be ſynonymous. Such are the words *mercy*, and *pity*; tho mercy in its ſtrict ſenſe is exerciſed towards an offender, and pity reſpects one in diſtreſs.

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As this peculiar force and diſtinction of words is carefully to be attended to, ſo it may be known ſeveral ways. Thus the proper ſignification of ſubſtantives may be ſeen by their application to other ſubſtantives. As in the inſtance juſt now given, a perſon is ſaid to ſhew *mercy to a criminal*, and *pity to one in diſtreſs*. And in the like manner verbs are diſtinguiſhed, by being joined to ſome certain nouns, and not to others. So a perſon is ſaid *to command an inferior*, *to intreat a ſuperior*, and *to deſire an equal*. Adjectives alſo, which denote the properties of things, have their ſignification determined by thoſe ſubjects, to which they moſt properly relate. Thus we ſay, *an honeſt mind*, and *a healthful body*; *a wiſe man*, and *a fine houſe*. Another way of diſtinguiſhing the propriety of words, is by their uſe in gradations. As if one ſhould ſay: *Hatreds, grudges, quarrels, tumults, ſeditions, wars, ſpring from unbridled paſſions*. The proper ſenſe of words may likewiſe be known, by obſerving to what other words they are either oppoſed, or uſed as equivalent: So in that paſſage of Cicero, where he ſais: *I cannot perceive why you ſhould be angry with me; if it be becauſe I defend him, whom you accuſe;*

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cuſe; why may not I be diſpleaſed with you, for accuſing him, whom I defend? You ſay, I accuſe my enemy; and I ſay, I defend my freind [1]. Here the words *accuſe* and *defend*, *freind* and *enemy*, are oppoſed; and *to be angry* and *diſpleaſed*, are uſed as terms equivalent. Laſtly, the derivation of words, contributes very much to determine their true meaning. Thus becauſe the word *manners*, comes from the word *man*, it may properly be applied either to that, or any other put for it. And therefore we ſay, *the manners of men*, and *the manners of the age*, becauſe the word *age* is there uſed for *the men of the age*. But if we apply the word *manners* to any other animal, it is a trope. By theſe, and ſuch like obſervations, we may perceive the proper ſenſe and peculiar force of words, either by their connection with other words, diſtinction from them, oppoſition to them, equivalency with them, or derivation. And by thus fixing their true and genuine ſignification, we ſhall eaſily ſee when they become tropes. But tho words, when taken in their proper ſignification, generally convey the plaineſt and cleareſt ſenſe; yet ſome are more forceable, ſonorous, or beautiful than others. And by theſe conſide-

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[1] *Pro Sulla, c.* 17.

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rations we muſt often be determined in our choice of them. So whether we ſay, *he got*, or, *he obtained the victory*, the ſenſe is the ſame; but the latter is more full and ſonorous. In Latin, *timeo* ſignifies *I fear*, *pertimeo* is more full and ſignificant, and *pertimeſco* more ſonorous than either of the former. The Latin and Greek languages have much the advantage of ours in this reſpect, by reaſon of their compoſitions; by the help of which they can often expreſs that in one word, for which we are obliged to put two words, and ſometimes more. So *pertimeo* cannot be fully expreſſed in our language by one word; but we are forced to join one or two particles to the verb, to convey its juſt idea, and ſay, *I greatly*, or *very much fear*: and yet even then, we ſcarce ſeem to reach its full force. As to tropes, tho generally ſpeaking they are not to be choſen, where plainneſs and perſpicuity of expreſſion is only deſigned, and proper words may be found; yet thro the penury of all languages, the uſe of them is often made neceſſary. And ſome of them, eſpecially metaphors, which are taken from the ſimilitude of things, may, when cuſtom has rendered them familiar, be conſidered as

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proper words, and uſed in their ſtead. Thus, whether I ſay, *I ſee your meaning*, or, *I underſtand your meaning*, the ſenſe is equally clear; tho the latter expreſſion is proper, and the former metaphorical, by which the action of ſeeing is transfered from the eyes to the mind.

BUT *Perſpicuity*, as I have ſaid, ariſes not only from a choice of *ſingle words*, but likewiſe from the *conſtruction* of them in ſentences. For the meaning of all the words in a ſentence, conſidered by themſelves, may be very plain and evident; and yet by reaſon of a diſorderly placing them, or confuſion of the parts, the ſenſe of the whole may be very dark and obſcure. Now it is certain, that the moſt natural order is the plaineſt; that is, when both the words and parts of a ſentence are ſo diſpoſed, as beſt agrees with their mutual relation, and dependance upon each other. And where this is changed, as is uſually done, eſpecially in the antient languages, for the greater beauty and harmony of the periods; yet due regard is had by the beſt writers to the evidence and perſpicuity of the expreſſion.

BUT to ſet this ſubject in a clearer light, on which the perfection of language

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ſo much depends, I ſhall mention ſome few things, which cheifly occaſion obſcurity; and this either with reſpect to ſingle words, or their conſtruction.

AND firſt, all ambiguity of expreſſion is one cauſe of obſcurity. This ſometimes ariſes from the different ſenſes, in which a word is capable of being taken. So we are told, that upon Cicero's addreſſing himſelf to Octavius Caeſar, when he thought himſelf in danger from his reſentment, and reminding him of the many ſervices he had done him; Octavius replied, *He came the laſt of his freinds* [1]. But there was a deſigned ambiguity in the word *laſt*, as it might either reſpect the time of his coming, or the opinion he had of his freindſhip. And this uſe of ambiguous words we ſometimes meet with, not only in poetry, where the turn and wit of an epigram often reſts upon it; but likewiſe in proſe, either for pleaſantry or ridicule. Thus Cicero calls Sextus Clodius, *the light of the ſenate* [2]; which is a compliment he pais to ſeveral great men, who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their public ſervices to their country. But Sextus, who had a contrary character, was a relation of P. Clodius, whoſe dead body, after he had

[1] Appian. *De Bell. civ. Lib.* v.

[2] *Pro Milon. c.* 12.

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been killed by Milo, he carried in a tumultuous manner into the ſenate houſe, and there burnt it with the ſenators benches, in order to inflame the populace againſt Milo. And it is in illuſion to that riotous action, that Cicero, uſing this ambiguous expreſſion, calls him, *the light of the ſenate*. In ſuch inſtances therefore it is a beauty, and not the fault I am cautioning againſt; as the ſame thing may be often good or bad, as it is differently applied. Tho even in ſuch deſigned ambiguities, where one ſenſe is aimed at, it ought to be ſufficiently plain, otherwiſe they loſe their intention. And in all ſerious diſcourſes they ought carefully to be avoided. But obſcurity more frequently ariſes from the ambiguous conſtruction of words, which renders it difficult to determine, in what ſenſe they are to be taken. Quintilian gives us this example of it: *A certain man ordered in his will, that his heir ſhould erect for him a ſtatue holding a ſpear, made of gold* [1]. A queſtion ariſes here, of great conſequence to the heir, from the ambiguity of the expreſſion; whether the words *made of gold*, are to be applied to the *ſtatue*, or the *ſpear*: that is, whether it was the deſign of the teſtator by this appointment, that the

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vii. c. 9.

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the whole ſtatue, or only the ſpear, ſhould be made of gold. A ſmall note of diſtinction, differently placed between the parts of this ſentence, would clear up the doubt, and determine the ſenſe either way. For if one comma be put after the word *ſtatue*, and another after *ſpear*, the words *made of gold*, muſt be refered to the *ſtatue*, as if it had been ſaid, *a ſtatue, made of gold, holding a ſpear*. But if there be only the firſt comma placed after *ſtatue*, it will limit the words *made of gold*, to the *ſpear* only; in the ſame ſenſe, as if it had been ſaid, *A ſtatue holding a golden ſpear*. And either of theſe ways of expreſſion would in this caſe have been preferable, for avoiding the ambiguity, according to the intention of the teſtator. The antient heathen oracles were generally delivered in ſuch ambiguous terms. Which without doubt were ſo contrived on purpoſe, that thoſe, who gave out the anſwers, might have room left for an evaſion.

AGAIN, obſcurity is occaſioned either by too ſhort and conciſe a manner of ſpeaking, or by ſentences too long and prolix; either of theſe extremes have ſometimes this bad conſequence. We find an inſtance of the former in Pliny the elder,

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where ſpeaking of Hellebore, he ſais: *They forbid it to be given to aged perſons and children, and leſs to women than men* [1]. The verb is wanting in the latter part of the ſentence, *and leſs to women than men*, which in ſuch caſes being uſually ſupplied from what went before, would here ſtand thus: *and they forbid it to be given leſs to women than men*. But this is directly contrary to the ſenſe of the writer, whoſe meaning is, either that it is ordered to be given in a leſs quantity to women than men, or not ſo frequently to women as men. And therefore the word *order* is here to be ſupplied, which being of a contrary ſignification to *forbid*, expreſſed in the former part of the ſentence, occaſions the obſcurity. That long periods are often attended with the ſame ill effect, muſt be ſo obvious to every one's experience; that it would be intirely needleſs to produce any examples, in order to evince the truth of it. And therefore I ſhall only obſerve, that the beſt way of preventing this ſeems to be, by dividing ſuch ſentences, as excede a proper length, into two or more, which may generally be done without much trouble.

[1] *Hiſt. Nat. Lib.* XXV. *c.* 5.

ANOTHER cauſe of obſcurity, not inferior to any yet mentioned, is *Parentheſis*, when

when it is either too long, or too frequent. This of Cicero, in his oration for Sulla, is longer than we uſually find in him: *O immortal gods (for I muſt attribute to you, what is your own: nor indeed can I claim ſo much to my own abilities, as to have been able of myſelf to go thro ſo many, ſo great, ſuch different affairs, with that expedition, in that boiſterous tempeſt of the ſtate) you inflamed my mind with a deſire to ſave my country*[1]. But where any obſcurity ariſes from ſuch ſentences, they may frequently be remedied by much the ſame means, as was juſt now hinted concerning long and prolix periods; that is, by ſeparating the parentheſis from the reſt of the ſentence, and placing it either before or after. So in this ſentence of Cicero, the parentheſis may ſtand laſt, in the following manner: *O immortal gods, you inflamed my mind with a deſire to ſave my country: for I muſt attribute to you, what is your own; nor indeed can I claim ſo much to my own abilities, as to have been able of myſelf to go thro ſo many, ſo great, ſuch different affairs, with that expedition, in that boiſterous tempeſt of the ſtate.* This order of the ſentence is very plain, and leſs involved than the former. But to remove the obſcurity,

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[1] *Cap.* 14.

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ſcurity, which otherwiſe might be occaſioned by a long parentheſis, one or more words are ſometimes repeated immediately after it, which had been mentioned juſt before. Thus Cicero in his ſecond Philippic ſais: *A ſpear being erected before the temple of Jupiter Stator, the goods (unhappy I, tho my tears are exhauſted, my greif yet continues fixed in my breaſt) the goods, I ſay, of Pompey the Great were expoſed to auction by the doleful voice of a crier* [1]. In the following ſentence of the ſame excellent writer, there are no leſs than three parentheſes; which I take notice of, as a thing very ſeldom to be found in him; and therefore rather to be obſerved, than imitated without neceſſity. Speaking of the duty of magiſtrates, and ſuch who have the management of public affairs, he ſais: *Care muſt be taken, that it be not (as was often done by our anceſtors, thro the ſmallneſs of the treaſury, and continuance of the wars) neceſſary to raiſe taxes; and in order to prevent this, proviſion ſhould be made againſt it long before hand: but if the neceſſity of this ſervice ſhould happen to any ſtate (which I had rather ſuppoſe of another, than our own; nor am I now diſcourſing of our own, but of every ſtate in general) methods*

[1] *Cap.* 26.

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thods muſt be uſed to convince all perſons (if they would be ſecure) that they ought to ſubmit to neceſſity[1]. Every one will readily perceive, that the ſenſe of this period is not altogether ſo clear, nor the run of it ſo free and eaſy, as it would otherwiſe have been without the parentheſes. But even two of theſe might be avoided, by a ſmall change in the diſpoſition of the members, in the following manner: *Care muſt be taken, that it be not neceſſary to raiſe taxes, as was often done by our anceſtors, thro the ſmallneſs of the treaſury, and continuance of the wars; and in order to prevent this, proviſion ſhould be made againſt it long before hand: but if the neceſſity of this ſervice ſhould happen to any ſtate (which I would rather ſuppoſe of another, than our own; nor am I now diſcourſing of our own, but of every ſtate in general) methods muſt be uſed to convince all perſons, that they ought to ſubmit to neceſſity, if they would be ſecure.* The words are here exactly the ſame as before, and no other alteration made, but that two of the members, which before were included in others, are now placed after them. I have been the longer upon this head, becauſe it is what many perſons are too apt

[1] *De Offic. Lib.* ii. *c.* 21.

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to fall into, by involving ſeveral ſentences, or parts of ſentences, one within another, inſtead of ſeparating them, and placing one after another, in a proper dependance and connexion, as might be done by due care and attention.

THESE are the principal things, which occaſion obſcurity in a diſcourſe, with reſpect to the language. There have been ſome perſons, who have affected a dark and obſcure way of ſpeaking. We are told concerning Tiberius the emperor, that, *He was thought to ſpeak better off hand (as we ſay) than when he made a ſtudied and ſet diſcourſe* [1]. But this was not occaſioned from his want of ſkill, but, as the hiſtorian ſais, from an affected obſcurity in his ſtile. And Heraclitus was called the *dark philoſopher* upon that account [2]. And Quintilian mentions a certain rhetorician of this make, *Who uſed to order his ſcholars to cloud their diſcourſes.* And his higheſt applauſe was: *Bravely ſaid, I did not underſtand it myſelf* [3]. It is hard to gueſs what ſuch perſons can propoſe to themſelves by this conduct; unleſs they imagine their diſcourſes will be thought to have the more in them, the leſs they are underſtood. But the deſign of language is to communicate our

[1] Suet. *in Vit. c.* 70.

[2] Clem. *Strom.* v.

[3] *Inſt orat Lib.* viii. *c.* 2.

thoughts

thoughts to others, and the plainer it is, the better this design is answered. And therefore Quintilian very prudently advises persons not only to endeavour, *that their hearers may understand them, but as far as may be, that it should be impossible for them not to understand them* [1].

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[1] *Ubi supra.*

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Of Compoſition, and particularly of Period.

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THE firſt part of *Elocution*, which conſiſts in *Elegance*, I finiſhed in my laſt diſcourſe; and ſhall now procede to the ſecond, which is *Compoſition*.

Now *Compoſition*, in the ſenſe it is here uſed, gives rules for the ſtructure of ſentences, with the ſeveral members, words, and ſyllables, of which they conſiſt, in ſuch a manner, as may beſt contribute to the force, beauty, and evidence of the whole. Some have not only neglected this, but pleaded againſt it, that ſuch an attendance to rules of art in the ſtructure and formation of ſentences rather weakens and enervates the ſtile; which is more ſtrong and natural, when every thing is expreſſed in the manner it firſt occurs to the mind. But to this Quintilian very well replies: *If that only is to be eſteemed natural, which firſt ſprang from nature, before it was cultivated; then the whole art of oratory is unnatural. And beſides, if what nature at firſt dictates, is not to be improved by ſtudy and induſtry, mankind muſt be deprived not only*

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only of many pleaſures, but likewiſe conveniences of life. But if all theſe are found ſuitable to nature; then that ſeems to be moſt natural, which is moſt agreable to reaſon; and that is moſt agreable to reaſon, which is beſt in its kind [1]. So that nature and art are not oppoſite to each other, and different in kind, but only in degree, as art is nature improved. Nor is it true, that rough and harſh language is more ſtrong and nervous; than when the compoſition is ſmooth and harmonious. A ſtream, which runs among ſtones and rocks, makes more noiſe, from the oppoſition it meets with in its courſe; but that, which has not thoſe impediments, flows with greater force and ſtrength. So harſh and jarring ſounds are diſagreable to the ear, which does not give them that eaſy admittance to the mind, as thoſe, which are more pleaſant and melodious. Beſides harmonious numbers do not only give delight; but oftentimes impreſs the mind with an irreſiſtable force, by the powerful influence they have upon the paſſions. This is evident from muſic, whoſe ſounds, not being attended with rational ideas, cannot affect the underſtanding, and yet raiſe in the hearers a variety of emotions.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

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But poetry is ſtill a greater inſtance of it, which, by reaſon of its numbers joined to fine thoughts, affords us both a rational and delightful entertainment. But nothing more is neceſſary to ſhew the advantage of this part of elocution, and how neceſſary it is for an orator, than to take a period well wrought up, and alter the form of it; by which it may be eaſily ſeen, how differently the mind will be affected by ſuch an alteration. Cicero has ſhewn this from ſeveral inſtances, in his book *Of a perfect orator* [1]. But ſince they cannot ſo well be expreſſed in a tranſlation, let us try it by one example in our own language, taken from a very polite writer, thus addreſſing his patron: *You have*, ſais he, *acted in ſo much conſiſtency with yourſelf, and promoted the intereſts of your country in ſo uniform a manner; that even thoſe, who would miſrepreſent your generous deſigns for the public good, cannot but approve the ſteadineſs and intrepidity, with which you purſue them* [2]. I think this may be juſtly eſteemed an handſome period. It begins with eaſe, riſes gradually till the voice is inflected, then ſinks again, and ends with a juſt cadency. And perhaps there is not a word in it, whoſe ſituation could be altered

[1] *Cap.* 70.

[2] *Spectat. Vol.* V. *pref.*

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tered to an advantage. Let us now but ſhift the place of one word in the laſt member, and we ſhall ſpoil the beauty of the whole ſentence. For, if inſtead of ſaying, as it now ſtands, *cannot but approve the ſteadineſs and intrepidity, with which you purſue them*; we put it thus, *cannot but approve the ſteadineſs and intrepidity, which you purſue them with*; the cadency will be flat and languid, and the harmony of the period entirely loſt. Let us try it again by altering the place of the two laſt members, which at preſent ſtand in this order, *that even thoſe, who would miſrepreſent your generous deſigns for the public good, cannot but approve the ſteadineſs and intrepidity, with which you purſue them.* Now if the former member be thrown laſt, they will run thus, *that even thoſe cannot but approve the ſteadineſs and intrepidity, with which you purſue them, who would miſrepreſent your generous deſigns for the public good.* Here the ſenſe is much obſcured by the inverſion of the relative *them*, which ought to refer to ſomething that went before, and not to the words *generous deſigns*, which in this ſituation of the members are placed after it. And *Perſpicuity*, as I have ſhewn already, is to

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be always carefully regarded, as the cheif and moſt neceſſary property of language. It may perhaps be thought, that this is a thing in itſelf ſo very plain and obvious, that no one can well miſs of falling into that manner, which is beſt. But ſurely if it was ſo, the contrary would not ſo often appear both in ſpeaking and writing.

COMPOSITION conſiſts of four parts; which rhetoricians call *Period*, *Order*, *Juncture*, and *Number*. The firſt of theſe treats on the ſtructure of ſentences; the ſecond of the parts of ſentences, which are words and members; and the two laſt of the parts of words, which are letters and ſyllables. For all articulate ſounds, and even the moſt minute parts of language, come under the cognizance of oratory. I ſhall begin with the firſt of theſe, which relates to ſentences.

BUT before I enter upon this, it may not be improper to conſider a little the nature of a ſentence in general, with the different kinds of it, which are either ſimple or compound. Now in every ſentence, or propoſition, ſomething is ſaid of ſomething. That of which ſomething is ſaid, logicians call the *ſubject*, and that, which is ſaid of it, the *predicate*: but in gram-

matical

matical terms, the former is *a noun ſubſtantive of the nominative caſe*, and the latter *a finite verb*. Theſe two parts may of themſelves conſtitute a ſentence. As when we ſay, *The ſun ſhines*, or, *The clock ſtrikes*, the words *ſun* and *clock* are the ſubject in theſe expreſſions, *ſhines* and *ſtrikes* the predicate. But moſt commonly they are accompanied with other words, which in grammatical conſtruction are ſaid either to be connected with, or to depend upon them; but in a logical conſideration they denote ſome property, or circumſtance relating to them. As in the following ſentence: *A good man loves virtue for itſelf.* The ſubject of this ſentence is *a good man*; and the predicate, or thing affirmed of him, that he *loves virtue for itſelf.* But the two principal or neceſſary words, on which all the reſt depend, are *man* and *loves*. Now a ſimple ſentence conſiſts of one ſuch noun and verb, with whatever elſe is joined to either, or both of them. And a compound ſentence contains two or more of them, and may be divided into ſo many diſtinct propoſitions, as there are ſuch nouns and verbs, either expreſſed or underſtood. So in the following ſentence: *Compliance gains freinds,*

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but truth procures hatred [1], there are two members, each of which contains in it an entire propoſition. For, *Compliance gains freinds*, is one complete ſentence; and, *Truth procures hatred*, is another; which are connected into one compound ſentence by the particle *but*. Moreover it frequently happens, that compound ſentences are made up of ſuch parts or members, ſome if not all of which are themſelves compounded, and contain in them two or more ſimple members. Such is that of Salluſt: *Ambition has betrayed many perſons into deceit; to ſay one thing, and to mean another; to found freindſhip and enmity, not upon reaſon, but intereſt; and to be more careful to appear honeſt, than really to be ſo* [2]. This ſentence conſiſts of four members, the three laſt of which conſiſting of oppoſite parts are all compounded; as will appear by expreſſing them at length in the following manner: *Ambition has betrayed many perſons into deceit; it* [that is ambition] *has betrayed them to ſay one thing, and to mean another; it has betrayed them to found freindſhip and enmity, not upon reaſon, but intereſt; and it has betrayed them to be more careful to appear honeſt, than really to be ſo.* The three laſt of theſe members, begining with

[1] Terent. *Andr. Act.* I. *Sc.* I. *v.* 41.

[2] *Bell. Cat. c.* 10.

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with the words *it betrays*, are all of them compounded, and conſiſt of two oppoſite members; which might each of them be expreſſed at length in the ſame manner, by ſupplying the ellipſis. As: *Ambition has betrayed many perſons to ſay one thing, and it has betrayed them to mean another.* And ſo of the reſt. From this inſtance we ſee, how much is left to be ſupplied by the mind in all diſcourſe; which if expreſſed, would both deſtroy its harmony, and render it exceding tedious. But ſtill regard muſt be had to that, which is omitted, ſo as to render what is ſaid conſiſtent with it; otherwiſe there can be no propriety in what is ſpoken. Nor can the members of a ſentence be diſtinguiſhed, and duly ranged in their proper order, without this. But to procede, ſome ſentences conſiſt either wholly, or in part, of ſuch members, as contain in them two or more compound ones, which may therefore for diſtinction's ſake be called decompound members. Of this kind is that of Cicero, in his *defence of* Milo: *Great is the force of conſcience, great either way: that thoſe perſons are not afraid, who have committed no offence; and thoſe, who have offended, always think puniſhment preſent be-*

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fore their eyes[1]. The latter member of this ſentence, which begins with the word *that*, contains in it two compound members, which repreſent the different ſtate of mind between innocent and guilty perſons. And it is in the proper diſtinction, and ſeparation of the members in ſuch complex ſentences, that the art of pointing cheifly conſiſts. For the principal uſe of a comma is to divide the ſimple members, a ſemicolon the compound ones, a colon ſuch as are decompounded, and a period the whole from the following ſentence. I mention this the rather, to ſhew the different acceptation of theſe terms by grammarians, from that of the antient writers upon oratory. For theſe latter apply them to the ſenſe, and not to any points of diſtinction. A very ſhort member, whether ſimple or compound, with them is a comma; and a longer a colon; for they have no ſuch term, as a ſemicolon. Beſides they call a very ſhort ſentence, whether ſimple or compound, a comma; and one of ſomewhat a greater length, a colon. And therefore, if a perſon expreſſed himſelf either of theſe ways in any conſiderable number of ſentences together, he was ſaid to ſpeak by commas, or colons. But a ſentence con-

[1] Cap. 23.

containing more words, than will conſiſt with either of theſe terms, they call a ſimple period; the leaſt compound period with them requiring the length of two colons. However this way of denominating ſentences, and the parts of them, rather from their length, than the nature of them, appearing not ſo ſuitable, I have choſen rather to make uſe of the terms ſimple and compound members; and to call all thoſe compound periods, which contain two or more members, whether ſimple or compounded. LECT. XXII.

BUT I procede to the ſtructure of ſentences, which with reſpect to their form or compoſition, are diſtinguiſhed into two ſorts, called by Cicero *tracta*, ſtrait or direct; and *contorta*, bent or winding [1]. By the former are meant ſuch, whoſe members follow each other in a direct order, without any inflexion; and by the latter thoſe, which ſtrictly ſpeaking are called periods. For περίοδος in Greek ſignifies a *circuit* or *circle*. And ſo the Latins call it *circuitus* and *ambitus*. By which they both mean a ſentence conſiſting of correſpondent parts, ſo framed, that the voice in pronouncing them may have a proper elevation and cadency, and diſtinguiſh them by

[1] *Orat. c.* 20.

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by its inflexion. And as the latter part returns back, and unites with the former, the period, like a circle, ſurrounds and incloſes the whole ſenſe. This elevation of the voice in the former part of the period, is by the Greeks called, προτασις, and by the Latins *propoſitio*; and the depreſſion of it in the latter part, by the one ἀπόδοσις, and by the other *redditio*.

Now as ſimple ſentences have not theſe correſpondent parts, which require any inflexion of the voice; nor a circular form, by reaſon of their brevity, they are not properly periods, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word: tho in common ſpeech the words ſentence and period are often uſed as equivalent terms. Thus, if I ſay: *Generous minds are incited to the performance of noble exploits from motives of glory:* here is no diſtinction of parts, nor inflexion of the voice in this ſentence. And indeed there is not any thing, which relates to the ſtructure of theſe ſentences, but what will more properly be taken notice of in the ſecond part of *Compoſition*, which is *order*.

AND as to thoſe compound ſentences, whoſe members follow each other in a direct order, without any inflexion, there is little art required in their compoſition.

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I ſhall produce one example of this kind from Cicero: *Natural reaſon inclines men to mutual converſe and ſociety; and implants in them a ſtrong affection for thoſe, who ſpring from them; and excites them to form communities, and join in public aſſemblies; and for theſe ends to endeavour to procure both the neceſſaries and conveniences of life; and that not for themſelves only, but likewiſe their wives, children, and others, who are dear to them, and have a right to their aſſiſtance* [1]. Here are five ſhort members in this ſentence, placed in a ſeries, without any inflexion of the parts, or orbit of the whole. And as ſuch ſentences have no other boundary, but the concluſion of the ſenſe, ſuited to the breath of the ſpeaker; he may either contract, or lengthen them at pleaſure, without offending the ear. So ſhould the ſentence laſt mentioned conclude with the firſt member, in this manner: *Natural reaſon inclines men to mutual converſe and ſociety:* the ſenſe would be perfect, and the ear ſatisfied. The caſe would be the ſame at the end of the ſecond member, thus; *Natural reaſon inclines men to mutual converſe and ſociety; and implants in them a ſtrong affection for thoſe, who ſpring from them.* And the like

[1] *Off. Lib.* i. *c.* 4.

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may be ſaid of the reſt. Since ſuch ſentences therefore may be thus limited at pleaſure, it ſeems more convenient both for the ſpeaker and hearers to confine them to a moderate length.

BUT becauſe the principal art, relating to this part of compoſition, lies in the frame and ſtructure of ſuch compound ſentences, as are properly called periods; I ſhall treat upon theſe ſomewhat more largely. In the formation of theſe periods, two things are cheifly to be regarded, their length and cadency. As the length ought to be ſuited to the breath of the ſpeaker, the antient rhetoricians ſcarce admit of more than four colons; by which we may here underſtand compound members of a moderate ſize, which will, I beleive, upon obſervation be generally found a ſuitable and proportionate length [1]. For to extend them farther, than the voice can well manage, muſt be painful to the ſpeaker, and of conſequence unpleaſant to the hearers. As to the cadency, what Cicero has obſerved, is found true by experience, that the ears judge what is full, and what is deficient; and direct us to fill up our periods, that nothing be wanting, of what they expect. When the voice is raiſed at

[1] Cic. *Orat.* c. 66.

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the begining of a ſentence, they are in ſuſpenſe till it be finiſhed; and are pleaſed with a full and juſt cadency, but are ſenſible of any defect, and are diſpleaſed with redundancy. Therefore care muſt be taken, that periods be neither deficient, and as it were maimed, that is, that they do not drop before their time, and defraud the ears, of what ſeemed to be promiſed them; nor, on the other hand, offend them by too long and immoderate excurſions [1]. This riſe and cadency of the voice in pronunciation, depend on the nature and ſituation of the members, as I ſhall endeavour to ſhew by particular inſtances; in the explication of which, by the word *members*, are to be underſtood ſuch as are compounded. In a period of two members, the turn of the voice begins with the latter member. Of this kind is the following ſentence of Cicero: *If impudence prevailed as much in the forum and courts of juſtice, as inſolence does in the country and places of leſs reſort*; Aulus Caecina *would ſubmit as much to the impudence of Sextus Ebutius in this cauſe, as he did before to his inſolence when aſſaulted by him* [2]. Here the cadency begins at the words *Aulus Caecina*. If a ſentence conſiſt of three members, the inflexion is beſt

[1] See Cic. *De clar. orat. c.* 8. & *Orat. c.* 50, & 53.

[2] *Pro Caecin. c.* 1.

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beſt made at the end of the ſecond member; for if it begin immediately after the firſt, the voice will either be apt to ſink too low, and not be heard, before it reach the end; or elſe be precipitated, in order to prevent it. Cicero begins his oration for Milo with a ſentence of this form: *Altho I fear, it may be a ſhame to be diſmayed at the entrance of my diſcourſe in defence of a moſt valiant man; and that it no ways becomes me, while Milo is more concerned for the ſafety of the ſtate than for himſelf, not to ſhew the ſame greatneſs of mind in his behalf:* yet *this new form of proſecution terrifies my eyes, which, whatever way they turn, want the antient cuſtom of the forum, and former manner of trials.* Here the cadency begining at the third member with the word *yet*, makes a proper diviſion of the ſentence, and eaſy for the ſpeaker. But a period of four members is reckoned the moſt complete and perfect, where the inflexion begins at the middle, that is, with the third member. Nor is it the ſame caſe here, as if in a ſentence of three members, the cadency be made at the ſecond. For in proportion to the time of raiſing the voice, may the ſpace be allowed for its ſinking. The following ſentence

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of Cicero gives us an inſtance of this, where he ſpeaks to his ſon: *Altho, ſon Mark, having now been an hearer of Cratippus for a year, and this at Athens, you ought to abound in the precepts and doctrines of philoſophy, by reaſon of the great character both of your inſtructor, and the city; one of which can furniſh you with knowledge, and the other with examples:* yet, *as I always to my advantage joined the Latin tongue with the Greek, and have done it not only in oratory, but likewiſe in philoſophy; I think you ought to do the ſame, that you may be equally converſant in both languages* [1]. The turn in this period begins at the word *yet*, which ſtanding near the middle, the voice is raiſed to that pitch in pronouncing the former part, as to admit of a gradual cadency, without being loſt, before the concluſion of the ſentence. But where the ſenſe does not ſuit with this diviſion at the entrance upon the third member, it is beſt made at the fourth. Such is the following ſentence of Cicero: *If I have any genius, which I am ſenſible how ſmall it is; or any readineſs in ſpeaking, wherein I do not deny, but I have been much converſant; or any ſkill in*

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[1] *De Off. Lib.* i. *c.* 1.

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in oratory, from an acquaintance with the beſt arts, to which I confeſs I have been always inclined: no one *has a better right to demand of me the fruit of all theſe things, than this Aulus Licinius*[1]. The cadency of this ſentence does not begin, till the words *no one*; yet it ends handſomly, and without diſappointing the ear. Tho indeed the three firſt members having each of them an inflexion, check the elevation of the voice, and by that variety in the pronunciation add to the harmony of the ſentence. An equality of the members ſhould likewiſe be attended to in the compoſition of a period, the better to adjuſt their riſe and cadency. And for this reaſon in ſentences of three members, where the cadency begins with the third; or in thoſe of four members, where it begins at the fourth; it promotes the harmony, to make the laſt member longeſt. This is properly the nature of rhetorical periods, which when rightly formed have both an equal beauty and dignity in their compoſition.

[1] *Pro Archia, c. 1.*

BUT, as all diſcourſe is made up of diſtinct ſentences, and whenever we expreſs our thoughts, it is in ſome of the forms

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above mentioned; ſo the uſe of them is not promiſcuous, but ſuited to anſwer different deſigns in ſpeaking. And in this view they are conſidered, and made uſe of by the orator, as will be ſhewn hereafter.

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Of Order.

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HAVING already diſcourſed upon the different forms and ſtructure of ſentences, I am next to conſider the conſtruction of the parts, of which they conſiſt. This rhetoricians call *Order*. And by this they mean the placing each word, and member of a ſentence, in ſuch a manner, as will moſt contribute to the force, beauty, or evidence of the whole. But regard muſt always be had to the genius and cuſtom of different languages. For that order is agreable to one language, which will not ſuit with another; as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew in the ſeries of this diſcourſe.

Now there are two kinds of *Order*, one of which may be called *natural*, and the other *artificial*. And each of theſe may be conſidered with reſpect to the parts either of ſimple, or compound ſentences.

As to ſimple ſentences, we may call that order *natural*, when all the words in a ſentence are ſo placed, as they are connected with, or follow each other, in a gram-

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grammatical conſtruction. And it may properly enough admit of this name, as it is founded in the nature of a propoſition; and the relation of the ſeveral words, of which it conſiſts, to each other. This I explained in my laſt diſcourſe, and illuſtrated by proper examples; and ſhall therefore only give one inſtance of it here, to introduce the ſubject I am now upon. And it is this: *The fame of Iſocrates excited Ariſtotle to the profeſſion of oratory.* Here theſe words, *the fame of Iſocrates*, contain the ſubject of this ſentence, with what relates to it; and all thoſe which follow, *excited Ariſtotle to the profeſſion of oratory*, make up the predicate, and its dependants. And in both parts each word grammatically conſidered ſtands in its proper order of conſtruction. And this ſeems agreable to the natural way of conveying our thoughts, which leads us firſt to expreſs the ſubject, or thing, of which ſome other thing is ſaid, before the predicate, or that which is ſaid concerning it; and with reſpect to both, as every idea ſucceedes another in the order of our conceptions, to range it in the ſame order, when we communicate them to others. Our language in the general keeps pretty much

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much to this method. But in one thing particularly it recedes from it; and that is, in placing adjectives, which denote the properties of things, before their ſubſtantives or ſubjects, whoſe properties they are. As when it is ſaid: *Evil communication corrupts good manners.* And this we always do, except ſomething follows, which depends upon the adjective. So we ſay: *He was a man eminent for his virtue*, not, *an eminent man.*

ARTIFICIAL order, as it reſpects ſimple ſentences, has little or no regard to the natural conſtruction of words; but diſpoſes them in ſuch a manner, as will be moſt agreable to the ear, and beſt anſwer the deſign of the ſpeaker. The Latins take a much greater liberty in this reſpect, than we do, or the nature of our language will permit. Quintilian ſais, it is beſt for the verb to ſtand laſt, when there is no particular reaſon to the contrary. And he gives this reaſon for it, *becauſe the force of the ſentence lies in the verb* [1]. So that according to him, they ſeem to have had this view in puting the verb at the end; that as the whole ſentence is imperfect without the verb, the mind being thus held in ſuſpence might receive the deeper impreſſion

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

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from it at laſt. They likewiſe ſeparate ſuch words, as have an immediate relation between them, or dependance one upon another; and place any of them firſt or laſt, as they pleaſe. In ſhort, their order ſeems in a manner arbitrary, if it does not break in upon perſpicuity, to which they uſually attend. But moſt of theſe things are unſuitable to the genius of our language. One might ſay indeed: *Convince him he cannot*, inſtead of ſaying: *He cannot convince him.* Or: *With my own eyes I ſaw it*, for, *I ſaw it with my own eyes.* And again: *In proportion to the increaſe of luxury the Roman ſtate declined*, for, *The Roman ſtate declined in proportion to the increaſe of luxury.* But the inverſion of the words in the former order of theſe expreſſions, doth not ſound ſo kindly to an Engliſh ear, which is not accuſtomed to ſuch a manner of ſpeaking.

As to compound ſentences, that is, ſuch as conſiſt of two or more members, either ſimple or compounded; what relates to the words in each member ſeparately, is the ſame, as in ſimple ſentences. But with regard to the diſpoſition of the ſeveral members, that may be called the *natural* order, which ſo places them, as they mu-

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tually depend on each other. Thus the antecedent member naturally precedes the relative. As in this expreſſion: *Men are apt to forgive themſelves, what they blame in others.* In hypothetical ſentences the conditional member naturally ſtands firſt. Thus: *If Socrates be a rational creature, he is a man.* That member, which expreſſes the effect of an action, naturally comes laſt. As: *Tho you offer never ſo good reaſons, you will not prevail with him.* The like may be ſaid of time, with regard to things done in it. As: *The Roman eloquence ſoon declined, when Cicero was dead.* And to name no more, the reaſon of a thing naturally follows that, of which it is the reaſon. As thus: *All the pleaſures of life muſt be uncertain, ſince life itſelf is not ſecure.*

WHEN this order is inverted, it may be ſtiled *artificial.* So to keep to the inſtances already given, the two members in the firſt ſentence may be thus inverted: *What they blame in others, men are apt to forgive themſelves.* In the ſecond in this manner: *Socrates is a man, if he be a rational creature.* In the third thus: *You will not prevail with him, tho you offer never ſo good reaſons.* And ſo in the reſt. As: *When Cicero*

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Cicero was dead, the Roman eloquence ſoon declined. And: *Since life itſelf is not ſecure, all the pleaſures of life muſt be uncertain.* The variety of inverſions in a ſentence may generally be greater or leſs, in proportion to the number of its members. In the following ſentence of Cicero, the natural order ſeems to be this: *If that greatneſs of mind be void of juſtice, which ſhews itſelf in dangers and labors, it is blameable.* Which may be varied by changing the place of the firſt and third member, in the following manner: *That greatneſs of mind is blameable, which ſhews itſelf in dangers and labors, if it want juſtice.* Or by altering the place of all the three members thus: *That greatneſs of mind is blameable, if it be void of juſtice, which ſhews itſelf in dangers and labors.* But oftentimes one member may be included in another, as in the inſtance here given: *If that greatneſs of mind, which ſhews itſelf in dangers and labors, be void of juſtice, it is blameable.* Here the relative member is included in the conditional, which is placed firſt, and the antecedent member follows both. But in Cicero it ſtands thus: *That greatneſs of mind, which ſhews itſelf in dangers and labors, if it want juſtice, is blameable* [1]. [1] *De Off. Lib.* i. *c.* 19.

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Where the relative and conditional members are both included in the antecedent member. The Latin tongue commonly admits of a much greater variety in the tranſpoſition of members, as well as in that of ſingle words, than ſuits with our idiom. In the following ſentence the natural order is much preferable, as it beſt ſuits with the proper elevation and cadency of the voice in its pronunciation: *I am willing to remit all that is paſt, provided it may be done with ſafety.* But ſhould we invert the members, and ſay: *Provided it may be done with ſafety, I am willing to remit all that is paſt:* the harmony of the cadency would be loſt. And if the latter member be included in the former, the alteration will ſtill be worſe. As: *I am willing, provided it may be done with ſafety, to forgive all that is paſt.* Here the inflection of the voice falls upon the ſame member as before, and deſtroys the beauty of the period by its elevation afterwards. Some ſentences admit of no involution of their members. Such are thoſe, whoſe members are connected by conjunctive or disjunctive particles. As: *Virtue furniſhes the mind with the trueſt pleaſure in proſperity, and affords it the greateſt comfort in adverſity.* And;

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A wiſe man is neither elated by proſperity, nor depreſſed by adverſity. And the like may be ſaid of thoſe, where the latter member begins with ſome illative or reditive particle. As in theſe inſtances: *The cheif thing to be regarded in life is virtue, for all other things are vain and uncertain.* And: *Tho fortune is always inconſtant, yet ſhe has many votaries.* Neither of the members in any of theſe ways of expreſſion, and ſome others, which might be named, can be included one in the other. In all the examples hitherto given, the ſentences conſiſt only of ſimple members; and indeed compound members are not ſo often inverted, nor included one in another, by reaſon of their length. However I ſhall here produce one inſtance of each: *Whoever conſiders the uncertainty of human affairs, and how frequently the greateſt hopes are fruſtrated; he will ſee juſt reaſon to be always on his guard, and not place too much dependance upon things ſo precarious.* This ſentence conſiſts of two compound members, which here ſtand in their natural order, but may be thus inverted: *He will ſee juſt reaſon to be always on his guard, and not place too much dependance on things ſo precarious; whoever conſiders the uncertainty*

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of human affairs, and how often the greateſt hopes are fruſtrated. In the following ſentence one compound member is included in another: *Let us not conclude, while dangers are at a diſtance, and do not immediately approach us, that we are ſecure; unleſs we uſe all neceſſary precaution to prevent them.* Here the natural order would be: *While dangers are at a diſtance, and do not immediately approach us; let us not conclude, that we are ſecure; unleſs we uſe all neceſſary precaution to prevent them.*

BUT there are ſome other conſiderations relating to order, which being taken from the nature of things, equally ſuit all languages. So in amplifying there ſhould be a conſtant gradation from a leſs to a greater. As when Cicero ſais: *Ambition creates hatred, ſhyneſs, diſcords, ſeditions, and wars* [1]. On the contrary, in extenuating we ſhould deſcend from a greater to a leſs. As if ſpeaking of the antient laws of Rome one ſhould ſay: *They were ſo far from ſuffering a Roman citizen to be put to death, that they would not allow him to be whipt, or even to be bound* [2]. In conſtituting any whole we put the parts firſt. As: *Invention, diſpoſition, elocution, and pronunciation, make up the art of oratory.* But in ſeparating any whole

[1] *De fin. Lib.* 1. *c.* 13.

[2] *In Verr. c.* 66.

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whole the parts follow. As: *The art of oratory may be divided into theſe four parts; invention, diſpoſition, elocution, and pronunciation.* In every enumeration care muſt be taken not to mix the whole with the parts; but if it be mentioned at all, it muſt either be put firſt, or laſt. So it would be wrong to ſay: *He was a man of the greateſt prudence, virtue, juſtice, and modeſty.* For the word *virtue* here contains in it the other three, and therefore ſhould not be inſerted among them.

THESE are the principal things neceſſary to be obſerved with regard to order. There are others, which might be mentioned; but they will readily offer themſelves to thoſe, who attend to this ſubject. And there are ſome ſo variable and uncertain, that they are ſcarce reducible to any fixed rules; and may therefore be more eaſily acquired by uſe and obſervation. Variety is always neceſſary, for the moſt accurate and exact compoſition, if it return too often, will be unpleaſant. And therefore, notwithſtanding Quintilian recommends it as beſt in the Latin tongue to end a ſentence with the verb; yet it would be wrong, and contrary to the uſage of the beſt writers, always to keep to this, or in-

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deed too frequently. Beſides, the ſame accuracy is not at all times neceſſary; but regard muſt be had to the nature of the diſcourſe, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew hereafter.

In treating upon this ſubject I have been more particular in obſerving the analogy between our language, and the Latin; becauſe there ſeems to me no better way of diſcovering the genius, and peculiar properties of any language, than by comparing it with others. And we cannot but perceive, from what has been ſaid, that our compoſition is in this part of it much more limited and confined, than the Latin. The natural order is certainly more plain and eaſy; but yet it muſt be owned, that the other has its advantages, and thoſe very conſiderable. The language both of the Greeks and Romans has more ſtrength, as well as harmony, than any modern tongue; which is owing in a good meaſure to this liberty in their compoſition. For by giving their periods the fineſt turn, and placing the moſt ſignificant words, where they may ſtrike the mind with the greateſt force; at the ſame time they both delight the ear, and excite the attention. Soon after learning began to revive in Europe, and to

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diſpel thoſe clouds of ignorance, which had overſpread it for ſeveral ages before, the ſtudy of the antient languages was very much purſued, as the neceſſary key to all uſeful knowledge. At which time many learned men began to cultivate the language of their own country, both in foreign parts, and here in England. And ſome among us endeavoured to reduce our tongue, as near as they could, to the Latin, as in other things, ſo likewiſe in the compoſition of ſentences. However this did not meet with the deſired ſucceſs, but rendered their ſtile very harſh and ſtiff, and often obſcure; as appears by the works of ſome eminent writers in that age. Nor have ſome later attempts of that kind been able to reconcile it to an Engliſh ear. And indeed our language is not ſuited to all the varieties in this reſpect, which the Latin tongue admits of from the different terminations of the declinable words. I will illuſtrate this by one plain inſtance. In Latin theſe three forms of expreſſion, *Ariſtoteles docuit rhetoricam*, and, *Rhetoricam docuit Ariſtoteles*, and, *Docuit Ariſtoteles rhetoricam*, have all one ſenſe; the ſame, as when I ſay in Engliſh, *Ariſtotle taught rhetoric*. But with us, if the words are placed in the

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the ſecond form, *Rhetoric taught Ariſtotle*; the ſenſe is abſurd. And in the laſt, *Taught Ariſtotle rhetoric*, they make only an imperfect ſentence without a ſubject. But now in the Latin, the word *Ariſtoteles* being limited to the ſubject, and *rhetoricam* to the predicate, by their terminations, the ſenſe remains the ſame, in whatever order the words are placed. So great is the advantage of a language to be thus formed.

UPON the whole therefore; in Engliſh the nearer we keep to the natural or grammatical order, it is generally beſt; but in Latin we are to follow the uſe of the beſt writers; a joint regard being always had to the judgement of the ear, and perſpicuity of the ſenſe, in both languages.

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LECTURE XXIV.

Of Juncture and Number.

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QUINTILIAN ſpeaking of compoſition, repreſents a diſcourſe, as very happy in that reſpect, when the *Order*, *Juncture*, and *Number*, are all juſt and proper [1]. The firſt of theſe, which gives rules for the due placing of the words, and members of a ſentence, I made the ſubject of my laſt lecture. The other two relate to letters and ſyllables, the former treating of their connection, and the latter of their quantity. I propoſe therefore to give ſome account of both theſe in my preſent diſcourſe, and ſhall begin with *Juncture*.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

BUT before I enter upon this, it will be proper to take notice of ſome conditions, which are neceſſary to render the ſounds of words and ſyllables agreable in their pronunciation; as likewiſe of the force and power of the different ſorts of letters, which compoſe them.

AND with regard to ſounds, it is requiſite in the firſt place, they ſhould be moderate; that is, ſoft, and yet clear and diſtinct. For harſh and rough ſounds grate

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upon the ears, and by that means give them offence; and if they are too low or confuſed, they diſpleaſe, by not being fully and clearly perceived. And the caſe is the ſame with reſpect to the other ſenſes, which feel the moſt agreable ſenſations from ſuch things, as act upon them with moderation. Sweet things are ſoft to the tongue, and ſo create a pleaſure; whereas ſour things give pain, by being too pungent; and thoſe things, whoſe parts are too blunt to excite a ſenſation, are therefore inſipid. So likewiſe moderate light is moſt agreable to the eyes; and that which is either too ſtrong, or too feeble, is offenſive. And the like may be ſaid of the reſt of the ſenſes. Again, ſounds muſt have a certain equality and proportion, to render them agreable. Unequal ſounds, that ſtrike the organ ſtrongly or weakly, ſwiftly or ſlowly, by frequent and ſudden changes from one to the other, without a due proportion, can never be grateful. Laſtly, a variety is requiſite, in conjunction with their proportion or ſymmetry. This is a neceſſary ingredient of pleaſure, for ſimilitude and a conſtant return of the ſame thing ſoon cloys. And it is this conjunction of a proportionate equality with variety,

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which conſtitutes all harmony. Theſe conditions are indeed neceſſary in ſounds of all kinds, to render them pleaſant and delightful. But my buſineſs is to conſider them only, as they relate to diſcourſe. There is a natural ſympathy between the ears of the hearer, and the voice of the ſpeaker; inſomuch that whatever is difficult to pronounce, is painful to hear. We find this very evidently in thoſe, who have an impediment or heſitation in their ſpeech. When they attempt to ſpeak, it gives an uneaſineſs to thoſe about them. From whence it is plain, that no diſcourſe can be attended to with pleaſure, which is not ſo compoſed, as to be ſpoken with eaſe.

As to the letters, ſome have a ſmoother, and others a harſher ſound. All the vowels have a ſofter pronunciation, than the conſonants; for which reaſon it is neceſſary in the formation of words, that the roughneſs of the latter ſhould be duly attempered with a juſt proportion of the former. But tho all the vowels are ſofter than the conſonants, yet they differ conſiderably from each other in that reſpect. *A*, *o*, and *u*, have generally a much ſtronger and broader ſound, than *e*, and *i*. As to the conſonants, thoſe are hardeſt, which end with

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the ſound of the vowel, and are therefore called mutes, as *b*, *c*, *d*, *g*, *k*, *p*, *q*, and *t*; of which *c*, *k*, and *q*, may be conſidered as the ſame letter. The other ſingle conſonants, which begin with the ſound of the vowel, being ſofter, are for that reaſon called half vowels, as *f*, *h*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, and *s*. *X* and *z* are double conſonants, the former of which has the force of *cs*, and the latter of *ds*. And ſome letters are both vowels and conſonants in a different ſituation, as *i*, *u*, *w*, and *y*. Beſides, moſt of the letters are very differently pronounced, and have a variety of ſounds, harder or ſofter, fuller or ſmaller, longer or ſhorter, in different words. Now there are ſeveral organs of ſpeech, whoſe action is not only different, but ſometimes contrary, in pronouncing the letters, and their various combinations, both in the forming of ſeparate words, and their connection in ſentences. Thus the lips are drawn backward in pronouncing the three firſt vowels, *a*, *e*, and *i*; and puſhed forward in the two laſt, *o*, and *u*. *P*, and *b*, are called labials, becauſe they principally require the action of the lips, which are firſt cloſed, and then opened again, in their pronunciation. *C*, and *g*, are termed dentals, from the agency of

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the teeth; and *t*, and *d*, linguals, from that of the tongue; but they all four draw back the lips, when they are pronounced. Beſides, *p*, *c*, and *t*, require leſs force of the organ in ſounding them; than *b*, *g*, and *d*. Now it is the different mixture of the letters and ſyllables in the make of the words, ſuited to the action of the ſeveral organs of ſpeech, that in a good meaſure renders the harmony of one language greater than another. The Engliſh tongue abounds with conſonants, and therefore cannot but ſeem harſh and ruged to thoſe, whoſe ears have been accuſtomed to ſofter ſounds. Indeed uſe makes this leſs obſervable to us, unleſs when we compare it with other languages, which are ſmoother (as thoſe are in the more ſouthern climates) and then we ſoon perceive the difference. Tho of late years, it muſt be owned, that our tongue has in this reſpect, as well as others, been very much improved and poliſhed by perſons of the fineſt taſte, and moſt exact judgement. But in order to render the ſound of words more ſmooth and eaſy, it has been cuſtomary in all languages to take out, and put in letters, or to ſubſtitute one in the place of another. And the more any language has

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been cultivated, the more commonly has this been practiſed. And therefore, as the Greeks ſeem to have been moſt careful to improve and perfect their language, they have taken the greateſt liberties in this reſpect. They often put one vowel for another, or unite them into diphthongs; and in like manner, with regard to the conſonants, they frequently change, inſert, or remove them. And this they do both in the inflexion of their ſimple words, and the formation of ſuch as are compounded. By which means they not only increaſe the variety of ſounds in the pronunciation of their words, but likewiſe promote their harmony. Examples of all theſe things might eaſily be given from their writers, were they ſuitable to an Engliſh diſcourſe. The Latins copied after them in ſome meaſure, but not to the ſame degree, nor will their language admit of it. But it is doubtleſs from a regard to the ſound, which makes them ſay *abſtineo* for *abtineo*, and *prodes* for *proes*, by inſerting a letter; and by droping one to ſay *coheres* for *conheres*; as alſo to alter *abfero* into *aufero*, *adlego* to *allego*; with many other inſtances of the like nature. We take the ſame method likewiſe in ſome caſes. As when

when we ſay *mirrour* for *mirour* to ſtrengthen the ſound, *can't* for *cannot* to eaſe it, and *knives* for *knifes* to ſoften it. And the French do this more than we. But this is not properly the ſubject, I now propoſe to treat on; tho it may help to illuſtrate, and ſhew the uſe of it. For an orator muſt take the words of a language, as he finds them; tho he may place them in ſuch a manner, as will render the pronunciation moſt eaſy and pleaſant, and beſt promote the harmony of the ſentence; which, ſo far as it relates to letters and ſyllables, is what rhetoricians call *Juncture*.

Now the method of doing this conſiſts in three things; a due attendance to the nature of the vowels, conſonants, and ſyllables in the connexion of words, with regard to the ſound: each of which I ſhall conſider diſtinctly.

As to the firſt, when a word ends with a vowel, and the next begins either with a different vowel, or the ſame repeated, it uſually renders the pronunciation hollow and unpleaſant. For, as Quintilian has juſtly obſerved: *This makes a chaſm in the ſentence, and ſtops the courſe of it* [1]. For there muſt be ſome pauſe, in order to

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

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pronounce them both, or otherwiſe the ſound of one will be loſt. So, for inſtance, in pronouncing theſe words, *the other day*, unleſs you ſtop a little after the word *the*, the ſound of *e* will not be heard. And if it is dropt, it will occaſion a rougher ſound, from the aſpiration of *th* twice repeated ſo near together, as *th' other day*. Therefore to prevent both theſe inconveniences, we uſually ſay, *t'other day*. But the different conſonants, which together with the vowels make up thoſe ſyllables, often cauſe a conſiderable difference in the pronunciation, ſo as to render it more or leſs agreable. As, if I ſay, *he over did it*, the words *he over* have not ſo harſh a ſound, as *the other*; tho ſtill they require ſome pauſe to keep them diſtinct. Beſides ſome vowels meet more amicably, and admit of a ſofter pronunciation, than others. Thoſe which have the weakeſt and ſmalleſt ſound, follow beſt; becauſe they occaſion the leaſt alteration of the organ in forming the two ſounds. Such are *e* and *i*; and therefore without any chaſm in the ſound, or heſitation of the voice, we ſay, *he is*. But where the action of the organ is greater, and the ſound ſtronger, the pronunciation is more difficult: as when we ſay, *tho all*.

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For here is a contrary motion of the lips, which are firſt put forward in ſounding the *o*, and then drawn backward to pronounce the *a*; and therefore the ſound is much ſofter to ſay, *tho every*, where their action is leſs. And the like ill effect commonly happens from the repetition of the ſame vowel: as if I ſay, *go on*, or, *you uſually act thus*. There is a conſiderable difference between theſe two expreſſions, in repeating the ſound of the vowel, and where either of them is doubled in a ſingle word. For then the ſame ſound only is protracted by one continued motion of the organ; as in the words *good*, and *deem*. But here the ſound is repeated again by a new action of the organ, which, if precipitated, obſcures the ſound of one of the vowels, and, if too much retarded, makes a chaſm in the pronunciation; either of which is unpleaſant to the ear.

BUT as the coalition of two vowels occaſions an hollow and obſcure ſound, ſo the meeting of ſome conſonants renders it very harſh and rough. Thus the words *king Xerxes*, and *public good*, when ſo placed, have not only a roughneſs, but likewiſe a difficulty in their pronunciation, from the contrary action of the lips; which

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in the former are firſt drawn back and then forward, but in the latter the contrary way, and in both of them with ſome conſiderable force. But this may very eaſily be avoided, by ſaying, with a little alteration in the words, *Xerxes the king*, and *the good of the public*. So likewiſe the words *ill company* have a ſofter ſound, than *bad company*, for the ſame reaſon. To multiply inſtances of this kind ſeems unneceſſary, which ſo frequently occur in all diſcourſe.

THE repetition of the ſame ſyllable, at the end and begining of words, is the laſt thing to be conſidered. And a little obſervation will convince us, that where this happens, it generally renders the ſound either confuſed, or unpleaſant. Cicero was often rallied on account of this verſe:

O fortunatam natam me conſule Romam [1].

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

Every one will eaſily perceive a diſagreable ſound in the following expreſſion: *A man many times does that unadviſedly, of which he afterwards repents.* The chime of the words *man many* both ſeems affected, and diſpleaſes the ear. But this will ſoon be remedied, if we ſeparate thoſe two words, and ſay, *A man does that many times unadviſedly*.

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FROM the ſhort account here given of this part of compoſition it is eaſy to perceive, what things are neceſſary to render it moſt complete and accurate; which are theſe following. If a word end with a vowel, the next ought to begin with a conſonant; or ſuch a vowel, whoſe ſound may agree well with the former. But if a word conclude with a conſonant, either a vowel ſhould follow; or ſuch a conſonant, whoſe pronunciation will ſuit with it. And laſtly, the ſame ſyllable ought not to be repeated at the end of one word, and the begining of the next. It has been obſerved by ſome critics, that the following verſe at the begining of Virgil's *Eneid*, has all theſe properties.

Arma virumque cano, Trojae qui primus ab oris.

Where any word in this verſe ends with a vowel, the next begins with a conſonant; and where any one ends with a conſonant, the next begins with a vowel; and there is no repetition of the ſame ſound throughout the whole. But this is what rarely happens, eſpecially in our language, which abounds with conſonants. And what Quintilian ſais of the coalition of vowels, in treating upon this ſubject, ſeems applicable

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cable to the whole. *This*, ſais he, *is a thing not much to be dreaded, and I know not whether the neglect of it, or too great a concern about it, be worſe. It neceſſarily checks the vigor of the mind, and diverts it from matters of greater importance. And therefore, as it ſhews negligence to permit it; ſo to be in conſtant fear of it diſcovers a low genius* [1]. This was the opinion of that judicious writer. And as theſe things cannot always be attended to, it may be ſufficient to avoid them, where they prove very offenſive to the ear, and it may be done without ſome greater inconvenience. So in this ſentence, *Honeſty is the beſt policy*, the coalition of *t* and *p* in the two laſt words *beſt policy* produce a roughneſs in their pronunciation; but as the expreſſion is ſtrong, and cannot perhaps be well altered for the better, the ſound here ought to give way to the ſenſe.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 4.

I COME now to the fourth and laſt part of *Compoſition*, which is called *Number*. And this reſpects the quantity of ſyllables, as *Juncture* does their quality. In the Greek and Roman languages every ſyllable has its diſtinct quantity; and is either long, ſhort, or common: two or more of which joined together in a certain order

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make a foot; and a determinate number of theſe in a different order conſtitute their ſeveral ſorts of metre. This variety of ſounds gives a much greater harmony to their poetry; than what can ariſe only from the ſeat of the accent, and the ſimilitude of ſound at the end of two verſes, which cheifly regulate our metre. And altho their proſe was not ſo confined with regard to the feet, either as to the kind or place of them, as their metrical compoſitions; yet it had a ſort of meaſure, more eſpecially in the riſe and cadency of their periods. This they call *rhetorical number*. And accordingly the antient writers upon this art acquaint us, what feet are beſt ſuited to the begining, middle, or concluſion of a ſentence. Such rules are not applicable to our language, which has not that accurate diſtinction of quantity in its ſyllables. For we are apt to confound accent with quantity, and pronounce thoſe ſyllables longeſt, on which we lay the accent, tho in their nature they are not ſo. As in the word *ádmirable*, where none but the firſt ſyllable *ad* is pronounced long; tho that is only rendered ſo by poſition, and the two following are ſo by nature. And again, in the word *ávaríce*, we ſound

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the firſt *a* long for the ſame reaſon, and the ſecond ſhort; contrary to the nature of both thoſe vowels. However I ſhall offer a few things, that may be of ſome uſe to modulate our periods, and adjuſt their cadency.

A GREAT number of monoſyllables do not ſtand well together. For as there ought to be a greater diſtance in the pronunciation between one word and another, than between the ſyllables of the ſame word; ſuch pauſes, tho ſhort, yet when too frequent, make the ſound rough and uneven, and by that means ſpoil its harmony. And this may ſeem more neceſſary to be attended to, becauſe the Engliſh language abounds ſo much with monoſyllables. On the contrary, a continuation of many long words makes a ſentence move too ſlow and heavily. And therefore ſuch periods generally run beſt, which have a proper mixture of words of a different length. Beſides, as every word has its accent, which with us ſtands for quantity; a number either of monoſyllables, or long words, coming together ſo far abates the harmony, as it leſſens the variety.

AGAIN, ſeveral words of the ſame ending do not ſtand well together, eſpecially where

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the accent falls upon the ſame ſyllable in each of them. For this creates too great a jingle by the ſimilitude of ſound; and is apt to diſpleaſe, from an appearance of affectation. Of this kind is the following ſentence: *Nothing is more wélcome, delíghtſome, or whóleſome, than reſt to a wearied man.* In ſuch expreſſions therefore, if the order of the words cannot well be altered; ſome other word ſhould be ſubſtituted in the room of one of them at leaſt, to diverſify the ſound. So in the example here given, the ſound might be varied by ſaying: *Nothing is more wélcome, pleáſant, or whóleſome.*

BUT to add no more, if a ſentence end with a monoſyllable, it is apt to hurt the cadency, and diſappoint the ear; whereas words of a moderate length carry a greater force with them, by the fulneſs of their ſound, and afford the ear what it expected. And there is one ſort of monoſyllables more eſpecially, which never ſtands well at the concluſion of a period, tho we frequently find it there; and that is the ſigns of caſes. Thus we ſay: *Avarice is a crime, which wiſe men are too often guilty óf.* But the cadency would doubtleſs be more agreable, if it was altered thus: *Avarice is a crime,*

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crime, of which wiſe men are too often gúilty. Every one muſt perceive, when the accent falls upon the laſt ſyllable in the ſentence, as it does, if it end with *óf*, the ſound is not ſo pleaſant, as when it reſts upon the preceding ſyllable in the word *gúilty*. Nor are very long words well ſuited, either to the begining or concluſion of a period; for they retard the pronunciation at firſt, and fall too heavy at the end.

THESE obſervations may ſuffice for our conduct, in what relates to number, ſo far as it agrees with the genius of our language. But this, and all the parts of compoſition, ſhould be ſo managed, as may beſt ſuit the nature of the ſubject, and deſign of the ſpeaker. Long and full periods, a juſt order, ſmooth connection, and flowing numbers, are not always requiſite. Nay ſometimes the neglect of accuracy is itſelf a beauty. And even harſh and rough ſounds, when moſt expreſſive of thoſe ideas, they are deſigned to convey, ought to be choſen. But of theſe things I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more largely hereafter, in their proper place.

LECTURE XXV.

Of Dignity, and particularly of Tropes.

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HAVING finiſhed the two firſt parts of *Elocution*, I now procede to the third and laſt part, which is called *Dignity*, and conſiſts in the right uſe of *Tropes* and *Figures*. It is not ſufficient for an orator to expreſs himſelf with propriety and clearneſs, or in ſmooth and harmonious periods; but his language muſt likewiſe be ſuited to the nature and importance of the ſubject. And therefore as *Elegance* gives rules for the firſt of theſe, and *Compoſition* for the ſecond; ſo does *Dignity* for the laſt of them. It is very evident, that different ſubjects require a different ſtile and manner of expreſſion; ſince, as Quintilian ſais, *What is magnificent in one diſcourſe, would be turgid in another; and thoſe expreſſions, which appear low upon a ſublime ſubject, would ſuit leſſer matters; and as in a florid harangue a mean word is remarkable, and like a blemiſh, ſo any thing lofty and bright upon a trivial argument is diſproportionate, and like a tumour upon an even ſurface* [1]. Now this variety in the manner of expreſſion

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 3.

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preſſion ariſes in a great meaſure from *Tropes* and *Figures*, which not only inliven and beautify a diſcourſe, but give it likewiſe force and grandeur; for which reaſon this part of elocution ſeems to have been called *Dignity*.

TROPES and *Figures* are diſtinguiſhed from each other in ſeveral reſpects. *Tropes* moſtly affect ſingle words, but *Figures* whole ſentences. A *Trope* conveys two ideas to the mind by means of one word, but a *Figure* throws the ſentence into a different form from the common, and uſual manner of expreſſion. Beſides, *Tropes* are cheifly deſigned to repreſent our thoughts, but *Figures* our paſſions. In treating upon this ſubject, I ſhall begin with *Tropes*. And that I may procede in the moſt regular and eaſy method, I ſhall firſt conſider the nature of *Tropes* in general, with the ſeveral kinds or ſpecies of them; then aſſign the reaſons, which have occaſioned their uſe; and laſtly, lay down ſome directions, proper to be obſerved in the choice of them.

A TROPE then, as it has been uſually defined, is, *the change of a word from its proper ſignification to ſome other with advantage* [1]. The words *with advantage* are added

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 5.

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added in the definition, becauſe a *Trope* ought not to be choſen; unleſs there is ſome good reaſon for uſing it rather than the proper word. But in what manner, or how far, it can be ſaid of all *Tropes* in general, that they change the proper ſignification of words, will beſt appear by conſidering the nature of each kind of them ſeparately. Now in every *Trope* a reference is had to two things, which occaſions two ideas, one of the thing expreſſed, and another of that thing, to which it has a reſpect, and is ſupplied by the mind. For all *Tropes* are taken either from things internally related, as the whole and a part; or externally, as cauſe and effect, ſubject and adjunct; or from ſome ſimilitude, that is found between them; or from a contrariety. The firſt of theſe is called *Synecdoche*, the ſecond *Metonymy*, the third *Metaphor*, and the laſt *Irony*. I will endeavour to illuſtrate this by examples. When I ſay, *Hannibal beat the Romans*, the meaning is, that Hannibal and his army did this. So that altho in ſome ſenſe a part may here be ſaid to ſtand for the whole, which makes it a *Synecdoche*; yet ſtrictly ſpeaking the word *Hannibal* does not alter its ſenſe, but there is an ellipſis in the ex-

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preſſion, Hannibal being put for himſelf and his army. But if I ſay, *Cicero ſhould be read by all lovers of eloquence*, here indeed the word *Cicero* appears to be changed from its proper ſenſe, and to ſignify the books of Cicero, which is a *Metonymy*, the author being put for his works; and therefore ſuch expreſſions need not be deemed elliptical. Again, if any one ſpeaking of a ſubtle and crafty man, ſhould ſay, *He is a fox*, the meaning is, he is like a fox, which is a *Metaphor*, where the word *fox* retains its proper ſenſe, and denotes that animal, to which the man is compared on account of his craft. Laſtly, if a perſon ſay to another, *Well done*, meaning that the thing was ill done, the word *well* keeps its own ſenſe, but from the manner of its pronunciation, or ſome other circumſtance attending the expreſſion, it will be evident, that the contrary is intended, which is called an *Irony*. From theſe inſtances it may appear, in what latitude we muſt underſtand the common definition of a *Trope*, which makes it to conſiſt in the change of a word from its proper ſenſe into ſome other. But tho in reality there are but four kinds of *Tropes*, which are diſtinguiſhed by ſo many different reſpects, which things bear

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bear one to another; yet as theſe ſeveral reſpects are found in a variety of ſubjects, and attended with different circumſtances, the names of *Tropes* have from hence been greatly multiplied; which however may all be refered to ſome or other of thoſe already mentioned, as will be ſhewn, when I come to treat of them in their order. And for diſtinction ſake I ſhall call the former *primary* and the latter *ſecondary Tropes*.

I NOW procede to conſider the reaſons, which have occaſioned the introduction of *Tropes*. And theſe, as Quintilian obſerves, are three; *Neceſſity*, *Emphaſis*, and *Beauty*.

TROPES were firſt introduced from *Neceſſity*, becauſe no language contains a ſufficient number of proper words, to expreſs all the different conceptions of our minds. The mind conſiders the ſame thing various ways, views it in different lights, compares it with other things, and obſerves their ſeveral relations and affections, wherein they agree, and in what they differ. From all which reflections it is furniſhed with almoſt an infinite number of ideas; which cannot all of them be diſtinguiſhed and expreſſed by proper words, ſince new ones occur daily. And were this poſſible, yet would it be

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impracticable; becauſe the multitude of words muſt be ſo vaſtly great, that the memory could not retain them, and be able to recall them as occaſion required. *Tropes* have in a good meaſure redreſſed both theſe inconveniences; for by means of them the mind is not burdened with a numberleſs ſtock of different words, and yet nothing ſeems to want a name. Thus ſometimes, where a word is wanting to expreſs any particular thing, it is clearly enough repreſented by the name of ſome other thing, by reaſon of the ſimilitude between them. At other times the cauſe is ſignified by the effect, the ſubject by the adjunct; or the contrary. And the whole is often underſtood by a part, or a part by the whole. And thus by the uſe of *Tropes* the mind is helped to conceive of ſomething not expreſſed, from that which is expreſſed. It is much the ſame caſe, as when we have occaſion to ſpeak of a perſon, whoſe name we are either unacquainted with, or have forgot; for by deſcribing his perſon, abode, or ſome other circumſtances relating to him, thoſe we converſe with as well underſtand whom we mean, as if we mentioned his name. So the ſhepherd in Virgil, when he could not think of the name

of

of Archimedes, deſcribes him by his works: LECT. XXV.

And what's his name, who form'd the
ſphere,
And ſhew'd the ſeaſons of the ſliding year[1]?

[1] *Ecl.* iii. *v.* 40.

Beſides, it ſometimes happens in a diſcourſe, that thoſe things are neceſſary to be ſaid, which, if expreſſed in their proper terms, would be offenſive; but being clothed with metaphors, may be conveyed to the mind with decency.

A SECOND reaſon above mentioned for the uſe of *Tropes* was, *Emphaſis*. *Tropes* do many times expreſs things with greater force and evidence, than can be done by proper words. We receive much the greateſt part of our knowledge by our ſenſes. And ſimilitudes taken from ſenſible things, as in metaphors, very much aſſiſt the mind in its reflections upon thoſe things, which do not come under the cognizance of the ſenſes. For it is certain, that we are ſooner, and more ſtrongly affected with ſenſible objects; than with ſuch things, of which we can have no ideas but from the internal operations of our own minds. Nay ſometimes one bright and lively *Trope* ſhall convey a fuller, and more juſt idea of a thing, than a large periphraſis. So when

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Virgil calls the Scipios, *two thunderbolts of war* [1], he gives us a more lively image of the rapid force, and ſpeedy ſucceſs of their arms, than could have been conveyed by a long deſcription in plain words. And in many caſes the tropical uſe of words is ſo emphatical, and ſuited to the idea we deſign to excite; that in this reſpect it may be juſtly eſteemed the moſt proper. So, *incenſed with anger, inflamed with deſire, fallen into an error*, are all metaphorical expreſſions, uſed in a way of ſimilitude; and yet perhaps no proper words can be made uſe of, which will convey a more lively image of the thing, we deſign to repreſent by them.

[1] *Aen. Lib.* vi. *v.* 842.

BUT *Beauty* and ornament, as was obſerved before, has been another cauſe of the uſe of *Tropes*. Some ſubjects require a more florid and elegant dreſs, than others. When we deſcribe or applaud, ornaments of ſpeech, and a gaiety of expreſſion, are requiſite. And it is the buſineſs of an orator to entertain his hearers, at the ſame time that he inſtructs them. Now Cicero, who was an admirable judge of the force and power of eloquence, has obſerved, that tropical expreſſions give the mind the greateſt delight and entertainment. *I have often wondered,*

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wondered, ſais he, *why tropes ſhould give greater pleaſure, than proper words. I imagine the reaſon muſt be, either that there is an appearance of wit in neglecting what is at hand, and making choice of ſomething at a diſtance; or that the hearer is furniſhed with a different thought, without being led into a miſtake, which affords a very agreable pleaſure; or that a whole ſimilitude is conveyed to the mind by a ſingle word; or that particularly in the beſt and moſt lively metaphor, the image is preſented to our ſight, which is the quickeſt of our ſenſes* [1]. And therefore he ſuppoſes, that, *as garments were firſt invented from neceſſity, to ſecure us from the injuries of the weather; but improved afterwards for ornament and diſtinction; ſo the poverty of language firſt introduced tropes, which were afterwards increaſed for delight* [2]. Beſides, a variety of expreſſion is pleaſing in a diſcourſe. It is many times neceſſary, that the ſame things ſhould be repeated. And if this be done in the ſame words, it will grow tireſome to the hearers, and ſink their eſteem of the ſpeaker's ability. Therefore to prevent this, it is proper the expreſſion ſhould be varied, that altho the ſenſe be the ſame, it may give the mind a new pleaſure by its different dreſs.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 39.

[2] *Ibid. c.* 38.

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I COME now in the laſt place to lay down ſome directions, proper to be obſerved in the choice of *Tropes*.

AND firſt, as every *Trope* gives us two ideas, one of the word expreſſed, and another, which by means of that the mind connects with it; it is neceſſary, that the relation between theſe two appear very plain and evident. For an obſcure *Trope* is always faulty, unleſs where ſome particular reaſon makes it neceſſary. And therefore *Tropes* ought not to be too far fetched, leſt that ſhould render them dark. For which reaſon Cicero ſais, he ſhould not chooſe to call any thing deſtructive to a perſon's fortune, *the Syrtis of his patrimony, but rather the rock of it*; nor, *the Charybdis of his eſtate, but the gulph of it* [1]. For thoſe, who either did not know, that the Syrtes were two quickſands upon the coaſt of Africa, or that Charybdis was a gulph in the ſtreight of Sicily, both of them very deſtructive to mariners, would be at a loſs to underſtand the meaning of the metaphor. Beſides, metaphors taken from things we have ſeen, affect the mind more forceably; than thoſe, which are taken from ſuch things, of which we have only heard. Now there is ſcarce any one, who has not

[1] *Ibid. c.* 41.

ſeen

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ſeen a rock, or a gulph; but there are very few perſons comparatively, who have been either at Charybdis, or the Syrtes. It is neceſſary therefore in a good *Trope*, not only that there be a near affinity between the two ideas, but likewiſe, that this affinity be very obvious, and generally known; ſo that the word be no ſooner pronounced, but both images do immediately preſent themſelves to the mind.

AGAIN, as a *Trope* ought to be very plain and evident, ſo likewiſe ſhould it bear a due proportion to the thing it is deſigned to repreſent, ſo as neither to highten, nor diminiſh the juſt idea of it. Indeed ſometimes, when we ſpeak of things indefinitely, we ſay too much, leſt we ſhould ſeem to ſay too little. And this manner of ſpeaking is called an *Hyperbole*, which is not uncommon in the ſacred writings. So, for inſtance, *Saul* and *Jonathan* are ſaid to be, *ſwifter than eagles, and ſtronger than lions* [1]. But even in this way of expreſſion a proportion is to be obſerved. For ſome very conſiderable, and unuſual exceſs of the thing in its kind is at leaſt deſigned by it; which perhaps cannot, or however is not neceſſary to be defined. And therefore Quintilian blames Cato for calling the top of an hill

[1] 2 *Sam.* i. 23.

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a *wart* [1]. Becauſe the proportion between the two ideas is no ways adequate. And ſo on the contrary, Ariſtotle cenſures Euripides for calling *rowing, the empire of the oar* [2]. Poets indeed are allowed a greater liberty in this reſpect. But an orator ſhould be modeſt in his expreſſions, and take care, that he neither ſo highten, nor diminiſh the natural ideas of things by *Tropes*, as to lead his hearers into miſtakes.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 3. *& Gell. Lib.* iii. *c.* 8.

[2] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. *c.* 2. §. 3.

BUT further, as a moderate uſe of *Tropes*, juſtly applied, beautifies and inlivens a diſcourſe; ſo an exceſs of them cauſes obſcurity, by runing it into abſtruſe allegories and riddles. *Tropes* are not the common and ordinary dreſs of our thoughts, but a foreign habit. And therefore he, who fills his diſcourſe with a continued ſeries of them, ſeems to act like one, who appears in public in a ſtrange dreſs; which no man of character would chooſe to do.

MOREOVER, as one uſe of *Tropes* is pleaſure and entertainment, we ſhould endeavour to make choice of ſuch, as are ſmooth and eaſy. But if at any time we think it neceſſary to uſe a harſh *Trope*, it is proper to ſoften it by ſome precaution. For, as Cicero very handſomly ſais: *A trope ſhould be modeſt, ſince it ſtands in a place, which does*

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does not belong to it: for which reaſon it ſhould ſeem to come thither by permiſſion, and not by force. And therefore, when he thought it harſh to ſay, *The death of Cato made the ſenate an orphan*, he guards the expreſſion by ſaying, *The death of Cato has (if I may be allowed to ſay ſo) rendered the ſenate an orphan* [1].

[1] *De orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 41.

AND to add no more, care ſhould be taken how we transfer *Tropes* from one language into another. For as they are frequently taken not only from natural things, or ſuch notions, as are common to the generality of mankind, but likewiſe from the manners, cuſtoms, and occurrences of particular nations; ſo they may be very plain and obvious to thoſe, among whom they took their riſe, but altogether unintelligible to others, who are unacquainted with the reaſon of them. It was cuſtomary for the Roman ſoldiers to carry their money in their girdles; hence it was the ſame thing with them to ſay, *a perſon had loſt his girdle* [2], as that, *he had loſt his money*. And becauſe the Romans wore the *toga*, which was a long gown, in time of peace, and a different garb, when ingaged in war, their writers ſometimes uſe the word *toga* to ſignify peace. But as neither

[2] Hor. *Lib.* ii. *ep.* 2.

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of theſe cuſtoms is in uſe among us, ſo neither would the *Tropes* ſuit our language, or be generally underſtood by us. And even in ſuch *Tropes*, as are taken from the common nature of things, languages very much differ. There is a very beautiful *Trope* in the account of St. Paul's ſhipwreck, where it is ſaid: *The ſhip was caught, and could not bear up into the wind.* The original word, that we tranſlate *bear up*, is ἀνθοφθαλμεῖν [1], and properly ſignifies, *to look, or keep its eyes againſt it*; which is a very ſtrong and lively image, taken from animate beings, and when applied to men often ſignifies, *to withſtand*, or *reſiſt*: as, ἀνθοφθαλμεῖν πολεμίῳ, *to reſiſt an enemy*: and Plutarch ſais of Demoſthenes, that he could not ἀνθοφθαλμεῖν τῷ ἀργυρίῳ [2], *look againſt*, or, *reſiſt the power of money*. Nothing is more common with Latin writers, than to call men of a public ſpirit, and true patriots, *lumina et ornamenta reipublicae*, that is, *the lights and ornaments of the ſtate*. And we have borrowed from them the uſe of both theſe metaphors. But becauſe *Tropes* and *Figures* illuſtrate and highten the ſtile, they call them alſo, *lumina orationis*, or, *the lights of a diſcourſe*; which I do not know that we have yet adopted

[1] *Acts* xxvii. 15.

[2] *In vit.*

adopted into our language. It ſometimes happens, that only the tropical ſenſe of a word is taken from one language into another, and not the proper ſignification of the ſame word. So *ſcrupulus* in Latin properly ſignifies, *a little ſtone, which getting into the ſhoe, hurts a perſon as he walks*; hence it is applied to the mind, and uſed to expreſs, *a doubt, or uneaſy thought, that gives it pain*. We have borrowed this latter ſenſe of the word, but not the former. LECT. XXV.

I SHOULD now procede to treat more particularly on the ſeveral kinds of *Tropes*, but this will be the ſubject of ſome following diſcourſes.

LEC-

LECTURE XXVI.

Of a Metaphor.

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IN my laſt diſcourſe, I obſerved, that all *Tropes* may be reduced to four ſpecies, which are taken from the different reſpects, things bear one to another. For in every *Trope* a reference is had to two things; and where thoſe things have a natural and internal relation, as the whole and a part, it is called a *Synecdoche*; where the relation is external, as between the cauſe and effect, ſubject and adjunct, it is a *Metonymy*; where they have only ſome ſimilitude, as rational and brute animals, and their properties, it is a *Metaphor*; and where they are oppoſite to each other, as virtue and vice, it is called an *Irony*. And this ſeems to be the natural order of placing them, if regard be had to the riſe and foundation of them. But if we conſider their uſe and beauty in language, a *Metaphor* ought to ſtand firſt, a *Metonymy* next, then a *Synecdoche*, and an *Irony* laſt. And this is the uſual order, in which they are placed. Cicero, ſpeaking of a *Metaphor*, calls it, *the moſt florid manner of expreſſion, and brighteſt ornament of lan-*

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language, that consists in single words [1]. Wherefore both in compliance with custom, and by reason of the just preeminence of this *Trope*, I shall begin with it, and make it the subject of my present discourse.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 41.

AND here I shall endeavour first to explain the nature of this *Trope*, then consider the several kinds of it, and lastly, offer some considerations relating to the choice of *Metaphors*.

NOW a *Metaphor*, as usually defined, is: *A trope, which changes words from their proper signification to another different from it, by reason of some similitude between them* [2]. But that a word, when used metaphorically, does not alter its signification, but retains its proper sense, was shewn in my last discourse. However, it may not be amiss to explain this matter more fully, and set it in a clearer light. Every *Metaphor* then is nothing else but a short similitude. Cicero calls it, *a similitude reduced to a single word* [3]. And Quintilian to the same purpose says, that, *a metaphor is a short similitude, and differs from it only in this; that the former is compared to the thing, we design to express, and the latter is put for it. It is a similitude, when I say of a man, he has acted like a lion; and a metaphor, when I say,*

[2] Voss. *Inst. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 6. §. 1.

[3] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 39.

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ſay, he is a lion [1]. Thus far Quintilian. Now in every ſimilitude three things are requiſite, two things, that are compared together, and a third, in which the ſimilitude or likeneſs between them conſiſts. And therefore to keep to this example, when Horace calls a Roman ſoldier *a lion* [2], if the word *lion* did not retain its proper ſenſe, there could be no ſimilitude; becauſe there would not be two things to be compared together with reſpect to a third, which is neceſſary in every ſimilitude, and was deſigned by this expreſſion. The ſenſe of which is plainly this: *That as a lion ſeizes his prey with the greateſt fierceneſs, ſo a Roman ſoldier with like rage and fury attacked his enemies.* In the ſame manner, when Cicero calls Piſo, *the vulture of the province* [3], his meaning is, *that he was like a vulture*, or, *acted in ſuch a manner, as a vulture acts*, that is, *rapaciouſly*. So that the real difference between a metaphor and a ſimilitude conſiſts in this; that a metaphor has not thoſe ſigns of compariſon, which are expreſſed in a ſimilitude. But ſome perſons have run into miſtakes in reaſoning from tropes of this kind. For they have ſo argued from metaphorical words, as if all the affections and properties of the things expreſſed

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 6.

[2] *Carm.* iii. 2, 11.

[3] *In Piſon. c.* 16.

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preſſed by them, might be attributed to thoſe other things, to which they are applied, and by that means have ſtrained the compariſon (which has uſually but one particular view) in order to make it tally in other reſpects, where there is not that ſimilitude of ideas. I will endeavour to make this more evident by another example from Cicero, where he calls M. Antony, *the torch of the ſtate* [1]. The ſimilitude between Antony and a torch lay in this: *That as a torch burns and deſtroys every thing within its reach; ſo Antony brought devaſtation and ruin, wherever he came.* Now a torch has not only a property to burn, but alſo to give light; but the ſimilitude would not hold in this reſpect, nor was it at all deſigned. For Cicero never calls a wicked, profligate man, as Antony was, *the light of the ſtate*; tho he often gives that character to good and virtuous men [2], who by their examples do, as it were, inlighten others, and ſhew them the way to be happy themſelves, and uſeful to others. But tho metaphors are uſually taken from a ſimilitude between two things, as in the inſtances here mentioned; yet ſometimes they are founded in the ſimilitude, which two things bear to two others in ſome particular re-

[1] *Philipp.* vii. *c.* 1.

[2] *Pro Sulla, c.* 2.

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ſpect, by means whereof what properly belongs to one of them is transfered to the other: the former of which are called ſimple metaphors, and the latter analogous. Hence the rudder of a ſhip may be called its reins; for what the reins are to a horſe, that the rudder is to a ſhip, in guiding and directing it. So that here is a double ſimilitude, one between a ſhip and an horſe, and another between the rudder of the former, and reins of the latter; and from the analogy between the uſe of the rudder to the one, and reins to the other, the reins, which belong properly to the horſe, are applied to the ſhip. Again, ſome metaphors are reciprocal, in which the ſimilitude holds either way. Thus to ſteer and to govern are uſed reciprocally both of a ſhip and a ſtate; the proper expreſſions being, *to ſteer a ſhip*, and *govern a ſtate*, and the contrary metaphorical. But tho we ſay, *the foot of a mountain*, borrowing the ſimilitude from animals, yet we do not ſay on the contrary, *the bottom of an animal*, meaning his feet, and therefore that metaphor is not reciprocal. From this account therefore of the nature of a metaphor, it may be ſaid to be: *The application of a word by way of ſimilitude to ſome other thing, than what it properly ſignifies.*

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nifies. And the plainer this ſimilitude appears, the greater beauty there is in the *Trope.*

THE uſe of metaphors is very extenſive, as large as univerſal nature. For there are ſcarce any two things, which have not ſome ſimilitude between them. However, they may all be reduced to four kinds, which was the ſecond thing propoſed to be conſidered.

THE firſt kind of metaphors therefore may be taken from ſimilitudes between animate beings. As where thoſe things, which properly relate to brutes, are accommodated to men; or thoſe, which belong to men, are applied to brutes. Of the former ſort is that joke of Cicero: *My brother being aſked by Philip, why he barked ſo: anſwered, becauſe he ſaw a theif*[1]. Here *barking*, the property of a dog, is applied to a man. And the reply does not ſeem to carry more ſeverity, or harſhneſs with it, than the queſtion. By the latter ſort we ſay, *a crafty fox*, and *a generous horſe*; which are affections, that properly relate to men. And to this kind of metaphors may thoſe likewiſe be refered, when that, which properly belongs to the ſenſes, is applied to the mind. Thus we often ſay, *that we ſee*

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. c. 54.

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a thing, when we mean, *that we underſtand*, or *apprehend it*. And in the ſame ſenſe we ſay, *that we hear ſuch a thing*, or *perſon*. And by the like manner of expreſſion, a perſon is ſaid, *to ſmell out a thing*. And thoſe, who have a genius or diſpoſition for any art or ſcience, are ſaid, *to have a taſte for it*. And ſuch, who have entered upon the ſtudy of it, are ſaid, *to have a touch of it*. Theſe are common ways of ſpeaking in moſt languages, and very expreſſive of what is intended by them. And we may alſo bring thoſe metaphors under this head, by which the properties and affections of men are attributed to the deity: as, when God is ſaid *to hear*, *ſee*, *be angry*, *repent*, and the like; which are forms of expreſſion very frequent in the ſacred writings.

A SECOND kind of metaphors lies between inanimate things, whether natural or artificial, which bear ſome ſimilitude to each other. And this head is very extenſive. Thus we ſay, *floods of fire*, and *clouds of ſmoke*, for large quantities. And ſo likewiſe, *to inflame an account*, that is, to highten or increaſe it; with innumerable others of the like ſort. In the two firſt of theſe inſtances, the terms proper to one element are applied to another; and as thoſe elements

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ments of fire and water are oppoſite to each other, they ſhew the extenſiveneſs of this trope, that there are no things in nature ſo contrary, but may come within the limits of it, and be accommodated to each other in a way of ſimilitude. In the laſt example, a natural action is applied to what is artificial.

A THIRD ſort of metaphors is, when inanimate things are applied to animals, on the account of ſome like properties between them. Thus Homer calls Ajax, *the bulwark of the Greeks* [1], on account of his valour, which like a wall defended them from the Trojans. And nothing is more common with Cicero, than to brand ill men with the character of being, *the peſt of the ſtate* [2], by reaſon of the miſcheif, which they bring to the public. So likewiſe he calls Zeno the philoſopher, *an acute man* [3], for his great diſcernment, and quick perception of things, fetching the alluſion from metals, when brought to an edge, or a point. As on the contrary, old Chremes in Terence calls himſelf a *ſtone*, for want of apprehenſion [4]. And we ſay, *a gay perſon*, and *a bright genius*, by this kind of metaphor.

[1] *Iliad.* γ. 229.

[2] *Pro Milon.* c. 25, 33.

[3] *Ad fam. Lib.* ix. *ep.* 22.

[4] *Heaut. Act.* V. *Sc.* I. *v.* 43.

THE fourth and laſt kind of metaphors is that, by which the actions, and other at-

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tributes of animals are accommodated to inanimate things. Thus Cicero ſpeaking of Clodius ſais: *The very altars, when they ſaw that monſter fall, ſeemed to move themſelves, and aſſert their right againſt him* [1]. Here the words, *ſaw*, *move*, and *aſſert*, are all metaphors, taken from the properties of animals. And Virgil, when he would repreſent the impetuous force and rapidity of the river Araxes, ſais, *it diſdained a bridge* [2]. And it is a very uſual epithet, which Homer gives to words, to call them πτερόεντα [3], or *winged*, to intimate the ſwiftneſs of ſpeech.

[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 31.

[2] *Aen. Lib.* viii. *v.* 728.

[3] *Iliad. α.* 201.

LASTLY, as to the choice of metaphors, thoſe are eſteemed the fineſt and ſtrongeſt, which *give life and action to inanimate things* [4]. The reaſon of which is, becauſe they do as it were invigorate all nature, introduce new forms of beings, and repreſent their images to the ſight, which of all the ſenſes is the quickeſt, moſt active, and yet moſt unwearied. What can be more moving, or in ſtronger terms expreſs the villainy of Clodius, than when Cicero ſais: *The very altars of the gods ſeemed to exult at his death* [5]. And the ſame great orator particularly commends thoſe metaphors, for their ſprightlineſs and vivacity, which are

[4] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 6.

[5] *Pro Milan. c.* 31.

taken from the ſenſe of ſeeing [1], as when we ſay, *a bright thought*, or, *a gay expreſſion*. LECT. XXVI.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 40.

HOWEVER, care muſt be taken not to venture upon too bold and daring metaphors. Poets indeed claim greater liberty in this reſpect, whoſe view is often to amuſe, terrify, or delight, by hightening the juſt and natural images of things. But it is expected the orator ſhould reaſon coolly, tho ſtrongly and forceably; and not by theatrical repreſentations ſo tranſport the mind, as to take it off from reflection, unleſs perhaps on ſome particular occaſion. And yet on the other hand, metaphors ought not to ſink below the dignity of what they are deſigned to expreſs; but the idea they convey ſhould at leaſt be equal to the proper word, in the place of which they are ſubſtituted.

BUT there is a very great difference in the choice of metaphors, as they are deſigned either to praiſe, or diſpraiſe. One thing may be compared to another in a great variety of reſpects. And the ſame thing may be made to appear either noble or baſe, virtuous or vicious, by conſidering it in a different light. Such metaphors therefore, as are choſen to commend, muſt be taken from great and laudable things;

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and on the contrary, thoſe which are deſigned to diſcommend, from things vile and contemptible. Ariſtotle gives us a very pleaſant example of this in the poet Simonides. A certain perſon, who had carried the prize at a race of mules, offered him a reward to write a poem in honor of that action. Simonides thought he did not bid high enough, and therefore put him off with ſaying, the ſubject was too mean to write in praiſe of mules, which were the offſpring of aſſes. But upon his being offered a larger ſum he undertook the taſk, and, as Ariſtotle obſerves, when he has occaſion to ſpeak of the mules in that poem, he does not mention them by that name; but calls them, *the daughters of fleet and generous horſes*; tho he might with as much propriety have called them, *the daughters of dull aſſes* [1]. But it was the poet's buſineſs in praiſing to take the moſt advantageous part of the character. Where things are capable of ſuch different turns, metaphorical expreſſions are generally moſt beautiful. And ſometimes the ſame metaphor may be applied contrary ways, both in praiſe and diſpraiſe, as it will ſuit different properties of the thing, to which it refers. So a dove in a metaphorical ſenſe may repreſent, either

[1] *De rhetor. Lib.* iii. c. 2.

innocence, or fear; and an iron heart may denote, either courage, or cruelty, as an hard head ſtrength, or weakneſs of thought. And this ambiguity, in the application of metaphorical words, often affords occaſion for jeſts, and conciſe wit. I obſerved before that Cicero never calls ill men, *lights of the ſtate*. But he once in this manner calls Sextius Clodius, *the light of the ſenate* [1]. For, when his kinſman Publius Clodius had been killed by Milo, and his corps was brought to Rome, Sextius raiſed the mob, and in a tumultuous manner carried it into the ſenate houſe, where they burnt it, and by that means ſet the building on fire. For which ſeditious action Cicero paſſes that joke upon him, under the metaphor of light, which elſewhere he always uſes in a good ſenſe.

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[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 12.

BUT to procede, all forced and harſh metaphors ſhould be avoided, the one being no leſs diſagreable to the mind, than the other to the ear. Nor ſhould they come too thick in a diſcourſe. In a word, they ought not to be uſed, but either where a proper word is wanting, or they are more ſignificant, or beautiful than the proper word. But altho theſe cautions do more eſpecially relate to metaphors, yet they are

alſo

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also to be attended to in some other tropes; for which reason I treated of them more largely in my last discourse.

GIVE me leave only to add, that from what has been hitherto discoursed concerning the nature, and properties of metaphors, it is very evident, that the Cynics, and such of the Stoics, who fell in with them, were guilty of a mistake in asserting, that there is no turpitude, or immodesty in words. The argument they went upon in defending their notion was this. If two words signify the same thing, they are both immodest, or neither of them. Not both, because there is nothing, which cannot some way or other be modestly expressed. Consequently, if one of the words be modest, the other must be so also: because they have both the same sense [1]. But this way of reasoning is false and sophistical. For a word is either modest or immodest, according to the different manner, in which it affects the mind, and the emotions it excites, when pronounced. But it is plain, that of the several words made use of to express the same thing, some may be heard without the least offence to the chastest ear, and others not without offering violence to the modesty of the auditors. And this difference

[1] See Cic. *Off.* *Lib.* i. *c.* 35. *Ad fam.* *Lib.* ix. *ep.* 22. & Voss. *Inst. orat.* *Lib.* iv. *c.* 6. §. 14.

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ference ariſes from ſeveral cauſes. For one word may only expreſs the thing in general, and ſo convey but a confuſed and imperfect idea; and another may be more proper and peculiar to that thing, and ſo repreſent it more fully. Nay, even of thoſe words, which are commonly eſteemed ſynonymous, or of an equivalent ſignification, one either from its nature and origin, or from uſe, may have an immodeſt idea affixed to it, which another has not. And from thence it happens in moſt languages, that ſome words, which at firſt were modeſt and innocent enough, have afterwards become obſcene and indecent. Beſides, words may be rendered immodeſt by conveying a more lively image of the thing to the ſenſes, than others do. And this, as was ſaid before, is the property of ſome metaphors.

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Of a Metonymy.

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THE moſt conſiderable *Trope* next to a *Metaphor* is a *Metonymy*, whether we conſider its force and elegancy, or the frequent uſe of it both in ſpeaking and writing. Having therefore treated upon the former in my laſt diſcourſe, I ſhall endeavour in this to give the beſt, and cleareſt account I can of the latter. And in doing this I ſhall firſt explain the nature of a *Metonymy* in general, and then conſider the ſeveral ſpecies contained under it.

Now a *Metonymy*, as defined by Quintilian, is, *the puting one word for another* [1]. But Voſſius deſcribes it more fully, when he calls it: *A trope, which changes the names of things, that are naturally united, but in ſuch a manner, as that one is not of the eſſence of the other* [2]. That a *Metonymy* is thus diſtinguiſhed from the other tropes, has been ſufficiently ſhewn already in my two laſt diſcourſes. When it is ſaid, *to put one word for another*, or, *to change the names of things*, the meaning is, that the word ſo uſed changes its ſenſe, and denotes ſomething different from its proper ſignification.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 6.

[2] *Inſt orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 7. §. 1.

Thus,

Thus, when *Mars* is put for *war*, and *Ceres* for *corn*, they loſe their perſonal ſenſe, and ſtand for ſuch effects, of which thoſe deities were ſaid to be the cauſe. So likewiſe, when Virgil ſais: LECT. XXVII.

He drank the frothing bowl [1].

the word *bowl* muſt neceſſarily ſignify the *liquor* in the bowl. And, when in another place deſcribing the temple of Juno at Carthage, in which the actions of the Trojan war were repreſented, and the images of the heroes, he makes Aeneas, upon diſcovering that of Priam among the reſt, cry out,

[1] *Aeneid. Lib.* i. *c.* 739.

Lo here is Priam [2],

it is plain the word *Priam* there muſt ſtand not for his perſon, but his *image* or *figure*. And this property of changing the ſenſe of the word appears peculiar to a *Metonymy*. In treating upon a metaphor I obſerved the miſtake of thoſe, who teach, that a word uſed metaphorically loſes its proper ſignification; whereas it only changes its place, but not its ſenſe; being applied to a thing, to which it does not naturally belong, by way of ſimilitude. And as the not attending to this has run ſome perſons into very great abſurdities, in treating upon metaphorical expreſſions, and reaſoning from them in the tropical ſenſe; ſo the like has happened

[2] *Ibid. v.* 440.

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pened to others in ſome inſtances of a *Metonymy*, where by miſapprehending their true nature, they have reaſoned from them in the literal ſenſe, as I ſhall ſhew preſently. A *Metonymy* is not ſo extenſive as a metaphor, nor altogether ſo neceſſary: becauſe nothing is ſaid by a *Metonymy*, which cannot be expreſſed in proper words; whereas metaphors are often uſed for want of proper words to expreſs ſome ideas. However, *Metonymies* are very uſeful in language, for they enrich a diſcourſe with an agreable variety, and give both force and beauty to an expreſſion. And what I obſerved with relation to a metaphor, is true alſo of this trope; that ſome *Metonymies* even in common diſcourſe are more frequently made uſe of, than the proper words, in whoſe room they are put. So, *pale death*, *a blind way*, and *a happy ſtate*, are very common expreſſions with us. And it is more uſual to ſay, *This is ſuch a perſon's hand*, or, *I know his hand*, than his writing, when we intend this latter ſenſe of the word.

I NOW procede to the diviſion of *Metonymies*, which are commonly diſtinguiſhed into four kinds, from the different manner, in which things are naturally, but externally united to one another. Now things are thus

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thus united, or one thing depends upon another, either with reſpect to its production, or in the manner of its exiſtence, when produced. In the former way the effect depends upon its cauſe, and in the latter the adjunct upon its ſubject. And hence ariſe four ſorts of *Metonymies*, which receive their names from the *cauſe* and *effect*, the *ſubject* and the *adjunct*.

IT is called a *Metonymy* of the *cauſe*, when the external cauſe is put for the effect. The external cauſe is twofold, the agent and end, which are uſually called the efficient and final cauſe. Of the former kind are ſuch *Metonymies*, where the inventor or author is put for what was invented, or effected by him. Thus, as I ſaid before, *Ceres* is ſometimes put for *corn*, the uſe of which ſhe was ſaid firſt to have introduced; and *Mars* for *war*, over which he was thought to preſide. And by this way of ſpeaking, any artiſt or writer is put for his work. So Juvenal blaming the luxury, and profuſeneſs of the Romans, ſais: *There are few tables without Mentor* [1], that is, which were not made by him, or after his manner. And our Saviour ſais in the parable of the rich man, and Lazarus, *They have Moſes, and the prophets* [2], meaning the books

[1] *Sat.* viii. *v.* 104.

[2] *Luke* xvi. 29.

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books of Moſes, and the prophets. But under this ſort of *Metonymy* is included not only the agent, ſtrictly ſo called, but alſo any means, or inſtrument made uſe of in the doing of a thing, when put for the thing done. Thus, *polite literature* is called *humanity*, becauſe it cultivates and improves the human mind. And in that expreſſion of Cicero: *Words move no body but him, who underſtands the tongue* [1]: the word *tongue*, which is the inſtrument of ſpeech, is put for *ſpeech*, or *language*. And in the like ſenſe *arms* are ſometimes put for *war*, and the *ſword* for *ſlaughter*. By the ſame kind of *Metonymy* likewiſe any affection, or quality is put for its effect. As when it is ſaid, *the end of government is to maintain juſtice*, that is, *ſuch mutual offices among men, as are the effects of juſtice*. And ſo likewiſe in that of Cicero: *It is the buſineſs of magiſtrates to check the levity of the multitude* [2]: by which he means tumults occaſioned by their levity. Moreover, as human affections are attributed to the deity in a metaphorical ſenſe, ſo ſeveral parts of the human body are likewiſe aſcribed to him by this kind of *Metonymy*. Thus, his *hand* and his *arm* are uſed to expreſs his *power* [3]; as his *ear* and *eye* his *care* and *providence* [4]; theſe being the inſtruments

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 59.

[2] *Pro Milon. c.* 8.

[3] *Iſaiah* l. 2. liii. 1.

[4] *Pſalm* xvii. 6. xxxiii. 18.

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ſtruments of ſuch effects in mankind. *Metonymies* of the final cauſe are ſuch, by which the end in doing a thing is put for the thing done. As when we ſay, *The watch is ſet*, meaning the *watchmen*, who are appointed for that purpoſe. And ſo likewiſe that expreſſion, *to make an example*, as it ſignifies to *puniſh*, in order to deter others from the like crimes by ſuch an example. As alſo that of Virgil,

Phillis ſhould garlands crop [1],

by which are meant *flowers* to make garlands.

[1] *Eclog.* x. *v.* 41.

THE ſecond kind of *Metonymy* puts the effect for the efficient cauſe, whether the agent, or only the means and inſtrument. So Virgil calls the two Scipios, *The deſtruction of Lybia* [2], becauſe they were the agents, who effected it. And Horace compliments his patron Maecenas with the titles of being, *his guard and honor* [3], that is, his guardian, and the author of his honor. But when Cicero tells the citizens of Rome, that *the death of Clodius was their ſafety* [4], he means the occaſion only of their ſafety. And elſewhere he calls that, *a dark hope, and blind expectation* [5]; the effect of which was dubious and uncertain to thoſe, who entertained it. And in like manner the ſons of

[2] *Aen.* vi. *v.* 844.

[3] *Carm.* i. 1, 2.

[4] *Pro Milon. c.* 2.

[5] *In Rull.* ii. *c.* 25.

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the prophets, when they were eating the pottage, which Eliſha had ordered to be ſet before them, cried out, *There is death in the pot* [1], that is, *ſome deadly thing*, as is preſently after explained. And thus ſweat, which is the effect of labor, is ſometimes put for labor. As in the threat denounced againſt Adam: *In the ſweat of thy face ſhalt thou eat bread* [2]: that is, by labor in cultivating the ground. And, in alluſion to this way of ſpeaking, Antony the orator tells Craſſus, *the improvement of the ſtile by conſtant exerciſe, as he preſcribed, was a thing of much ſweat* [3]. And, *virtue is ſaid to be gained by ſweat*, that is, continued care and exerciſe in ſubduing the paſſions, and bringing them to a proper regulation. But in theſe two expreſſions there is likewiſe a metaphor, the effect of bodily labor being applied to that of the mind. In all theſe inſtances the effect is put for the efficient cauſe.

[1] 2 *Kings* iv. 2.

[2] *Gen.* iii. 19.

[3] Cic. *De orat. Lib.* i. c. 60.

THE third kind of *Metonymy* is, when the ſubject is put for the adjunct. By ſubject here in a large ſenſe of the word may be underſtood that, wherein ſome other thing is contained, or about which it is converſant, as likewiſe the poſſeſſor with reſpect to the thing he poſſeſſes, and the thing

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ſignified, when put for the ſign of it. Now by the firſt of theſe ways of ſpeaking the ſeat of any faculty, or affection, is uſed for the faculty, or affection itſelf. So it is uſual to ſay, *a man of a clear head*, when we mean a clear mind or underſtanding; the ſeat of the mind being in the head. And a perſon is ſaid, *to have a warm heart*, becauſe the heart has been thought the ſeat of the affections. In like manner the place, where any actions are performed, is put for the actions done in it. As when Cicero ſais: *Do not always think of the forum, the benches, the roſtra, and the ſenate* [1]; meaning the diſcourſes, which were uſually made in thoſe places. So likewiſe the country, or place of reſidence, is put for the inhabitants, as in that paſſage of Cicero: *And to omit Greece, which always claimed the preeminence for eloquence, and Athens, the inventreſs of all ſciences, where the art of ſpeaking was invented and perfected; in this city of ours,* meaning Rome, *no ſtudies have prevailed more, than that of eloquence* [2]. Where the words Greece and Athens ſtand to denote the inhabitants of thoſe places. And hither may alſo be refered ſuch expreſſions, in which the time is put for the perſons living in it, as, *the degeneracy of the preſent*

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 8.

[2] *Ibid. c.* 4.

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age, the virtue of former times. In the ſecond way above mentioned, the object is uſed for the perſon, or thing imployed about it. As when Cicero ſais: *In time of battle the laws are ſilent* [1]. Where by *laws* he intends the *judges*, who pronounce ſentence according to law. By the third of theſe ways, in which the poſſeſſor is put for the thing he poſſeſſes, we ſay, *to devour*, *deſtroy*, or *ruin a man*, meaning not his *perſon*, but his *eſtate*. And mythologiſts explain the fable of Acteon by this trope, who is ſaid to have been devoured by his dogs. For by dogs they underſtand flatterers and paraſites, who conſumed his eſtate, and brought him to beggary. By the laſt way before recited, which puts the thing ſignified for the ſign, ſtatues and pictures are called by the names of the perſons, which they repreſent. As in that jeſt of Cicero upon his brother Quintus, when, as Macrobius relates, *being in the province, which his brother had governed, and ſeeing a large portrait of part of his body, holding a ſheild, tho Quintus was but a little man, he ſaid: My half brother is biger than my whole brother* [2]. The popiſh doctrine of tranſubſtantiation is founded upon an abuſe of this trope. For when our Saviour, ſpeaking of the bread and wine at that time

[1] *Pro Milon. c.* 4.

[2] *Saturn. Lib.* ii. *c.* 3.

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before him, ſais: *This is my body, and this is my blood* [1]: his plain meaning is, they were the ſigns of his body and blood, the thing ſignified being put for the ſign by this ſort of *Metonymy*. But the papiſts take the expreſſion literally, which muſt doubtleſs be very abſurd; ſince the words relate to the time then preſent, while Chriſt was yet living, and ſpoke them; when it was impoſſible for the bread and wine to be converted into his body and blood, it being evident to all, who were preſent, that thoſe elements, and his body exiſted ſeparately at the ſame time. But if the words are explained by this trope, the ſenſe is plain and eaſy, and the way of ſpeaking familiar to all writers. Whereas they, who plead for the literal ſenſe, might with equal reaſon aſſert, that thoſe expreſſions above mentioned are to be taken literally, in which ſeveral parts of the human body, as the hand, the arm, the ear, and the eye, are aſcribed to the deity: or that, when our Saviour in a metaphorical ſenſe calls himſelf, *a vine*, and *a door* [2], theſe words were deſigned to be applied to him ſtrictly and properly, and not by way of ſimilitude only, as is the caſe in all metaphors.

[1] *Matth.* xxvi. 26, 28.

[2] *John* xv. 5. x. 7.

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THE fourth kind of *Metonymies* is that, wherein the adjunct is put for the ſubject, which is done in the ſame variety of ways as the former. It is therefore a *Metonymy* of the adjunct, when the thing contained is put for that, which contains it. As when Virgil ſais, *They lie down upon purple* [1], that is, couches died with purple. And again, *They crown the wine* [2], meaning the bowl, which contained the wine; it being the cuſtom of the antients to deck their bowls with garlands at their entertainments. By this trope likewiſe virtues and vices are put for the perſons, in whom they are found. As in that beautiful paſſage of Cicero, where comparing the profligate army of Catiline with the forces of the ſtate, he ſais: *On this ſide modeſty is ingaged, on that impudence; on this chaſtity, on that lewdneſs; on this integrity, on that deceit; on this piety, on that profaneneſs; on this conſtancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baſeneſs; on this moderation, on that unbridled paſſion: in a word, equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues ingage with injuſtice, luxury, cowardice, raſhneſs, and all vices* [3]. And to this trope thoſe expreſſions are to be refered, in which any thing is put for the object, about which it is converſant. As in that ſaying of

[1] *Aen.* i. *v.* 704.

[2] *Ibid. v.* 724.

[3] *In Catil.* ii. *c.* 11.

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of the wiſe man: *Hope defered makes the heart ſick:* where hope is put for the thing hoped for. And thus Suetonius calls the emperor Titus, *the love and delight of mankind* [1], whoſe mild, and obliging temper rendered him the object of thoſe agreable affections to all perſons under his government. A third uſe of this trope is by puting a thing for the time, in which it was done. Thus we ſay of a perſon, *He has ſerved ſo many campains*, meaning ſo many ſummers, that being the uſual time, in which armies are drawn out into the feild. Laſtly, by this *Metonymy*, the ſign is put for the thing it ſignifies. As, *the ſcepter* for *the regal dignity*, and *the ſword* for *the authority of the magiſtrate.*

[1] *In Vit. init.*

THESE are the four kinds or ſpecies, into which a *Metonymy* is uſually divided. But Voſſius adds two others, namely of the *antecedent* and *conſequent* [2], which bear ſome analogy to the cauſe and effect, as the one does at leaſt give occaſion to the other. Both of them are often called *Metalepſis*; but ſince that name is likewiſe applied to another different trope, as will be ſhewn afterwards; I would rather chooſe with Voſſius to bring theſe under a *Metonymy*, and conſider them as two diſtinct ſpecies of

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 10. §. 1.

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it. By the former, *to hear*, when ſpoken of a ſuperior ſometimes ſignifies to *grant*, or *comply with*; and of an inferior *to obey*. Thus the ſervant in Terence, ſais: *ſhall I aſſiſt Pamphilus, or hearken to the old man* [1], that is, obey his orders, and forbear. By the latter, it is not unuſual to ſay, *I ſubſcribe*, or *ſet my hand to ſuch a thing*, meaning, that we aſſent or agree to it, and as a conſequence are ready to atteſt it under our hand. So when Cicero, ſpeaking of the pirates, who had lately infeſted the ſeas, ſais: *Shall I complain, that foreigners were taken in their paſſage hither, when the Roman legates have been redeemed* [2]; by which is intimated, that they were firſt taken, and afterwards purchaſed their redemption. And in that expreſſion of Terence: *You will own that kindneſs well placed* [3]: the ſenſe is, you will perceive or find it ſo, a conſequence of which will be an acknowledgement of it.

[1] *Andr. Act.* I. *Sc.* 3. *v.* 4.

[2] *Pro leg. Manil. c.* 12.

[3] *Phorm. Act.* III. *Sc.* 2. *v.* 9.

As to any obſervations neceſſary in the choice of *Metonymies*, I think nothing need be added, to what has been ſaid already, when I treated upon the uſe of tropes in general.

END *of the* FIRST VOLUME.